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POLICY SUMMARY
A multitude of public policy issues currently surround the tax treatment of 
employee benefits. In particular, the tax-favored status of employer contribu 
tions to pensions and health insurance has been blamed for numerous ills: a 
shrinking tax base that has exacerbated the federal budget deficit; an ineffi 
cient and bloated health care sector; overinsurance by many recipients of 
employer-provided health insurance; rising health care costs; and a tax system 
that is made more regressive because those who receive tax-favored fringe 
benefits tend to be in higher-income households than those who do not.
This study investigates how possible changes in the tax treatment of fringe 
benefits mainly pensions and health insurance can be expected to influence 
the provision of benefits by employers. We develop a model of fringe benefit 
provision in the United States, estimate that model using two separate data 
sets, and use the estimates to simulate how various proposed changes in federal 
personal income tax policy would affect the provision of private pensions and 
health insurance, the mix of employee compensation, federal revenues, and 
income inequality.
Estimates of the model of fringe benefits suggest three points about workers' 
preferences for wages and fringe benefits. First, the demand for pensions and 
health insurance is highly responsive to changes in total compensation (is in 
come elastic), whereas the demand for wage and salary payments is rather 
unresponsive to changes in total compensation (is income inelastic). Hence, 
if compensation were to double, pensions and health insurance would more 
than double, but wages would less than double. Second, workers view both 
pensions and health insurance as good substitutes for wages, and probably view 
pensions as a better substitute for wages than health insurance. Third, workers 
may view pensions and health insurance as complements, so that more of one 
results in a greater demand for the other.
We use one of our estimated models to simulate the effects of three major 
changes in tax policy: (a) the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which significantly 
lowered the marginal tax rates facing most households; (b) treating employer 
contributions to health insurance as taxable income, but leaving employer con 
tributions to pensions untaxed (we consider separately the consequences of 
taxing all health insurance contributions and of taxing only contributions in 
excess of $1,125 annually); and (c) treating employer contributions to both 
pensions and health insurance as taxable income.
The simulations suggest that the Tax Reform Act of 1986 has increased real 
expenditures on health insurance provided by employers and shifted the mix 
of compensation away from pensions and toward health insurance. This may
vn
seem paradoxical, because the 1986 tax reform reduced the incentive to de 
mand fringe benefits (including health insurance) by lowering marginal tax 
rates on wage income. The increase in health insurance provision is attributable 
to the large (positive) income effects of the tax reform. The simulations also 
suggest that the 1986 tax reform has reduced personal income tax revenues 
by over 21 percent, and has had minimal distributional effects.
We find that treating all health insurance contributions as taxable income 
would reduce real expenditures on employer-provided health insurance by near 
ly 15 percent, and that taxing health insurance contributions in excess of $ 1,125 
per year (in 1982 dollars) would reduce health insurance by nearly 9 percent. 
Taxing health insurance would also result in relatively small reductions in 
employer-provided pensions. Income tax revenues would increase by 8 per 
cent annually if all health insurance contributions were taxed, and by 1.5 per 
cent if contributions over $1,125 were taxed. Taxing all health insurance con 
tributions would have little effect on income equality, but a low tax cap would 
increase income equality.
Finally, we find that taxing all fringe benefits would cut pension provision 
in half and health insurance provision by 20 percent. Taxing all fringe benefits 
would increase income tax revenues by over 17 percent and would increase 
income equality.
We believe that taxing both pensions and health insurance is too sweeping 
a policy change to implement in the foreseeable future: our estimates suggest 
that taxing all fringe benefits would cut employer contributions to pensions 
nearly in half. Also, although mandated health insurance is not a topic of our 
empirical work, we believe that too little research has been conducted on man 
dated health insurance to inform good decisionmaking, and that requiring 
employers to provide health insurance could create its own set of problems 
without providing a complete solution to the problems it is intended to address.
In contrast, we believe that taxing health insurance contributions in excess 
of some relatively low amount (a tax cap on health insurance contributions 
of $1,125 in 1982 dollars, or about $1,500 in current dollars) would be an 
economically sensible and efficiency-improving policy. A low tax cap on health 
insurance would partially address the problems of rising health care costs and 
overuse of the health care system, would prevent further erosion of the in 
come tax base, would not limit or reduce access to basic health insurance 
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Introduction
Issues in the Tax Treatment of Fringe Benefits
In the United States, a significant proportion of retirement income and 
health insurance benefits are provided through private pension and 
health insurance plans to which employers contribute voluntarily. In 
1987, 31 percent of all retirement benefits came from private pension 
plans, and roughly two-thirds of all expenditures on health and medical 
care were private. 1 This private approach to providing retirement in 
come and health care differs markedly from many other western nations, 
where far greater proportions of retirement income and health care are 
provided by public programs.
The private provision of pension and health benefits in the U.S. has 
been stimulated and encouraged by the tax system. 2 Whereas wage 
income is taxed under the federal personal income tax, employer contri 
butions to pensions and health insurance plans are excluded from 
taxable income. 3 An accumulating body of empirical research has 
suggested that this favorable tax treatment of fringe benefits has created 
an effective incentive to substitute fringe benefits for wages, and that 
much of the growth of private pension and health insurance plans can be 
attributed to that favorable tax treatment (see below for a discussion of 
this research).
The favorable tax treatment of employer contributions to voluntary 
fringe benefit plans in the United States has been under attack since at 
least 1973, when Martin Feldstein argued that the exclusion of health 
insurance contributions from taxable income distorts the incentive to 
demand health insurance and leads to overuse of the health care system. 
One aspect of Feldstein's argument was that the tax-favored status of 
health insurance is responsible for the rising cost of medical care. That
1
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is, since the tax system creates an incentive to buy more health insur 
ance, and since health insurance coverage leads to greater use of the 
health care system, the tax-favored status of health insurance drives up 
both the demand for health care and the cost of health care (Feldstein 
1973; Vogel 1980). Another aspect of Feldstein's argument was that tax 
subsidies for health insurance are inefficient: the government could 
provide the same amount of health care directly, finance the health care 
through lump-sum taxes, and have revenue left over that could be 
returned to taxpayers or used to buy other public goods or services.
Somewhat different arguments have been made against continuing the 
tax-favored status of private pensions in the United States. Alicia Mun- 
nell has been a vocal proponent of taxing pension contributions, arguing 
that the tax-favored treatment of pensions has resulted in erosion of the 
income and payroll tax bases and a more regressive tax system (Munnell 
1984,1985). As the growth of pension contributions has slowed (Wood- 
bury and Huang 1988), this argument has lost some of its force. But 
more recently, Munnell (1988,1989) has generally criticized the private 
pension system in the U.S. on the grounds that it covers too small a 
proportion of households, reduces mobility of the workforce, and pro 
vides benefits whose real purchasing power is vulnerable to inflation. 
Her arguments suggest that a smaller private pension system would be 
desirable, and taxing employer contributions to private pensions is 
clearly one possible way of reducing the importance of the private 
pension system in the United States.
Existing Research and the Need for Further Work
Although fringe benefits have been the subject of a growing body of 
literature, a limited number of studies have examined the influence of 
favorable tax treatment of benefits on benefit levels or on the mix of total 
compensation those that do being Alpert (1983), Atrostic (1983), 
Hamermesh and Woodbury (1990), Holmer (1984), Leibowitz (1983), 
Long and Scott (1982), Rice (1966a, 1966b), Sloan and Adamache 
(1986), Taylor and Wilensky (1983), Turner (1987), Vroman and An-
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derson (1984), Woodbury (1983), and Woodbury and Huang (1988). 
Some additional studies (Goldstein and Pauly 1976; Mumy and Manson 
1985) have attempted to draw inferences about the effects of taxes on 
benefits, but have done so without including explicit tax measures.
The studies that include explicit tax measures take essentially one of 
two empirical approaches. The first approach is to regress (for an 
individual or a group) a measure of the level of employer contributions 
to all fringe benefits (FB), or pension benefits (PB), or health insurance 
benefits (HE) on a measure of the marginal tax rate facing the group (or 
individual) and a vector of control variables:
FB=a0 +a 1 t+a2x2 +...+amxm +ef (1.1)
PB=b0 +b l t+b2x2 + .. . +bmxm +ep (1.2)
HB=c0 +cl t+c2x2 + ... +cmxm +eh , (1.3)
where t is the marginal tax rate facing the group or individual, the xt 
represent (m - 1) control variables, the a{ , bf , and ci are coefficients, and 
the ei are normally distributed error terms. This procedure or some 
variant of it is followed by Atrostic (1983), Leibowitz (1983), Rice 
(1966a, 1966b), Sloan and Adamache (1986), Taylor and Wilensky 
(1983), and Vroman and Anderson (1984).
The alternative approach is to use as a dependent variable in equations 
like (1.1), (1.2), and (1.3) not the level of benefits per worker, but the 
share of total compensation received by workers as fringe benefits, 
pension benefits, or contributions to health insurance. Usually these 




where TC refers to total compensation per worker, and WS is wage and 
salary payments per worker. This approach or some variant of it is taken 
by Alpert (1983), Hamermesh and Woodbury (1990), Long and Scott 
(1982), Sloan and Adamache (1986), Turner (1987), Woodbury (1983),
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and Woodbury and Huang (1988). One possible advantage of this latter 
approach is that it can be shown to have an explicit link to well-known 
consumer theoretic models (Woodbury 1983).
These two approaches and the studies based on them share an impor 
tant weakness, correction of which could improve both our basic under 
standing of benefit provision and our predictions about how policy 
changes would affect benefit provision. Essentially, no study has consid 
ered that different benefits have different costs, and that cost differences 
between benefits may vary over time, by size of firm, and by region. As 
a result, no study to date has been able to estimate a tradeoff between any 
pair of fringe benefits (for example, between pensions and health 
insurance). The implication is that no study to date has estimated the 
effect of a change in tax policy that is specific to just one benefit (a tax 
cap on health insurance contributions, for example) on the amount of 
some other benefit provided by the employer. 4 Neither has existing work 
shown whether the impact of taxing both pensions and health insurance 
would have a different impact on the provision of pensions than on the 
provision of health insurance.
The same weakness implies that existing studies may have obtained 
biased estimates of tax effects on fringe benefits as a whole (or on a 
single specific benefit). In effect, as will be shown in chapter 2, the 
existing studies have made questionable simplifying assumptions about 
the rate at which the employer is willing to trade pensions for health 
insurance. This leads to an omitted variables bias that could, in princi 
ple, lead to mistaken inferences about the relation between taxes and 
fringe benefits.
Another weakness shared by most previous studies is that they have 
had difficulty separating income effects from tax (or price-substitution) 
effects on the provision of nonwage benefits. In some studies, income 
effects are ignored, and in most studies where they are distinguished, 
collinearity between income and marginal tax rates has frustrated the 
effort to distinguish income from substitution effects. In this mono 
graph, we use both a pooled time-series of cross sections, and a cross 
section of establishments, in an attempt to obtain improved and robust 
estimates of income and substitution effects.
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In summary, the need for further work is clear. Both because of the 
scarcity of studies on the effect of taxes on the mix of total compensa 
tion, and because of certain weaknesses in the studies that do exist, this 
area of research remains in an early stage. No study to date has 
examined how taxing pension contributions would affect the private 
provision of pensions. Also, even though some studies have examined 
how taxing health insurance contributions might influence private health 
insurance (Taylor and Wilensky 1983; Phelps 1984-85; Adamache and 
Sloan 1985), the existing studies have not taken account of the presence 
of pensions in the compensation package. Doing so could be important 
for at least two reasons. First, the relationship of substitutability or 
complementarity between pensions and health insurance could imply 
that taxing health contributions would have a significant impact on the 
provision of pensions by employers. Second, if a tax cap on health 
insurance did affect pension provision, then it would be important to 
take account of that effect in determining the revenue effects of taxing 
health contributions. Failure to do so could lead to either an under- or 
overestimate of the revenues to be raised by taxing health insurance 
contributions.
Plan of the Monograph
It is not our intent to offer a comprehensive treatment of the econom 
ics of fringe benefits in this monograph. 5 Rather, we have two goals that 
are more specific and more modest. The first is to obtain estimates of 
tradeoffs among wages, pensions, and health insurance that are an 
improvement over existing estimates. In particular, we have tried to 
produce convincing estimates of the degree to which pensions (indi 
vidually) and health insurance (individually) are substitutes for wages, 
and of whether pensions and health insurance are substitutes, comple 
ments, or unrelated. Such estimates have not been obtained before in a 
general framework that considers wages, pensions, and health insur 
ance all at once.
Chapter 2 offers a detailed treatment of the model of fringe benefit
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provision that we use to estimate tradeoffs among wages, pensions, and 
health insurance. The result of that chapter is an econometric specifica 
tion that allows us to estimate substitution (or tax) effects and income 
effects on the provision of fringe benefits. In chapter 3, we describe the 
data used to estimate the model and report the results of estimation. We 
use two separate data sets to estimate our model. The first is a pooled 
time-series of cross sections (1969-1982) from the National Income and 
Product Accounts "other labor income" series. The second is a cross 
section of establishments from the 1977 Survey of Employer Expendi 
tures for Employee Compensation.
Our second main goal is to use the estimates we produce to simulate 
the effects of various policy changes on the provision of fringe benefits. 
In chapter 4, we simulate how three major changes in tax policy would 
affect the voluntary provision by employers of pensions and health 
benefits. The changes simulated are: (a) the 1986 tax reform, which 
substantially lowered the marginal tax rates on earnings faced by many 
households; (b) treating employer contributions to health insurance as 
taxable income (we simulate both a policy of taxing all contributions to 
health insurance and a policy of taxing only contributions in excess of 
$1,125 per year); and (c) treating all employer contributions to both 
pensions and health insurance as taxable income.
Chapter 5 offers a summary of the model, our empirical findings, and 
our simulations. We also develop the implications of our findings for 
public policy in chapter 5.
NOTES
1 These figures were computed from data in tables 3. A3 and 3. A4 of the Social Security Bulletin 
Annual Statistical Supplement, 1989. Roughly half of all private expenditures on health care were 
made through employer-provided health insurance. See Kasper, Rossiter, and Wilson (1987); and 
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis (1986) and Survey of Current 
Business (various July issues), table 6.13.
2 Congressional Budget Office (1987) and Atrostic and Burman (1988) raise and provide 
excellent discussions of the policy issues surrounding the tax treatment of pensions and other fringe 
benefits. Mitchell (1988) offers a concise introduction.
3 On the development of the tax code as it bears on pensions and health insurance in the United 
States, see Korczak (1984, Chap. 2) and Chollet (1984, Chap. 4). See Organization for Economic
Introduction 7
Cooperation and Development (1988) for a discussion of the tax treatment of fringe benefits in 
OECD member countries.
Although neither pension nor health-insurance contributions are taxable to workers at the time 
they are made, pension benefits are taxable when they are received in retirement. Accordingly, 
pensions are often referred to as tax-deferred benefits, whereas health insurance, which is never 
taxed, is referred to as a tax-exempt benefit. See Korczak (1984, pp. 3-10) for a discussion.
4 Taylor and Wilensky (1983), Phelps (1984-85), and Adamache and Sloan (1985) offer 
estimates of the revenue effects of taxing health benefits; however, because they consider only 
tradeoffs between health benefits and wages, these studies are open to the criticism that they 
overstate the revenue gains of taxing health contributions.
5 See Hart (1984) and Hart, Bell, Frees, Kawasaki, and Woodbury (1988) for broader views of 
the economics of ncnwages.

A Model of Fringe Benefit Provision
The mix of fringe benefits and wages in the compensation package 
depends jointly on the decisions of employers and employees, both of 
whom operate under two sets of constraints. The first set of constraints 
can be thought of as market constraints associated with factor prices, 
goods prices, technology, and incomes. The second can be thought of as 
constraints (or incentives) established by government, with tax policies 
and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) being the 
two outstanding examples. Thus, although the employer actually pro 
vides the compensation package, that package must be fashioned subject 
to the preferences of workers (who can alter their level of effort or seek 
employment elsewhere if a compensation package is unsuitable) and 
subject to government policies (for example, meeting ERISA vesting, 
funding, fiduciary, and reporting standards if a defined-benefit pension 
plan is part of the compensation package). All these factors then  
workers' preferences, employers' costs, and government policy must 
be a part of any overarching theory of fringe benefit determination.
It is convenient to model the determination of fringe benefits by 
supposing that the employer offers a menu of possible benefit pack 
ages-or at least is willing to offer a variety of benefit packages and 
that workers select the package they most prefer. Institutionally, this 
may seem somewhat unrealistic, because we normally picture the em 
ployer making the benefit determination unilaterally the worker must 
take or leave whatever is offered. ! But employers do fashion their benefit 
packages with the preferences of workers in mind; indeed, if they failed 
to do so, they would find themselves with a level of labor turnover higher 
than desired, or a workforce of lesser quality than desired. An important 
advantage of casting the problem in this way is that it allows us to make 
use of the large theoretical and applied literature on consumer theory,
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which is one of the main developments of modern economics (see, for 
example, the excellent texts by Deaton and Muellbauer 1980b; Phlips 
1983; and Theil 1980). So, although modeling fringe benefits as 
"chosen" by workers may seem somewhat inconsistent with the institu 
tional realities of the process of benefit provision, it does little violence 
to our ability to predict benefit outcomes as long as we take full account 
of the constraints and costs faced by the employer in deciding what 
benefit packages are acceptable.
All existing research that attempts to model explicitly the mix of 
compensation approaches the problem as one where employees max 
imize utility by selecting from among a variety of possibilities presented 
by the employer (see Alpert 1983; Freeman 1981; Sloan and Adamache 
1986; Smeeding 1983; Triplett 1983; and Woodbury 1983, for exam 
ple). The reason is that much of this existing work has focused on the 
responses of workers to the favorable tax treatment that nonwage bene 
fits receive under the federal personal income tax. There is no conve 
nient way of modeling this aspect of benefit determination through an 
approach that focuses on the employer. 2 However, nothing in the utility- 
maximization approach commonly used precludes complete considera 
tion of the factors determining the employer's willingness to offer 
benefits.
In the remainder of this chapter, a model developed previously to 
describe the tradeoff between wages and fringes (Woodbury 1983) is 
extended to include tradeoffs between a pair of fringe benefits. The 
model developed is a utility-maximizing model that restricts attention to 
the determination of wages and the two most important voluntarily 
provided fringe benefits: pension plans and insurance contributions 
(most of which are for health care). Employer contributions to social 
security, unemployment insurance, and workers' compensation are not 
determined within the model because provision of these benefits is 
legally mandated and beyond the scope of the firm's decision. 3 Neither is 
the consumption by workers of goods such as food and clothing deter 
mined within the model because no available data set includes data on 
both goods consumption and fringe benefit consumption.
A Model of Fringe Benefit Provision 11 
Heuristic Statement of the Model
Consider that there are only three forms of compensation: wage 
benefits, pension benefits, and health insurance benefits. Consider also 
that the worker's utility depends on the quantities of goods bought with 
wage benefits (zw), pensions or retirement benefits (zr), and health 
insurance benefits (zh):
U=U(zw,zr,zh). (2.1)
A worker chooses quantities of zw , zr, and zh so as to maximize utility 
subject to a budget constraint that can be written:
ZwPW + ZrPr + ZhPh = 'n- (2-2)
In equation (2.2),pw,pr, and ph are the prices of wage goods, pension or 
retirement benefits, and health insurance benefits, each of which is 
beyond the worker's control. Also, m is the maximum dollar amount that 
the employer is willing to expend on workers' wages, pensions, and 
health insurance. Although m excludes various components of compen 
sation such as social security and in-kind perquisites, it will be referred 
to as total compensation in what follows. 4
Stated in this way, the problem of fringe benefit choice is a straightfor 
ward problem of consumer demand and may be handled by well-known 
techniques. But two basic difficulties need to be overcome. First, we do 
not ordinarily observe quantities of the components of compensation 
(zw , zr, and zh} or the prices of those components (pw , pr, andph). We do 
observe the dollar amounts expended by employers on the various 
components of compensation. For example, pwzw would be the number 
of dollars paid to a worker in wages, and przr would be the dollar 
contribution to the worker's pension plan. But prices and quantities must 
be observed separately in order to estimate some representation of the 
utility function (eq. 2.1). Accordingly, if the consumer model is to be 
made workable in this application, some effort will need to be spent 
identifying and measuring either the quantities or the prices of the
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components of compensation. Measurement of these prices is discussed 
further in a later section of this chapter and in the appendix to chapter 3. 
The second difficulty to overcome is that the budget constraint (eq. 
2.2) turns out to have some unconventional features that require careful 
treatment. In discussing these unconventional features, it is useful to 
proceed in two steps. First, we examine the tradeoff between wages and 
either of the two fringe benefit goods pensions or health insurance. 
This allows us to focus on the fact that wages are taxed, whereas fringe 
benefits are not, and to draw out the implications of this difference in tax 
treatment. Second, we examine the tradeoff between pensions and 
health insurance. This allows us to focus on the differences in the 
employer's cost of providing different fringe benefits, and to draw out 
the implications of these cost differences for fringe benefit demand.
Wage Taxation and the Tradeoff 
Between Wages and Fringe Benefits
Suppose for the moment that the quantity of health insurance benefits 
has already been determined and is held fixed. This allows us to analyze 
substitution between wage benefits and pension benefits in a two- 
dimensional diagram such as figure 2.1, which depicts a representative 
worker's preferences for pension and wage benefits. 5 The quantity of 
wage benefits (zw) is measured along the horizontal axis, and the 
quantity of pension benefits (zr) along the vertical axis. U0 and Ul are 
indifference curves, each showing combinations of wage and pension 
benefits that yield a given level of utility.
If the employer is willing to spend a total of m^ dollars in compensat 
ing the worker with wage and pension benefits and is willing to exchange 
wages for pensions at a rate of (cw/cr), then the employer will offer the 
worker any combination of wages and pensions that lies along the locus:
ZuAv+W=m i- (2.3)
Note that cw is the employer's cost of providing wages, and cr is the 
employer's cost of providing pensions. Note also that the dollar amount 
/Wj equals total compensation (ra) minus the predetermined expenditure 
on health insurance.
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Figure 2.1. The optimal mix of wages and pension benefits shifts from
(z*, z*) without income taxation to (z*% z**) with an income tax.




Given this initial budget constraint, the worker would maximize 
utility by choosing a quantity of wages, z^, and a quantity of pensions, 
z*, as shown in figure 2.1.
The initial constraint described by equation (2.3), however, is not the 
constraint that the worker finally faces. Under the current tax system, 
the worker's wages would be taxed at some marginal rate (t) whereas the 
employer's contributions to the worker's pension benefits would go 
untaxed. It follows that the budget constraint facing the worker pivots to
zwpw +zrpr =m l (2.4)
and the worker maximizes utility subject to this tax-modified constraint. 
The new optimal bundle of wages and pensions is given by (z", z**).
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Note that (pw/pr) is the rate at which the worker is able to exchange 
wages for pensions; that is, pw and pr are the tax-modified prices of 
wages and pensions. The relation between (pw/pr\ which is the rate at 
which the worker is able to exchange wages for pensions, and (cw/cr), 
which is the rate at which the employer is willing to trade wages for 
pensions, is a function of the marginal tax rate:
pjpr =(cjc,)/(l-t). (2.5) 
lfcw =cr, equation (2.5) can be simplified to:
t). (2.6)
An important simplification that has been incorporated into figure 2. 1 
is that the marginal tax rate (f) is taken as constant. In fact, of course, the 
marginal tax rate facing a worker varies with the income of the worker 
and his or her spouse. This variation in the marginal tax rate is both a 
blessing and a bane. It is a blessing because variation in t means that we 
will observe variation in the price ratio (pw/pr) facing different indi 
viduals or groups in any sample where there is variation in taxable 
income. Such variation will be central to estimating some representation 
of the utility function (eq. 2. 1). Further, because marginal tax rates are a 
discontinuous function (or step function) of income, it should be possi 
ble to separate the effects of changes in income from the effects of 
changes in the relative price of wages and pensions. That is, income and 
the price ratio do vary independently; hence, econometric estimation of 
both substitution effects (which could also be thought of as tax effects) 
and income effects should be possible.
The variation of the marginal tax rate with income is a bane because 
this variation makes the budget constraint facing the worker nonlinear, 
rather than linear as shown in figure 2.1. That is, as the share of total 
compensation received as wages increases, the marginal tax rate will 
increase. In figure 2.1, the budget constraint labeled zwpw +zrpr =m l 
should bend toward the wage axis and intercept the wage axis at some 
point to the left ofm^p^. The nonlinearity of the budget constraint has 
econometric implications that are discussed below.
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Figure 2.2. Relative cost to employers of pension and health insurance 
provision and the optimal mix of pension and health insurance benefits. 
The optimal mix of pension benefits shifts from (z*, zjj) under the initial
relative cost (to employers) of pensions and health insurance to 




2rcr + zhch = m2
2rcr + zh ch = m3
m. m3 zr
Fringe Benefit Costs and the Tradeoff 
Between Pensions and Health Insurance
Suppose now that the quantity of wage benefits has been predeter 
mined and is held fixed, so that we may show the tradeoff between 
pensions and health insurance benefits in a two-dimensional graph. 
Figure 2.2 is such a graph; it shows the representative worker's prefer 
ences, this time for pension benefits (zr, shown on the horizontal axis) 
and health insurance benefits (zh , shown on the vertical axis). The 
indifference curve U0 shows combinations of pension and health insur 
ance benefits that give the worker equal satisfaction.
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The key to analyzing substitution between pensions and health insur 
ance benefits is to note that the employer's cost of providing pensions 
differs from the cost of providing health benefits. If the employer is 
willing to spend a total of m2 dollars in compensating this worker with 
pensions and health insurance, and if the firm must pay cr per unit of 
pension benefit, and ch per unit of health insurance, then the firm will 
offer this worker any combination of pensions and health benefits lying 
on the locus:
zrcr +zhch =m2 . (2.7)
The dollar amount m2 equals total compensation (m) minus the predeter 
mined expenditure on wages. The dollar expenditures on pensions and 
health benefits are the two terms on the left-hand side of equation (2.7). 
In the absence of any taxes on either fringe benefit, the worker will 
choose the fringe benefit package (z*, z£). A different employer, how 
ever, might face different costs of providing pensions and health bene 
fits. For example, a small employer might face higher per unit insurance 
costs than a large employer (so that the cost of health benefits now equals 
c'h), and might be willing to make a total dollar expenditure on pensions 
and health insurance equal to m3 , which would yield the set of pension- 
health offerings depicted by zrcr +zhc'h =m3 . In this latter case, the 
worker chooses a different fringe benefit package (z**, z£*), with more 
pension benefits and less health insurance. 6 Note also that if a given 
employer faced rising health insurance costs over time, the initial 
constraint would pivot, and a similar substitution of pensions for health 
benefits would be likely to result.
A More Formal Statement of the Model
Recall our basic supposition that the worker's utility depends on the 
quantities of wage benefits (zw), pensions or retirement benefits (zr), and 
health insurance benefits (zh):
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U=U(zw,zr,zh). (2.1)
Empirical estimates of this utility function would yield information 
about how substitutable are these three components of compensation for 
one another. Such information could, in turn, be used to estimate how a 
change in tax policy that favored one component of compensation would 
affect demand for all three components of compensation. In effect, we 
are trying to estimate the shapes of the indifference curves shown in 
figures 2.1 and 2.2, and to use those estimates to predict how much 
substitution of one form of compensation for another would occur in 
response to a shift of the budget constraint.
Elasticities to Be Estimated
More precisely, we seek estimates of the following elasticities:
1. The Uncompensated Own- and Cross-Price Elasticities of De 
mand for Benefit i:
^(dzt/dpjKpj/zJ. (2.8)
This is the percentage change in demand for benefit i that can be 
expected in response to a 1 percent change in the price of benefit,/. 17,-, is 
often referred to as the Marshallian price elasticity of demand.
2. The Compensated Own- and Cross-Price Elasticities of Demand 
for Benefit i:
^(dZi/dpJ^pj/Zi). (2.9)
This is the percentage change in demand for benefit / that can be 
expected in response to a 1 percent change in the price of benefit j, 
holding utility constant. That is, r/J measures changes in demand that 
take place after the worker has been compensated for any changes in 
utility that occur as a result of the price change. 17 J is often referred to as 
the Hicksian compensated elasticity of demand.
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3. The Income Elasticity of Demand for Benefit i:
(2.10)
This is the percentage change in demand for benefit i that occurs in 
response to a 1 percent change in total compensation.
4. The Elasticity of Substitution between Benefit i and Benefit j:
o^tiysj (2.11)
where Sj is the share of total compensation received as benefit j. This is a 
measure of the strength and type of relationship (substitutability or 
complementarity) between benefits i and j. It can be either positive or 
negative. If atj is positive, the benefits are substitutes; if negative, they 
are complements.
These four elasticities are tied together by the Slutsky relation, which 
in elasticity form can be written:
"Qij^ifij-SjQim (2-12) 
or, by substituting equation (2.11) into equation (2.12),
Estimates of these elasticities will provide the information that is 
needed to predict the effects of various tax changes on the demand for 
each form of compensation.
A System of Demand Equations
for the Components of Compensation
Our goal, then, is to estimate some representation of the utility 
function (eq. 2.1), so as to obtain an unrestricted set of price, income, 
and substitution elasticities as defined by equations (2.8) through (2.11) 
above. The problem is that utility (£/) is unobservable, so that a utility 
function such as equation (2.1) cannot be estimated directly. The most 
straightforward way of solving this problem is to manipulate or trans 
form the direct utility function into a form that permits estimation and
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yields the same information about demand and substitution possibilities. 
Duality theory allows one to make just such manipulations. It turns out 
that if the direct utility function (eq. 2.1) is well-behaved, then an 
indirect utility Junction, dual to it, can be written showing the maximum 
utility attainable by a worker facing a price of wage benefits (pw), a price 
of retirement benefits (pr), a price of health benefits (ph), and a given 
level of total compensation (ni):
V=V(pw,pr,ph ,m). (2.14)
Further, the indirect utility function may be solved for the minimum 
expenditure or cost (C) required to attain a specified level of utility (£/)» 
given prices (pw, pr , and/?,,). So rewritten, equation (2.14) becomes a 
consumer cost Junction (or expenditure Junction):
C=C(pw, Pr,ph ,lT). (2.15)
Since our goal is to estimate an unrestricted set of elasticities of 
substitution for wages, pension benefits, and health benefits, it is desir 
able to estimate an arbitrary approximation to either the indirect utility 
function (eq. 2.14) or the consumer cost function (eq. 2.15) set out 
above. For example, a translog approximation to the indirect utility 
function could be estimated, as it has been in earlier work on similar 
issues (Woodbury 1983, 1985a). Although satisfactory, the translog 
indirect utility function requires costly nonlinear estimation techniques 
unless one is willing to restrict income elasticities to unity and estimate a 
homothetic indirect utility function. Since we do not wish to impose 
unitary income elasticities, it would be advantageous to find some 
alternative.
One attractive alternative is to estimate a representation of the con 
sumer cost function represented by equation (2.15). Deaton and 
Muellbauer (1980a) have developed a flexible approximation to the 
consumer cost function that results in an easily estimated system of 
consumer demand equations. They start with a representation of the 
consumer cost function known as the PIGLOG class (for Price Indepen 
dent Generalized Linear Logarithmic). For the case of three goods (w,
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r, and k), Deaton and Muellbauer's consumer cost function can be 
written as:
lnC(pw,pr,ph ,U)= (2.16) 
a0 +a'Jn pw +a'Jn pr +a'hln ph +
)(ln pj + (V2Whr(ln ph)(ln Pr) +
All variables in equation (2.16) have been defined previously, except for 
the parameters a0, aj, by, b0 , and bt . These parameters characterize 
preferences for the various forms of compensation and will be estimated 
econometrically. The parameter estimates in turn allow one to compute 
directly the price, income, and substitution elasticities set out in equa 
tions (2.8) through (2.11). (See below.)
Demand functions for wage benefits, pensions, and health insurance 
can be derived from equation (2.16) by differentiating with respect to 
pw, pr, and ph . This is the well-known property of cost functions 
developed by Shephard (1970). By some further manipulation, each 
demand function can be transformed into a demand function in budget- 
share form. For the consumer cost function represented by equation 
(2.16), these budget shares are:
sw =a'w +bwwln pw +bwrln pr +bwhln ph (2. 17) 
+bJn(m/P)
sr =ctr+bjn pw +brrln pr +brhln ph (2. 18)
sh =a'h +bhwln pw +bhrln pr +bhhln ph (2. 19) 
+bhln(m/P)
where *? =(V4)0J,+fy).
Equations (2.17), (2.18), and (2.19) are three expenditure share 
equations. They say that the share of total compensation received in each
A Model of Fringe Benefit Provision 21
form is a function of prices and an income term (m/P). Specifically, sw is 
the share of compensation received as wages, sr is the share received as 
pension or retirement benefits, and sh is the share received as health 
benefits. The price of wages (/? ,), the price of pension or retirement 
benefits (pr), and the price of health benefits (ph) are as defined earlier. 
The income term (m/P) equals after-tax total compensation (m) divided 
by a price index, P.
There is an exact definition of P (Deaton and Muellbauer 1980a, 
p. 314), which leads to a specification requiring nonlinear estimation 
techniques. Because nonlinear techniques are expensive and unattrac 
tive, several researchers, including Deaton and Muellbauer, have ap 
proximated P as:
In P*=sjnpw +sjnpr +shlnph (2.20)
where P* is the approximation to P. Using this approximation is attrac 
tive because it turns P into a predetermined variable, and hence gives us 
a model that is linear in parameters and relatively simple to estimate. 
Also, those who have used it (Deaton and Muellbauer 1980a; Anderson 
and Blundell 1983, 1984; and Kang 1983) have found P* to be a good 
approximation to the exact definition of P. Accordingly, the approxima 
tion will be used throughout this work.
Implementing the Model
Deaton and Muellbauer call the demand system represented by equa 
tions (2.17) through (2.19) the Almost Ideal Demand System (or, rather 
inauspiciously, the "AIDS") because it is log-linear in prices and income 
once an approximation to P has been selected. Linearity makes the 
Deaton-Muellbauer system simpler to estimate than other flexible repre 
sentations of consumer preferences, such as the translog or generalized 
Leontief. Indeed, linearity is the most significant advantage of the 
Deaton-Muellbauer demand system over other demand systems that are 
consistent with consumer theory and allow estimation of an unrestricted 
set of price, income, and substitution elasticities.
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Adding Demographic and Other Variables to the Model
An additional advantage of the Deaton-Muellbauer system is that it 
easily accommodates variables other than prices and income that may 
influence the observed share of fringe benefits. To this point in the 
discussion, there has been no attempt to include such variables. But 
there can be little doubt that unbiased estimation of the demand elas 
ticities of interest requires that we control for variables such as indi 
vidual demographic characteristics.
How to include demographic and other variables in empirical demand 
analysis is a problem that has been the topic of considerable research 
(see, for example, Lau, Lin, and Yotopoulos 1978; Pollak and Wales 
1981; and Lewbel 1985). The solution adopted here is the obvious one 
in the context of the Deaton-Muellbauer demand system. Since each 
budget share includes a constant term, it is natural to suppose that the 
constant shifts with demographic changes. If we make such an assump 
tion, which is known as demographic budget share translation, then 
equations (2.17) through (2.19) can be rewritten as follows:
sw =aw +bwwlnpw +bwrlnpr +bwhlnph +bwln(m/P*) + (2.21) 
dw ixi+--+dWKxK
s^dr+b^ln pw +brrln pr +brhln Ph +bM /P*)+ (2-22) 
"wi*i +       Jr dwKxK
sh =ah +bhJnpw +bhrlnpr +bhhlnph +bhln(m/P*) + (2.23)
In equations (2.21) through (2.23), xl , . . ., XK represent the demo 
graphic (and other) variables that shift the budget shares, and the dik are 
coefficients representing the effects of changes in those variables on the 
shares. Also, the approximation P* has been substituted for P. Note that 
use of P* results in a redefinition of the intercept terms (#,) in equations 
(2.21) through (2.23), which equal a^-b^ln g), where g is a scalar 
indicating how well P* approximates P (if g= 1, the approximation is 
exact). (For details, see Deaton and Muellbauer 1980a, p. 316.)
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Restrictions of Consumer Theory and Stochastic Assumptions
It is desirable for the demand system represented by equations (2.21) 
through (2.23) to exhibit three properties that are implied by consumer 
theory. These are usually referred to as the adding-up, homogeneity, and 
symmetry properties, and are treated in turn.
Adding-up simply means that the shares of the budget spent on the 
components of compensation sum to one. In order to satisfy the adding- 
up property, the system represented by equations (2.21) through (2.23) 
must satisfy the following across-equation constraints:
aw +ar +ah = \ (2.24)
bww +b^bhw =Q (2.25)
bwr +brr +bhr =Q (2.26)
bwh +brh +bhh =0 (2.27)
bw +br +bh =0 (2.28)
dwk +drk +dhk =0 for all k. (2.29)
In practice, the adding-up constraint is imposed by constructing the data 
so that the budget shares sum to one for each observation, and so that the 
mean of each price and income variable is unity (hence the natural 
logarithm of each mean is zero). Since, as discussed presently, only two 
of the three share equations must be estimated, constructing the budget 
shares in this way will cause the adding-up restrictions to be satisfied 
automatically.
Homogeneity implies that a doubling of both prices and income 
would leave the demand for each component of compensation un 
changed. For the system to be homogeneous (specifically, homogeneous 
of degree zero in prices and income), the following within-equation 
constraints must be imposed:
bww +bwr +bwh =0 (2.30) 
b^+brr+b^Q (2.31)
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bhw +bhr +bhh =Q. (2.32)
Finally, symmetry means that the cross-substitution effects must be 
symmetric  that is, 0^=0},. Such symmetry can be imposed by con 
straining by to equal bjt across equations in the econometric estimation. 
If we impose the adding-up, homogeneity, and symmetry constraints 
on equations (2.21) through (2.23), and append a random disturbance 




sh =ah +brhln(prlpJ+bhhln(phlpw)+bhln(m/P*) + (2.35) 
dhlx l +...+dhKxK+uh
where the random disturbance terms  uw, ur, and uh  are assumed to be 
normally distributed with zero mean.
Two points are worth noting. First, the price ratios used in equations 
(2.33) through (2.35) are the inverses of those stated as equations (2.5) 
and (2.6). This poses no problem  equations (1.5) and (2.6) simply 
define the inverses of the appropriate price ratios. Second, because the 
shares (sw, sr , and sh) sum to one, only two of the above three equations 
are independent. As a result, estimation of equations (2.33) through 
(2.35) can be accomplished by arbitrarily deleting one of the three 
equations and performing an iterative version of Zellner's seemingly 
unrelated regression procedure on the remaining two. (See Christensen 
and Manser 1976, 1977 for further discussion and references.) Results 
will be the same regardless of which equation is deleted, and will be 
maximum likelihood estimates.
Prices of the Components of Compensation
The demand system given by equations (2.33) through (2.35) is 
driven by variation in the relative prices of the components of compensa-
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tion [(pr/pw) and (ph/pw)], and by variation in income (m/P*). As a 
result, it is important to understand the origin of these price ratios and 
the income term. A complete treatment of the construction of these 
variables can be given only in the context of the data being considered, 
but the following general points are in order.
Recall that the price of wage benefits relative to the price of pen 
sions is:
pjpr =(cjcr)l(\-f) (2.5)
where cw is the employer's cost of wage benefits, cr is the employer's cost 
of pension benefits, and t is the marginal tax rate on wages faced by the 
worker. That is, income taxation shifts the rate at which the worker can 
trade wages for pensions, since the worker's wages are taxed at some 
marginal rate (f) but the employer's contributions to pensions are un 
taxed. Hence, wages have become more expensive relative to pensions 
as a result of income taxation.
Because the employer's contributions to health insurance are also 
untaxed, income taxation will shift the rate at which the worker can 
trade wages for health insurance benefits:
PjPh =(cJch)l(\-f) (2.36)
where ch is the employer's cost of providing health insurance benefits. 
Finally, income taxation will not affect the tradeoff between pensions 
and health benefits faced by the worker if all fringe benefits are untaxed. 
That is,
prlph =crlch (2.37)
or the rate at which the worker can ultimately trade health for retirement 
benefits is the same as the rate at which the employer can trade them. 
Note that only two of the three price ratios represented by equations 
(2.5), (2.36), and (2.37) are independent. This is another way of seeing 
that only two of the three equations of the demand system must be 
estimated. Indeed, the only relative prices needed to estimate the de 
mand system represented by equations (2.33) through (2.35) are (pjp^ 
and
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How are the needed price ratios (pjp^ and (pw/ph) to be obtained? If 
we are willing to assume that the cost of pensions relative to the cost of 
wages that is, cjcr — equals an arbitrary constant, then the price ratio 
(pJPr) can be written simply as:
pjpr =k/(l-t) (2.6a)
where k is the constant of proportionality between wage and pension 
costs. Since the only source of variation in (pw/pr) is the marginal tax 
rate (0 it is harmless to set c equal to 1 and to compute:
pjpr=l/(l-t). (2.6)
Hence, (pw/pr) is computed as a simple transformation of the marginal 
tax rate. (We explain how measures of the marginal tax rate are obtained 
in the next chapter.)
It is possible that the ratio of wage to pension costs (k) is not constant, 
but varies from industry to industry. The source of this variation can be 
thought of as exogenous interindustry differences in the organization of 
production, which lead to differing specific human capital require 
ments, turnover of workers, and pension provision. In our empirical 
specifications in the next chapter, we include proxies for the organiza 
tion of production independently, rather than attempting to embed the 
effects of differing organization of production in the price ratio (pw/pr)- 
The first reason for this independent inclusion is its feasibility and the 
apparent infeasibility of embedding the effect of differences in the 
organization of production in the price ratio (pw/pr).
The second reason is that independent inclusion of a specific human 
capital measure offers a way of testing for so-called agency incentives 
for pension provision. As Lazear (1981), Mumy and Manson (1985), 
and Bell and Hart (1990) have pointed out, firms may offer deferred 
compensation as an inducement to their employees to work hard and 
remain with the firm over many years, since only employees who stay 
with the firm will receive their deferred compensation. It follows that 
deferred compensation such as pensions will be important in industries 
where the organization of production places a premium on skill and 
specific human capital. Accordingly, we include proxies for specific
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human capital in our estimates of fringe benefit demand reported in the 
next chapter, with the expectation that higher levels of specific human 
capital will be related to a higher proportion of total compensation 
received as pensions, but will be unrelated to the share of compensation 
received as health insurance. 7
Estimates of (pw/ph) can be obtained by observing health insurance 
costs, which can be observed both over time and from employer to 
employer. Changes over time may be obtained from the price index of 
health insurance reported in the National Income and Product Accounts 
(U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis 1986, 
Table 7.10). Differences from employer to employer are more difficult 
to measure. Health insurance carriers vary their rates depending on the 
health and medical care experience of a group, which in turn depends on 
the group's size, occupational mix, and demographic composition. 
Estimation of these variations is taken up in the next chapter.
To summarize, since variation in the price of wage benefits relative to 
pension and health benefits can be observed, it should be possible to 
estimate tradeoffs between wages and pensions, between wages and 
health insurance, and between pensions and health insurance. The 
tradeoff between pensions and health insurance is of special interest. 
First, it has not been estimated in previous research. Moreover, pro 
posals have been advanced to tax health insurance contributions but not 
pension contributions under the federal personal income tax. Determin 
ing the effect of such a tax policy on pension provision requires under 
standing of the possibilities for substituting pensions for health insur 
ance. The assumption made in all previous analyses of the provision of 
fringe benefits has been that employers' costs of providing a unit of each 
benefit (cw , cr, and ch) are equal. Only by relaxing this assumption can 
we consider tradeoffs within the fringe benefit package, such as the 
tradeoff between pensions and health insurance.
Progressive Taxes and Nonlinearity of the Budget Constraint
Recall that because the marginal tax rate facing a worker increases as 
his or her income increases, the tradeoff between wages and fringe
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benefits facing that worker will be nonlinear. That is, the lower of the 
two budget constraints in figure 2.1 should actually bend toward the 
wage axis as the worker consumes more wages and fewer fringe 
benefits.
In fact, the nonlinearity of the budget constraint in the context of 
fringe benefit demand is a special case of a more general problem that 
results from progressive taxation. For example, the budget constraint 
facing workers when they make their labor supply decision is also 
nonlinear, because as a worker's hours of work increase, the marginal 
tax rate increases and the worker's net after-tax wage declines. The 
traditional way of handling this problem (Hall 1973; Wales 1973) is to 
use a linear approximation to the nonlinear budget constraint by, in 
effect, drawing a straight line, tangent to the indifference curve repre 
senting maximum attainable utility, through each individual's observed 
consumption bundle.
The linear approximation approach is illustrated in figure 2.3, which 
is a redrawing of figure 2.1 that has been corrected for the presence of 
progressive taxation. Three budget constraints are shown in figure 2.3. 
The first is the budget constraint in the absence of any income tax, which 
is repeated from figure 2.1. The second is the nonlinear budget con 
straint faced by a worker under progressive taxation. Again, this budget 
constraint curves toward the wage axis as the share of wages in total 
compensation increases. The third is the "linearized" budget constraint, 
which is a straight line tangent to the actual constraint at the optimal 
bundle of pensions and wages (z™, z**)-
The linear approximation approach entails assigning price and in 
come data to each observation as follows. First, the slope of the lin 
earized constraint is taken as the price of wages relative to pensions 
(pjpj. Second, the wage intercept of the linearized constraint (z°, in 
figure 2.3) multiplied by the price of wages (pw) is taken as total 
compensation. Equivalently, the observed marginal tax rate is assigned 
to each observation in the sample, and the sum of observed after-tax 
wages, pension contributions, and health insurance contributions is 
assigned to each observation as total compensation.
The problem posed by the linear approximation method is econo-
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Figure 2.3. Progressive income taxation, the nonlinear budget 
constraint, and the linear approximation method.
Linearized constraint






metric: the marginal tax rate observed for each worker (or the price of 
wages relative to pensions based on that tax rate) is no longer exogenous 
under progressive income taxation. The marginal tax rate is, in effect, 
chosen by the worker, as is easily seen from figure 2.3. The worker 
depicted in the figure has chosen the compensation bundle (z™, z**), and 
hence faces the marginal tax rate given by the slope of the dashed line. 
But another worker with different preferences might choose a different 
compensation bundle that is, a different point on the curved budget 
constraint and would as a result face a different marginal tax rate. 
Hence;, the marginal tax rate is chosen along with the compensation 
bundle, and is endogenous. In the worst case, using the observed 
marginal tax rate (or relative prices derived from it) as an independent 
variable could lead to inconsistent estimates of the effect of changes in 
the marginal tax rate on whatever dependent variable is of interest.
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A maximum likelihood solution to the problem of nonlinear budget 
constraints has been suggested and implemented by Burtless and 
Hausman (1978) and Wales and Woodland (1979). (See also Hausman 
1985; Moffitt 1986,1990; and Megdal 1987.) For two reasons, we have 
not used the maximum likelihood solution to the problem posed by the 
nonlinear budget constraint. First, the estimation procedure used is 
already complex and expensive, and handling the nonlinear budget 
constraint by maximum likelihood would make it more so. Second, it 
appears that the linear approximation method we use tends to underesti 
mate "true" elasticities of substitution estimated by maximum like 
lihood. 8 Hence, even though the elasticities of substitution estimated in 
the next chapter tend to be large, it is perhaps best to view them as lower- 
bound estimates of the true elasticities of substitution between various 
components of compensation.
Computation of Elasticities
We asserted above that estimates of the parameters of the demand 
system would yield, in turn, estimates of the price, income, and sub 
stitution elasticities that are needed to predict the effects of various tax 
changes on the demand for fringe benefits. (The elasticities were written 
out in equations (2.8) through (2.11).)
The formulas used to compute each elasticity from the parameters of 
the Deaton-Muellbauer demand system, written as equations (2.33) 
through (2.35), are as follows. 9 Start with the uncompensated price 
elasticities (eq. 2.8). The uncompensated own-price elasticities of de 
mand for benefit i can be computed as:
1- (2-8a) 
The uncompensated cross-price elasticities are:
(2.8b)
The compensated own- and cross-price elasticities can be com 
puted as:




Next, the income elasticities can be computed as:
ri^^dzt/dm^m/Zi) = (*>A) + 1 - (2- 10a) 
Finally, the elasticities of substitution are:
ff«=i?S/*/ =(*,A2)-(l/*,) + 1 (2- 1 la) 
and
In equations (2.8a) through (2. lib), the required parameters (b{ , btj) 
and shares ($,-) are from equations (2.33) through (2.35).
Confidence Intervals for the Elasticities
Estimating the price, income, and substitution elasticities set out 
above is the main objective of the empirical work presented in the next 
chapter. Because these elasticities are central to an understanding of 
how tax policy changes might affect the mix of total compensation, it 
would be highly desirable to construct confidence intervals around each 
elasticity estimate, so that statistical tests of significance could be 
performed.
Constructing confidence intervals around the elasticities estimated 
using the Deaton-Muellbauer and other flexible demand systems poses a 
well-known problem that has been discussed by many users of flexible 
functional forms (Anderson and Thursby 1986; Krinsky and Robb 
1986; Grant and Hamermesh 1981; Toevs 1980, 1982). It is clear from 
the elasticity formulas presented above that each elasticity is a nonlinear 
function of parameters and compensation shares. As a result, it is not 
obvious what measure of error should be associated with these elasticity 
estimates.
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One possible measure of the error associated with each elasticity is 
the asymptotic variance (and covariances) of the estimated parameter 
(or parameters) underlying the elasticity in question. This is easy to 
calculate in cases where only one parameter is used to compute an 
elasticity. In other cases, this solution involves computing the variance 
of a linear combination of parameters. This is true, for example, in the 
case of the uncompensated elasticities, since both bl and either bu or btj 
underlie these. 10
A remaining problem with this measure of error associated with the 
computed elasticities is that it treats only the parameters (bf , bif , and bfj) 
as stochastic; the compensation shares (st) are assumed nonstochastic. A 
case can be made that the shares should in fact be treated as random 
variables. Accordingly, an improved measure of error associated with 
the elasticities would be the variance of each elasticity derived by taking 
a Taylor expansion of each elasticity around the sample mean, which 
includes variances and covariances of shares, as well as variances and 
covariances of parameters (see, for example, Kmenta 1986, p. 486). 
Standard errors based on variances computed in this way are reported in 
tables 3.3 and 3.6 in chapter 3.
Restatement of the Model
The model of fringe benefit provision developed in this chapter is 
based on the following "story." The employer offers a menu of compen 
sation packages to workers, who select the package that maximizes their 
well-being. The menu offered by employers implies certain tradeoffs 
between components of compensation that the employer is willing to 
make, and these tradeoffs depend in turn on the employer's cost of 
providing each benefit. The package that workers choose from the menu 
depends on their preferences (which depend in part on characteristics 
such as age and marital status), on their level of total compensation, and 
on the prices of the components of compensation. The prices facing 
workers depend not only on the employer's costs of providing each
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component of the package, but also on the differential tax treatment of 
each component. l l
This story can be formalized, and a model that can be estimated 
econometrically can be derived. We follow Deaton and Muellbauer 
(1980a) and specify an expenditure function in flexible form. From this 
flexible expenditure function, the following system of demand equations 
for wages, pensions, and health insurance benefits can be derived:
sw =aw +bwrki(pr/pJ+blJn(ph/pJ+bwln(m/P*) + (2.33) 
dwlx l + ...+dwKxK+uw
sr =ar +brrln(Pr/Pj +brhln(ph/pJ+brln(m/P*) + (2.34) 
drlx l + ...+drKxK+ur
(2-35)
dhlx l +...+dhxxK+uh .
This is a standard set of demand equations, in the sense that the demand 
for each component of compensation is modeled as a function of the 
prices of those benefits, income, and other characteristics such as age 
and sex. In these equations, sw, sr , and sh are the shares (or proportions) 
of total compensation received in the form of wages, pension contribu 
tions, and health insurance benefits; (pr//O and (ph/pw) are the prices 
of pensions and health insurance, relative to wages, that face workers; m 
is total compensation in dollars; P* is a price index approximated by 
In P*—-swln pw +srln pr +shln ph ; x l through XK are control variables 
other than prices and income, such as demographic characteristics, that 
might affect the demand for fringe benefits; and uw, ur, and uh , are 
random disturbance terms that are assumed to be normally distributed 
with zero mean.
The ait bfj, bf, and dik are parameters to be estimated. These param 
eters can be interpreted as follows. The btj parameters show the effect of 
changes in relative prices on the budget shares, holding real income 
constant. More precisely, a 1 percent increase in the price of component 
/ changes the share of component 7 by (fc^/lOO), other things equal. The 
bf parameters show the effect of changes in real total compensation on 
compensation shares. For a component of compensation that is a luxury,
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bf will be positive; for a component that is a necessity, bi will be 
negative. 12 In addition, estimates of the by and bi parameters yield in 
turn estimates of the price, income, and substitution elasticities that are 
needed to determine the effect of changing tax policy on the provision of 
the different forms of fringe benefits. Finally, the dik show the influence 
of the demographic and other characteristics on each compensation 
share. A unit increase in any of these other control variables will change 
the compensation share in question by dik , all else equal.
Two final points deserve emphasis. First, the relative prices in the 
demand system are constructed with an eye to both the employer's cost of 
providing each component of compensation, and to the tax treatment of 




where cw, cr , and ch are the employer's cost of providing a unit of pension 
benefits, a unit of wage benefits, and a unit of health insurance benefits; 
and t is the marginal tax on income faced by the worker. Actual 
measurement of these relative prices is an important part of the work 
presented in the next chapter. 13 Second, earlier work on fringe benefits 
has examined only the choice between wages and fringe benefits taken 
as a whole. The demand system set out above specifies separate equa 
tions for pensions and health insurance, and hence allows examination 
of tradeoffs within the fringe benefit package. It is necessary to estimate 
only two of the three equations (2.33) through (2.35), because only two 
are independent. Although the choice of which equations to estimate is 
arbitrary, we estimate the two fringe benefit share equations [(2.34) and 
(2.35)] in the next chapter, because our main concern is with the 
influence of changing prices and incomes on fringe benefits.
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Appendix to Chapter 2 
Summary of Notation
Share equation intercept terms in the Deaton- 
Muellbauer Almost Ideal Demand System. Note that 
a^a'f—bjUn g). See below for definitions of bt and g.
Parameters, showing the effect of changes in real total 
compensation on compensation shares, in the Deaton- 
Muellbauer Almost Ideal Demand System.
Parameters showing the influence of changes in relative 
prices on compensation shares in the Deaton- 
Muellbauer Almost Ideal Demand System. Note that
cw , cr, ch Cost to the employer of a unit of wage benefits , pension 
benefits, and health insurance benefits.
C(.) The consumer cost or expenditure function, indicating 
the minimum expenditure needed to attain a given level 
of utility (£/) at a given set of benefit prices.
dik Parameters showing the influence of the control vari 
ables (*! , . . . , XK) on compensation shares in the 
Deaton-Muellbauer Almost Ideal Demand System.
g Scalar indicating the closeness of the approximation P* 
to the true price index P.
m Total compensation in dollars, exogenously set by the 
employer.
m' Instrument for real total compensation used with the 
EEEC data in chapter 3. Equals average after-tax earn 
ings of each worker group divided by the industry 
average share of compensation received as wages.
m l Total compensation paid in wage and pension benefits 
(health insurance benefits predetermined).
36 Tax Treatment of Fringe Benefits
m2 , m3 Total compensation paid in pension and health insur 
ance benefits (wage benefits predetermined).
pw, pr, ph Prices faced by workers of wage benefits, retirement 
benefits (referred to as pensions throughout the text), 
and health insurance benefits.
P Aggregate price index of benefits.
P* Approximation to the aggregate price index used in the 
empirical work.
s{ The share (proportion) of total compensation received 
as benefit /.
t The marginal tax rate on income faced by the worker.
uw , ur, uh Random disturbance terms in the wage share, pension 
share, and health insurance share equations.
t/(.) The direct utility function, indicating the utility de 
rived from consumption of a given bundle of benefit 
quantities.
K(.) The indirect utility function, indicating the maximum 
utility attainable at a given set of benefit prices, and a 
given level of total compensation.
jq, ...,XK Demographic, industry, and other control variables 
(other than prices and real total compensation) included 
in the benefit demand functions.
zw -> zr > ^h Quantities of wage benefits, retirement benefits (re 
ferred to as pensions throughout the text), and health 
insurance benefits. Optimal quantities are shown with 
asterisks.
fin ^y The uncompensated own- and cross-price elasticities 
of demand for benefit /.
i\ im The income (or expenditure) elasticity of demand for 
benefit i.
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The compensated own- and cross-price elasticities of 
demand for benefit i.
The elasticity of substitution between benefit i and ben 
efit./. A positive a^ indicates that i andy are substitutes, 
a negative atj indicates that they are complements.
NOTES
1 It is true that employers may offer several types of health benefits and that pension benefits 
also may be somewhat flexible. Regarding health benefits, the variation may be in the delivery 
system-health maintenance organization, fee-for-service provider, or independent practice asso 
ciation. In some cases, the actual premiums charged will differ, as will the service provided. Hence, 
employees are allowed to choose, in some cases, from a limited menu of benefit packages offered by 
a given employer, in addition to having different menus offered by different employers.
2 One can easily imagine a model of benefit determination that views the firm as providing a 
package of benefits that minimizes the firm's cost of retaining a workforce of given size and quality. 
But in such an approach, workers' responses to the tax treatment of benefits would be confounded 
with their underlying preferences for quantities of benefits.
3 The limited experience rating of unemployment insurance and workers' compensation 
implies that firms do have some control over these legally mandated expenses. The difficulty 
economists have had in estimating a behavioral response of firms to experience rating, however, 
suggests that these expenses are largely beyond a firm's control.
4 As already noted, we examine wages, pensions, and health insurance because they are the 
three largest components of total compensation that are provided voluntarily. Again, we omit fringe 
benefits that employers must provide by law social security, unemployment insurance, and 
workers' compensation contributions, for example-because workers and employers have limited 
scope for choosing these. By omitting these so-called mandatory fringe benefits, the utility function 
(2.1) embodies the assumption that wages and voluntarily provided fringe b' ;fits are (as a group) 
weakly separable from all other goods that provide utility to workers. This assumption of weak 
separability implies that changes in the consumption of goods other than wages, pensions, and 
health benefits do not affect the marginal rate of substitution between, for example, wages and 
pensions. It would be useful to test empirically the assumption of separability, although no 
straightforward way of doing so suggests itself.
5 The same points could be illustrated by fixing pension benefits and analyzing substitution 
between wages and health insurance, since for now we are assuming that wages are taxed and all 
fringe benefits are untaxed.
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6 Presumably, the two employers being considered would operate in different product and labor 
markets. Accordingly, total expenditures on pensions and health insurance could differ between the 
two employers without violating competitive assumptions. From an empirical standpoint, the key is 
to include appropriate controls for industry and workers' characteristics.
7 Our approach is open to the criticism that pension provision and specific human capital are 
jointly determined; that is, causation does not run from specific human capital to pension provision, 
as our empirical specification would suggest.
8 These are the results found by Wales and Woodland (1979). It is not obvious that their results 
can be generalized, but their case is similar to ours.
9 Note that formulas (2.8a) through (2.1 Ib) apply when the approximation to the price index 
(P*) is used. Use of the approximation P* results in elasticity formulas for the Deaton-Muellbauer 
demand system that differ from those that use the exact price index P- see, for example, Anderson 
and Blundell (1983).
10 Consider for example, the variance of 77^-:
var (,0)=var[( 1 /*,)&  - (*/*,)*,]
= [(l/j,2) var(fe,y)] + [(5y5,.)2 var (b,)] 
-I2(sjts 2) covfrpb,)].
1 ' Prices facing workers may in addition depend on the competitive position of the employer. 
That is, employers who possess market power may obtain rents by providing their employees with 
benefits obtained at favorable rates. We are grateful to William Alpert for this point.
12 If r/,m exceeds unity, then good i is a luxury, otherwise the good is a necessity. Referring to 
equation (2. lOa), t\ im = (b/fs,) +1. Hence, rj im will always exceed unity if b/ is positive, but cannot 
exceed unity if bt is negative. Also, if t\ im is greater than zero, the good in question is normal; if rj,m 
is negative it is inferior. To determine whether a component of compensation is normal or inferior, 
one needs to use (2. lOa); in general, though, bt must be negative and s, must be small in order for 
r\ im to be inferior.
13 Note again that the price ratios in equations (2.5) and (2.36) define the inverses of those used 
in the estimating equations (2.33) through (2.35).
Estimates of the Demand for 
Fringe Benefits
Existing data on fringe benefits are notoriously imperfect, as many 
economists have pointed out (Antos 1983; Hamermesh 1983; Atrostic 
1983; and Smith and Ehrenberg 1983, among others). One can imagine 
two kinds of data that would be ideal for examining the role of fringe 
benefits in the labor market. The first would be a broadly representative 
sample of individuals that would include complete information on the 
demographic and other characteristics of the workers in the sample 
(including age, marital status, employment status and earnings of 
spouse, family size, and so on), and a complete profile of each worker's 
nonwage benefit package. The second ideal data set would be a repre 
sentative sample of establishments that would include a complete char 
acterization of the establishment, the various groups of workers em 
ployed, and the fringe benefits provided to each of those groups. Alas, 
such ideal data sets are nonexistent.
Nevertheless, there exist at least two data bases that are serviceable 
for the purpose of estimating tradeoffs among various components of 
compensation. The first is a data set based on the unpublished two-digit 
industry data underlying the National Income and Product Accounts 
(NIPA) "other labor income" series for 1968 through 1982 (U.S. De 
partment of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis 1986). The 
second is a data base fashioned from the 1977 Survey of Employer 
Expenditures for Employee Compensation (hereafter, EEEC), the 1977 
Current Population Survey, and the 1977-78 National Medical Care 
Expenditure Survey. In the first of these data sets, the unit of observation 
is the two-digit industry; in the second, it is the establishment. The 
advantage of using two separate data bases in exploring tradeoffs among 
wages, pension benefits, and health insurance benefits is that each data
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base has different strengths and weaknesses, and the results from one 
analysis can be used as a check on the other. l
This chapter offers two separate estimates of the demand for fringe 
benefits, the first using the NIPA data from 1968 to 1982, the second 
using the 1977 EEEC survey. In each case, the demand for pension 
benefits and the demand for health insurance benefits, as specified by 
equations (2.34) and (2.35) in the last chapter, are jointly estimated. 
Each set of estimates results in a complete set of price, income, and 
substitution elasticities. These estimates are of intrinsic interest, and 
will also be used to simulate the effects of tax policy changes in 
chapter 4.
It is useful to restate the equations to be estimated, so that the data 
requirements of the empirical work can be clearly understood. Recall 
from the last chapter that equations (2.33) through (2.35) model the 
demand for wages, pensions, and health insurance benefits. Because 
only two of the three equations are independent, we will estimate only 
the demand for pensions and health insurance:
(2 - 34) 
drlx l + ...+drKxK+ur
sh =ah +brhln(prlpw)+bhhln(phlPw)+bhln(m/P*) + (2.35)
To repeat, this is a standard set of demand equations, in the sense that the 
demand for each component of compensation is modeled as a function of 
the relative prices of those benefits [(prlp^) and (ph/pwy], real total 
compensation (w/P*), and other characteristics such as age and sex 
(*! , . . . , Xff). The dependent variables, sr and sh , are the shares (that is, 
proportions) of total compensation received in the form of pension 
contributions and health insurance benefits. The at , btj , bt , and dik are 
parameters to be estimated, and ur and uh are random disturbances. (See 
chapter 2 for a complete development of the model, and the conclusion 
of that chapter for a summary.)
Prices and income drive any system of demand equations, and this 
demand system is no exception. All of the policy changes that will be
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simulated in the next chapter have their effect on the demand for fringe 
benefits and the mix of compensation through their effect on relative 
prices and income. It follows that construction of the relative price and 
income variables is of central importance. Recall from the last chapter 
the definition of the relative prices: 2
pjpr =(cjcr)/(l-t),and (2.5) 
i), (2.36)
where cw , cr, and ch are the employer's cost of providing a unit of wage 
benefits, a unit of pension benefits, and a unit of health insurance 
benefits; and t is the marginal tax on income faced by the worker.
Four variables, cw, cr , ch , and t, are needed to construct the above 
relative prices. How are these four variables to be observed? First, in 
using both the NIPA data and the EEEC survey, we will assume that the 
wage-pension cost ratio (cw/cr) is constant. As pointed out in the last 
chapter, this is a debatable assumption worth further research, but the 
problems to which it may give rise can be minimized by including a 
proxy for firm-specific human capital among the control variables 
(*! , . . . , XK). Next, the wage health-insurance cost ratio (cw/ch) will be 
constructed from a hedonic model of the price of health insurance. This 
model is developed in the appendix to this chapter, and relies on the 
1977-78 National Medical Care Expenditure Survey. The National 
Medical Care Expenditure Survey is a critical part of the empirical work 
presented in this chapter because it is the only existing data from which 
one can obtain measures of variation in health insurance costs from 
establishment to establishment and from industry to industry. The 
results of the hedonic model are applied to both the NIPA data and the 
EEEC survey.
Finally, the marginal tax rate (f) will be constructed from data on each 
observation in each sample. The methods involved in computing t for 
each of the two data sets will be discussed below, along with the 
development of each data set.
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Estimates from the National Income and Product Accounts
Description of the Data
In the past 20 years, labor economists and other applied micro- 
economists have grown accustomed to using and interpreting household 
data, almost to the point where they distrust and eschew data in which 
the unit of observation is more highly aggregated than the household. 
Indeed, it is clear that the availability of household data is responsible for 
many of the important advances in labor economics during the past 25 
years. Nonetheless, household data have disadvantages as well, and first 
among these is the problem of measurement error, which may have led 
to the appearance of "very great microlevel randomness in economic 
behavior" (Stafford 1986, p. 405). Aggregation can provide a way of 
washing out, through averaging, some of the errors that appear at the 
individual level, and when a unit of observation higher than the indi 
vidual or household can be justified on behavioral grounds, subaggre- 
gate data can be quite useful.
In this section, we use two-digit industry data from the National 
Income and Product Accounts. Hence, the two-digit industry is our unit 
of observation. In addition to mitigating problems of measurement 
error, the NIPA data are capable of representing the entire private U.S. 
economy. We have assembled data on 54 of the two-digit nongovernmen 
tal industries for the years 1968 through 1982. Governments have been 
excluded from the sample examined because the vesting and funding of 
government pensions raise issues that are unique to the public sector. 
Likewise, railroads have been excluded because railroad workers' pen 
sions are regulated separately from the pensions of all other workers in 
the economy. Farms and "Other services" consisting of social services, 
membership organizations, and miscellaneous professional services  
have been deleted because of inadequate data. A more detailed account 
of the data and the variables constructed from them follows.
Central to our work is the unpublished two-digit industry data on 
"other labor income" for 1968 through 1982, which was provided to us 
by the Income and Wealth Division of the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
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For each two-digit industry, we obtained "employer contributions to 
private pension and welfare funds" divided into two categories: (a) 
"pension and profit-sharing," and (b) the sum of "group insurance"  
which includes both group health and group life insurance and supple 
mental unemployment benefits. This two-way breakdown is less than 
ideal because pension contributions are lumped with profit-sharing, and 
because life insurance and supplemental unemployment are lumped 
with health insurance. (That is, the Bureau of Economic Analysis does 
not separate health insurance from life insurance and supplemental 
unemployment at the two-digit industry level.) Nonetheless, the break 
down improves on that used in previous research, and the problems of 
having health contributions lumped with life insurance and supplemen 
tal unemployment benefits are minimized by the dominance of health 
contributions within that category. (For example, in 1982, health contri 
butions were 89.6 percent of the sum of health, life, and supplemental 
unemployment benefits in the aggregate economy.) 3
From these unpublished data and the published NIPA data, the follow 
ing variables needed to estimatethe model stated as equations (2.34) and 
(2.35) can be constructed for each two-digit industry in each year.
1. Relative Prices. Recall from equations (2.5) and (2.36) that four 
variables (cw, cr, ch , and t) are required to construct the relative prices 
(Pr/Pw) and (Ph/Pw)- We will assume, as already discussed, that (cr/cw) 
equals one, which means we need only estimates of ch and /.
The employer's cost of providing health benefits (ch) can be measured 
both over time and from industry to industry at a point in time. Variation 
over time is measured by observing the price index for health insurance 
published in the NIPA (U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, 1986, Table 7.10). Variation in the cost of health 
insurance from industry to industry is measured by using the hedonic 
model of health insurance cost, described in the appendix to this chapter. 
Readers of the appendix will see that interindustry differences in the cost 
of health insurance are derived only for 1977-78. Consequently, it is 
necessary to assume that these interindustry differences are constant 
over all years from 1968 through 1982. 4 These constant interindustry
44 Tax Treatment of Fringe Benefits
differences are adjusted upward or downward for each year by the health 
insurance price index in the NIPA. Hence, the cost of health insurance 
matched to each industry in each year depends on both the industry and 
the year of the observation.
The marginal tax rate on earnings (t) is computed under two alter 
native tax schemes, in an effort to test the sensitivity of the results to 
different assumptions about the tax filing status of the average worker in 
each industry. 5 The idea is to obtain an upper and lower bound on the 
marginal tax rate faced by the average worker in each industry. Under 
the joint-filing tax scheme, it is assumed that the average worker filed a 
joint return with three exemptions, and took the minimum standard 
deduction, low-income allowance, or zero-bracket amount (whichever 
was most favorable). Accordingly, taxable income, computed as yearly 
gross earnings minus exemptions and deductions, is applied to the tax 
table for a married individual filing a joint return. Under the separate- 
filing tax scheme, it is assumed that the average worker was married 
filing separately, took two exemptions, and again took the minimum 
standard deduction, low-income allowance, or zero-bracket amount. In 
this latter case, the computed taxable income figure is applied to the tax 
table for a married individual filing a separate return. Under both tax 
schemes, tax credits in effect during 1975 through 1978 are accounted 
for, as are the tax surcharges of 1968 and 1969, but no attempt is made to 
account for the Earned Income Tax Credit in effect in 1975 and follow 
ing years.
We have not added the social security payroll tax rate to the marginal 
tax rate on wages when earnings are below the social security maximum 
earnings base. This amounts to assuming that workers receive an actu- 
arially fair return on their social security contributions. Burkhauser and 
Turner (1985), Gordon (1983), and Sloan and Adamache (1986) have 
favored this assumption, based on the logic that the social security 
benefit formula links a worker's social security benefits to payroll taxes 
paid. Indeed, most current retirees are receiving more than an actu- 
arially fair return on their social security payroll taxes; it is only for 
workers born after 1945 that social security will provide a return that is 
actuarially unfair.
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Two alternatives to assuming that workers receive an actuarially fair 
return to social security have been developed and tested by Hamermesh 
and Woodbury (1990). One alternative is to add the social security 
payroll tax rate to the marginal tax rate paid on earned income whenever 
a worker's earnings fall below the social security maximum earnings 
base. (That is, / in equations (2.5) and (2.36) would include the payroll 
tax.) Two assumptions underlie this alternative: that the social security 
payroll tax does not apply to benefits, hence adding to the incentive to 
receive benefits; and that workers receive an actuarially fair return on 
their share (50 percent) of the payroll tax. The other alternative, first 
used by Turner (1987), takes the further step of adding the social 
security payroll tax to the employer's cost of providing wages, in 
addition to adding the payroll tax to the marginal tax on earned income. 
(That is, the payroll tax is added to cw in equations (2.5) and (2.36), in 
addition to being included in t.) This alternative assumes that workers 
bear the full burden of the tax but will never receive any benefits, and 
reflects the way most college students seem to perceive the social 
security system.
As it turns out, estimates of the demand for fringe benefits are 
remarkably insensitive to these alternative ways of handling the social 
security payroll tax. For example, Hamermesh and Woodbury (1990) 
find that estimates of the uncompensated price elasticities using the three 
alternatives are within 3 percent of each other. Similarly, Woodbury and 
Bettinger (1991) find that estimated responses of fringe benefit coverage 
to the tax-price of benefits are virtually identical under the three alter 
natives. Accordingly, even though we have not performed sensitivity 
tests on the estimates reported in this chapter, we feel reasonably 
confident that our results would be unchanged if we handled the social 
security payroll tax differently.
2. Compensation Shares. The share of compensation received as 
pension benefits by the average worker in each industry (sr) is obtained 
by dividing pension contributions per employee by total compensation 
per employee. 6 Total compensation per employee is defined as the sum 
of after-tax wages and salaries per employee, pension contributions per
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employee, and insurance contributions per employee. After-tax wages 
and salaries are not observed directly, but are imputed in the process of 
assigning the marginal tax rate to the average worker in each industry 
(see the discussion of Relative Prices above). Similarly, the share of 
compensation received as health benefits (sh) is constructed by dividing 
insurance contributions per employee by total compensation per em 
ployee. These shares are the dependent variables in equations (2.34) and 
(2.35).
3. Real Total Compensation. The measure of real total compensation 
(m/P*) is obtained by summing after-tax earnings with employer contri 
butions to pension and health insurance plans, and dividing by the 
approximated price index P*. Note that m is the same as the de 
nominator of the compensation shares, sr and sh . Because our data span 
1969 through 1982, it is necessary to adjust P* by the Consumer Price 
Index (CPI). Specifically, in equation (2.20), pw and/?r are both multi 
plied by the CPI (divided by 100) for the appropriate year. Since ph 
already incorporates the health insurance component of the CPI, no 
further adjustment to ph is required.
4. Control Variables. The above variables, which are essential to the 
model and are derived from the NIPA, are supplemented by additional 
control variables. These variables, which are the jc^s in equations (2.34) 
and (2.35), are described presently. The source of each, if other than the 
NIPA, is noted.
First, a set of dummy variables, one for each two-digit industry in the 
sample, is included to control for features of an industry that do not 
change over time and that are either unmeasurable or difficult to mea 
sure. Inclusion of these variables yields a so-called fixed-effects model 
(see, for example, Johnston 1984, pp. 396-407, for a lucid exposition). 
It should be noted that these industry dummies are the only control 
variables that do not vary over time. The remaining jc^s will hence be 
referred to as time-varying control variables.
Second, the proportion of workers in each industry who are blue- 
collar workers, and the proportion of workers in each industry who are
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women, are both derived from Employment and Earnings (U.S. Depart 
ment of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, various March issues). These 
variables offer a way of controlling for characteristics of each industry's 
workforce that do vary over time, particularly over the business cycle, 
and that may influence the shares of compensation received in various 
forms. 7
Third, for each industry and each year, the median ages of men and of 
women are approximated by taking published data from the 1970 and 
1980 decennial Censuses of Population on the median age of men and 
women by industry, and forming a trend. From this trend, one can 
interpolate to obtain values for years between 1970 and 1980, and 
extrapolate (using the trend that prevailed between 1970 and 1980) to 
obtain values for years earlier than 1970 and later than 1980. 8 (The data 
come from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census 1972, 
1982.)
Fourth, the average number of workers per establishment is com 
puted for each industry in each year by taking annual data on the number 
of employees and number of establishments in each industry from 
County Business Patterns (U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of 
the Census, various years). This allows us to control for and appraise the 
existence of scale economies in the provision of benefits, which were 
first studied systematically by Mitchell and Andrews (1981).
Fifth, the business cycle may affect the degree to which pension 
liabilities are funded, or the degree to which health insurance benefits 
are provided or enhanced. In order to account for variation over the 
cycle in fringe benefit provision, we include as a control variable the 
annual proportional change in real Gross National Product contributed 
by the industry. (Note that, as a result, observations from 1968 are 
dropped from the sample, leaving us with a sample of observations from 
1969 through 1982.) Also, in order to account for any exogenous trends 
in fringe benefits, a simple time trend is included among the xks.
Finally, we attempt to control for the level of firm-specific human 
capital possessed by the average worker in each industry. This is impor 
tant because Lazear (1981), among others, has hypothesized that the 
greater the amount of firm-specific human capital possessed by a
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worker, the greater will be the incentive for the worker's employer to 
offer compensation in a deferred form such as pensions. The reasoning 
is that deferred compensation creates an incentive to workers who 
possess large stocks of specific human capital to remain with the firm 
(see Alien and Clark 1987 for a review). This line of reasoning is known 
as the "agency hypothesis."
Given the popularity of the agency hypothesis as an explanation of 
why firms offer deferred compensation, it is interesting that it has rarely 
been tested (but see Mumy and Manson 1985). Part of the reason for the 
rarity of testing the agency hypothesis is that finding good proxies for 
firm-specific human capital is no easy matter. Parsons (1972), in his 
pioneering effort to test for the effects of specific capital, focused on 
capital per worker, job tenure, and occupational category (for example, 
the proportion of managers in an industry) as variables likely to be more 
highly correlated with specific than with general human capital. Long 
and Scott (1982, p. 215), in their work on tax incentives for provision of 
fringe benefits, approximated firm-specific human capital with a 
capital-labor ratio constructed by dividing real corporate capital con 
sumption allowance (in $1,000,000s) by the number of full-time equiv 
alent employees (both obtained from the NIPA). We follow their prac 
tice, except, of course, the measure of capital consumption allowance 
per worker used here is disaggregated by industry, rather than for the 
economy as a whole. 9 Also, we recognize that the capital-labor ratio is 
an imperfect proxy for firm-specific human capital, and that it is open to 
alternative interpretations. 10
Descriptive statistics for each variable used in the analysis are dis 
played in table 3.1. Except as noted in the table notes, the means 
displayed are weighted by the number of employees in each industry. 11
Results from the National Income and Product Accounts
The results of estimating the demand system specified by equations 
(2.34) and (2.35) are displayed in table 3.2. Note that four sets of 
estimates are shown. The first two columns (labeled "Joint-Filing Tax 
Scheme") are estimated with marginal taxes on wage income (and the
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Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
in the NIPA Data
Variable
Standard 
Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum
Variables from joint tax scheme:
sw (wage share)
sr (pension share)





























Variables from separate tax scheme:
sw (wage share)
sr (pension share)
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(industry median)



























































NOTES: All means are weighted by the number of employees in each industry, except for average 
number of workers per establishment (which is weighted by the number of firms in the industry), the 
capital-labor ratio, and the annual proportional change in industry output (both of which are 
unweighted). There are 54 industries in the sample, with observations from 1969 through 1982 
(inclusive). Hence N= 756.
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derived tax-price of wage income) constructed by applying taxable 
income to the married joint-filing tax schedule. The second two columns 
(labeled "Separate-Filing Tax Scheme") are estimated using marginal 
taxes constructed by applying taxable income to the married separate- 
filing tax schedule. The first and second columns differ in that the first 
column displays estimates obtained by applying Zellner's joint gener 
alized least squares estimator to the data (labeled "JGLS"), whereas the 
second column displays weighted joint generalized least squares esti 
mates (labeled "WJGLS"). The same difference distinguishes the third 
column from the fourth. Weighted estimates were obtained out of a 
concern that the error terms in equations (2.34) and (2.35) might be 
heteroscedastic. Specifically, it stands to reason that the variance of the 
error term might be larger in small industries than in large industries. 
The solution is to implement weighted least squares, with industry 
total compensation serving as the weight. The results suggest that at 
most a minor gain in efficiency is obtained from the correction for 
heteroscedasticity.
1. Relations Between Control Variables and Fringe Benefit Shares. It 
is useful to examine first the coefficients of the additional time-varying 
explanatory variables; that is, the^s. Coefficients of the time-vary ing 
control variables appear under the headings "Variables in the Pension 
Equation" and "Variables in the Health Insurance Equation" of table 3.2. 
(Coefficients of the industry dummy variables are excluded from table 
3.2 to conserve space, and will not be discussed.)
A higher proportion of blue-collar workers in an industry appears to 
be related to a higher proportion of compensation received as pension 
benefits, but to a lower proportion of compensation received as health 
benefits. Thus, blue-collar workers appear to be favored relative to 
white-collar workers in the provision of pension benefits, whereas 
white-collar workers appear to be favored relative to blue-collar work 
ers in the provision of health insurance benefits, other things equal. 
Because these results differ both from the findings of earlier studies and 
from findings presented below (using the 1977 EEEC), it seems best to
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Table 3.2 Estimates Coefficients of the Fringe Benefit 























































































































Variables in the Pension Equation:
Proportion of workers
blue-collar
Proportion of workers female
Age of male workers




















































































Variables in the Health Insurance Equation:
Proportion of workers
blue-collar
Proportion of workers female
Age of male workers





























































































NOTES: Estimates result from applying an iterative version of Zellner's seemingly unrelated 
regression procedure to equations (2.34) and (2.35). "Joint-Filing Tax Scheme" indicates that mar 
ginal tax rates (and the implied tax-price of wages) are obtained by applying taxable income to the 
married joint-filing tax schedule; "Separate-Filing Tax Scheme" indicates that the married separate- 
filing schedule is used. JGLS denotes unweighted joint generalized least squares estimates, and 
WJGLS denotes joint generalized least squares estimates weighted by total compensation. The 
dependent variables are shares of total compensation received as pensions and as health insurance.
Asymptotic standard error of each coefficient is shown in parentheses.
Coefficients of the nonprice variables (shown under "Variables in the Pension Equation" and 
"Variables in the Health Equation") are interpretable simply as the change in the share of total 
compensation received as pension benefits (or as health insurance benefits) resulting from a unit 
change in the independent variable, all else equal.
Each equation includes a set of two-digit industry dummy variables, in addition to the time- 
varying control variables shown.
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defer discussion of the occupational effects to the Comparative Discus 
sion section.
A higher proportion of female workers in an industry may increase 
the share of compensation received as health insurance, but appears to 
bear little relation to the share of compensation received as pensions. 
The former finding conflicts with the notion that women often rely on 
the health insurance of their spouses. The simplest interpretation of the 
finding is that health insurance benefits are often a fixed sum that varies 
little from worker to worker within an establishment. Health insurance 
benefits, provided as such a fixed sum, would be a greater proportion of 
the relatively low total compensation received by women. This inter 
pretation is further discussed later in the chapter.
An aging male workforce may increase very slightly the share of 
compensation received as pensions, and appears to increase the share of 
health insurance benefits by .2 or .3 percentage point. The median age 
of women in an industry appears to be quite weakly related to the share 
of compensation received as either pension or health insurance benefits, 
although there is some evidence that an aging female workforce may 
slightly decrease the share of compensation received as health insur 
ance. This last is an entirely plausible finding, in that women have 
traditionally incurred relatively large health care costs during the child- 
bearing years.
The findings on establishment size reported in table 3.2 are strikingly 
at odds with earlier work on fringe benefit determination. First, indus 
tries whose establishments are on average larger appear to pay a lower 
proportion of compensation in the form of pension benefits. And sec 
ond, there is no statistically significant relationship between establish 
ment size and health insurance benefits. (The point estimates do suggest 
that an increase in establishment size of 1,000 workers may tend to 
increase the share of total compensation received as health insurance 
benefits by 1 percentage point, but the standard errors of the estimates 
are large.) These surprising establishment size relationships are dis 
cussed further below.
The estimated relations between the capital-labor ratio and fringe 
benefit shares are striking. The results consistently indicate that a higher
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capital-labor ratio leads to a greater proportion of total compensation 
paid as pensions that is, as deferred benefits. In contrast, a higher 
capital-labor ratio appears to have no consistent relationship with the 
share of compensation paid as health benefits that is, as current bene 
fits. If the measure of the capital-labor ratio is properly interpreted as 
representing the level of firm-specific human capital in an industry, then 
the results are consistent with the presence of a strong agency incentive 
to offer deferred benefits.
The annual proportional change in industry output is positively re 
lated to the pension share of total compensation, but negatively related 
to the health benefit share. Together, these results suggest that firms tend 
to fund pension liabilities when it is most convenient to do so that is, 
when business is good - but that health benefits are treated as a fixed cost 
that is paid regardless of business conditions. 12
Finally, the time trend variable shows that there has been a positive 
secular trend in the provision of both pensions and health insurance. For 
both pensions and health insurance, the annual increase is small-only 
.1 or .2 percentage point per year-but statistically significantly differ 
ent from zero. Moreover, it is worth bearing in mind that. 1 percentage 
point per year accumulates rapidly over time into important increases in 
the share of compensation received as fringe benefits.
2. Price, Income, and Substitution Elasticities. The effects of taxes 
and income on the shares of compensation received as pensions and 
health insurance are best seen by transforming the parameters shown in 
table 3.2 into appropriate elasticities. Compensated price elasticities 
(17*), uncompensated price elasticities (T/^), income elasticities (rj im), 
and elasticities of substitution (aiy), all computed at the sample mean, are 
displayed in table 3.3, and the standard error of each elasticity is shown 
in parentheses below each elasticity. (See chapter 2 for a discussion of 
how these standard errors were computed.) The elasticities displayed in 
the four columns of table 3.3 correspond to the parameter estimates 
given in the four columns of table 3.2.
Although the compensated and uncompensated price elasticities (r/*, 
and rjfj) are of intrinsic interest, they can be derived by the Slutsky
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Table 3.3 Price, Income, and Substitution Elasticities
Computed from Fringe Benefit Demand System
































































































































































































































































NOTES: Elasticities computed from the parameter estimated displayed in table 3.2. (See chapter 
2 for a discussion of the elasticities and details of their computation.) Standard error of each 
elasticity is in parentheses below each elasticity. (Standard errors are computed by taking a Taylor 
approximation at the sample mean.)
equation from the compensation shares, the income elasticities (r/,m), 
and the elasticities of substitution (a^. As a result, it is useful to focus on 
the latter two elasticities.
The estimated income elasticities of demand for wages, pensions, and 
health insurance are similar in each of the four estimated equation 
systems. There is strong evidence that the demand for wage benefits is
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income inelastic, with a point estimate of j\ wm around 0.85. The de 
mands for pensions and for health insurance, on the other hand, appear 
to be income elastic. Looking at the point estimates, the results suggest 
that the demand for pensions is highly income elastic, with estimates of 
t]rm in the range of 2.5 to 3.0. The demand for health insurance is also 
income elastic, although the point estimates of i\hm are lower in the 
range of 1.7 to 1.9. Note that the income elasticities of demand for 
pensions are statistically significantly different from unity at no better 
than the 12-percent level using a two-tailed test, whereas the income 
elasticities of demand for health insurance are statistically significantly 
different from unity at better than the 10-percent level (again using a 
two-tailed test). Hence, although the point estimates of the income 
elasticity of demand for health insurance are smaller, they are statis 
tically somewhat stronger.
The high estimated income elasticities of demand for pensions and 
health insurance and the correspondingly low income elasticity of 
demand for wage income-are striking because they suggest that the 
growth of pensions during the post-World War II era cannot be explained 
by rising marginal income tax rates alone. On the contrary, the income 
elasticities imply that a 100 percent increase in total compensation 
would lead to a near doubling of health insurance benefits, and possibly 
as much as a tripling of pension benefits. The same 100 percent increase 
in total compensation would result in only an 85 percent increase in 
wage benefits. Although these findings accord with some earlier income 
elasticity estimates (Woodbury 1983), the findings conflict with certain 
others (Long and Scott 1982).
The estimated elasticities of substitution (o^) suggest a rather simple 
and intuitively appealing structure of workers' preferences for wages, 
pensions, and health insurance. Pensions and health insurance benefits 
may be weakly complementary, as indicated by the negative estimated 
arhs. Note that although these point estimates are negative, they have 
high standard errors, and are not statistically significantly different from 
zero. Pensions and health insurance benefits both substitute for wages, 
and the point estimates suggest that pensions and wages may be better 
substitutes than health benefits and wages. Although the standard errors
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of both awr and awh suggest strongly that both substitution elasticities 
exceed zero, the evidence that awr and awh exceed unity is less strong. 
Thus, although we can conclude with some confidence that both pen 
sions and health insurance are substitutes for wages, we must be more 
tentative in concluding that the possibilities for substitution between 
wages and either form of fringe benefit are great.
There are no existing estimates with which these substitution elas 
ticities can be compared. But they do tell a logical and intuitively 
appealing story. Any change that leads to greater pension benefits leads 
also to more health insurance (and conversely). In that retirement 
income is more likely to be enjoyed if one has good health care, and 
since good health care leads to the expectation of a longer retirement, 
this result makes good sense. Likewise, it makes sense that wages and 
pensions should be better substitutes than wages and health benefits. 
Health benefits, in that they are benefits in-kind, are restrictive and 
specific. Pensions, on the other hand, are properly thought of as cash 
income with one restriction that the income be spent in retirement.
Estimates from the Survey of 
Employer Expenditures for Employee Compensation
Description of the Data
The Survey of Employer Expenditures for Employee Compensation 
(EEEC) was a survey of establishments conducted by the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics from 1966 through 1977. The 1977 EEEC sampled 
3,320 establishments of all sizes in order to obtain detailed data on 
wages and fringe benefits. 13 The main advantage of the EEEC is that it 
includes data on dollar expenditures on fringe benefits, as opposed to 
merely whether fringe benefits were provided. Hence, it allows one to 
observe the shares of compensation received as pensions, health insur 
ance, and so on.
The main shortcoming of the EEEC is that it contains no data on the 
characteristics of the employees of each establishment. But it does
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include industry, region, occupation, and urban-nonurban location iden 
tifiers that permit one to match each record with average employee 
characteristics obtained from a separate source. In order to partially 
remedy the deficiencies of the EEEC for research, several researchers  
including Alpert (1983), Antos (1981), Freeman (1981), and Sloan and 
Adamache (1986) have successfully matched the EEEC data with 
various group means tabulated from the Current Population Survey.
This section presents estimates of fringe benefit demand derived from 
a sample of 5,234 groups of workers from the 1977 EEEC. It is 
important to understand that although the EEEC are establishment-level 
data, we actually observe workers disaggregated into two groups in each 
establishment blue-collar workers and white-collar workers. 14 Hence, 
the unit of observation is not the establishment per se, but either a group 
of blue-collar workers, or a group of white-collar workers, observed in 
an establishment surveyed in the EEEC.
Each EEEC worker-group record is supplemented with data from the 
1977 Current Population Survey and the 1977-78 National Medical 
Care Expenditure Survey. Specifically, appropriate group means of 
certain variables tabulated from the Current Population Survey are 
matched to each EEEC worker-group record. The match between the 
EEEC worker-group and the Current Population Survey was carried out 
as follows. From the Current Population Survey, means of the required 
variables were computed for 848 groups of workers. The 848 groups 
result from dividing all workers in the Current Population Survey into 
53 two-digit industries of employment, 4 regions of residence (north 
east, north central, south, and west), 2 occupations (white-collar or 
blue-collar), and 2 locations (either within or outside of a Standard 
Metropolitan Statistical Area). The mean for each group of workers was 
then matched with the appropriate EEEC worker-group. For example, 
the mean years of schooling of urban blue-collar workers in printing and 
publishing in the north central states was matched with all EEEC 
worker-group observations that were of urban blue-collar workers in 
printing and publishing in the north central states. Also, the appropriate 
value of the hedonic price index of health insurance, created from the
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from the National Medical Care Expenditure Survey was matched with 
each EEEC record. (See the appendix to this chapter for details.)
This procedure of matching group means from a secondary data set 
with micro data (that is, either individual or establishment data) has 
been referred to as "data-stretching" by Greenberg, Pollard, and Alpert 
(1989). Their investigation of the statistical problems that arise from 
data-stretching suggests that the coefficients of stretched variables may 
be biased, and that the standard errors of the coefficients of stretched 
variables are biased downward. (Moulton 1990 has reached a similar 
conclusion regarding the standard errors of the coefficients of 
stretched variables.) Greenberg, Pollard, and Alpert conclude that data- 
stretching is a procedure whose routine use should be avoided, although 
they defend the practice as a means of reducing the variance of esti 
mates. Clearly, data-stretching is not a practice that anyone would 
undertake if adequate data were available. We defend our use of stretch 
ing in this context because it allows us to include controls  albeit 
imperfect for schooling, gender, race, and age that would otherwise be 
excluded. Greenberg, Pollard, and Alpert's results make us especially 
cautious in drawing inferences from these stretched variables.
Since 3,320 establishments were surveyed in the 1977 EEEC, as 
many as 6,640 groups of workers could have been analyzed a group of 
blue-collar workers and a group of white-collar workers in each estab 
lishment. However, for three reasons the final sample includes only 
5,234 worker-groups. First, not all establishments employed both types 
of workers; such establishments contribute only one observation to the 
sample. Second, not all EEEC worker-group records included all the 
industry, region, and location data needed to make a match with the 
means tabulated from the Current Population Survey or with the appro 
priate value of the hedonic price index. Third, in order to make the 
sample similar to the NIPA sample in its industrial composition, worker- 
groups in railroads, certain service industries (education; religious, 
welfare, and membership organizations; and miscellaneous profes 
sional services), and government were deleted from the sample.
The following variables needed to estimate the fringe benefit demand 
model (eq. 2.34 and eq. 2.35) can be constructed using the data base
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obtained by matching and merging the 1977 EEEC, the 1977 Current 
Population Survey, and the 1977-78 National Medical Care Expenditure 
Survey.
1. Relative Prices. Recall again that four variables (cw, cr, ch , and t) 
are required to construct the relative prices (pr/pw) and (ph/pw) . In using 
the NIPA data, we assumed that (cr/cw) equals one, and the same 
assumption will be made in using the EEEC survey. Hence, we again 
need estimates only of ch and t.
Variation in the cost of health insurance (ch) from industry to industry 
is measured by using the hedonic model of health insurance cost de 
scribed in detail in the appendix to this chapter. The price of health 
insurance matched to each worker-group is based on its industry, region 
(northeast, north central, south, or west), location (urban or nonurban), 
and occupation (white-collar or blue-collar).
The marginal tax rate on earnings (f) that faces the average worker in 
each group in the EEEC cannot be observed directly. Hence, the mar 
ginal tax rate is computed in two quite different ways, in an effort to test 
the sensitivity of the results to different assumptions about the marginal 
tax rate facing the average worker in each group.
The first approach is to impute the marginal tax rate facing each 
worker-group by a rather complicated algorithm. This algorithm pro 
ceeds by first assigning certain household variables from the 1977 
Current Population Survey to each EEEC worker-group. The following 
household variables turn out to be relevant to tax computation: (a) the 
mean ratio of total household income to worker's earnings; (b) the mean 
number of persons in the household, rounded to the nearest whole 
number; (c) a dummy variable equal to one if the majority of workers in 
the group owned their home; and (d) variables indicating the most 
common household arrangement of workers in the group (married with 
spouse present, single, or single head of household). Each of these 
variables is computed for each of the 848 Current Population Survey 
groups, and the appropriate value of each variable assigned to each 
EEEC worker-group.
Next, average earnings of each EEEC worker-group are multiplied by
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the mean ratio of total household income to worker's earnings, in order 
to obtain a measure of average total household income for each EEEC 
group. This is the basic measure of gross income from which taxes and 
the marginal tax rate are computed. Exemptions and deductions are 
computed based on the average number of persons in households in the 
worker-group. Either the minimum standard deduction or the average 
amount of itemized deductions is taken, depending on which is more 
advantageous and whether the average worker in the group owned his or 
her home. [The average deductions declared by each adjusted gross 
income class for interest, taxes, medical and dental expenses, and 
miscellaneous items are summed and applied to each worker-group by 
gross income class. These itemized deduction amounts for each ad 
justed gross income class are obtained from Statistics of Income (U.S. 
Department of the Treasury 1979).] The per capita credit in effect in 
1977 and the Earned Income Tax Credit, if applicable, are computed for 
each worker-group (Pechman 1977, pp. 76 and 102). Taxable income is 
computed by subtracting exemptions, deductions, and the exemption 
equivalent of applicable credits from gross income. The taxable income 
figure is then applied to the income tax schedule for single persons, 
single heads of households, or married couples filing a joint return, 
depending on the most common household arrangement of workers in 
the group. The result is a marginal income tax rate (t) and a federal 
income tax bill for each worker-group in the EEEC sample.
The second approach to computing the marginal tax rate is somewhat 
simpler. As in the first approach, this approach starts by assigning to 
each EEEC worker-group some household information from the Cur 
rent Population Survey in this case, the mean ratio of total household 
income to worker's earnings is the only variable required. Average gross 
household income for each EEEC group is again imputed by multiply 
ing the average earnings of each EEEC worker-group by the mean ratio 
of total household income to worker's earnings from the Current Popula 
tion Survey. Hereafter, the second approach differs from the first. Now, 
the marginal tax rate (f) and the taxbill are assigned directly to each 
worker-group based on its imputed gross household income. The appro-
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priate marginal tax rate and taxbill are taken from Statistics of Income 
(U.S. Department of the Treasury 1979).
To summarize, two different methods of computing the marginal tax 
rate (f) facing each worker-group are used in the EEEC estimation. The 
first relies on a fairly complicated algorithm that imputes the marginal 
tax rate facing each worker-group based on the existing tax code. This 
first approach results in what will be referred to as imputed marginal tax 
rates in what follows. The second approach assigns marginal tax rates 
from Statistics of Income directly to each worker-group based on its 
imputed gross household income. This second approach results in what 
will be referred to as direct marginal tax rates, since they are assigned 
directly from observed tax returns rather than being imputed from the 
tax code.
2. Compensation Shares. There are two different concepts of com 
pensation share that may be relevant with the EEEC data. The first is the 
proportion of each worker's total compensation received as wages, 
pensions, and health insurance. The second is the proportion of each 
household's total compensation received as wages, pensions, and health 
insurance. The first would be relevant if we believed that choices about 
fringe benefits were made by individual workers independent of their 
household situation. The second would be relevant if we believed that 
choices about fringes are really household decisions. There can be little 
doubt that fringe benefit choices are household choices, but available 
data are inadequate to treat these choices in a true household framework. 
Rather, lack of adequate household data has forced researchers to treat 
fringe benefit choices as choices made by individual workers.
A compromise is, however, possible. The share of each worker- 
group's total compensation received as wages, pensions, and health 
insurance could be computed as a proportion of household total com 
pensation, where household total compensation is defined as the income 
(excluding fringe benefits) of all household members plus the average 
fringe benefits of the worker-group. Such shares fail to consider the 
fringe benefits received by members of the household other than the
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worker in question, but may nevertheless serve two purposes. First, 
they may give an improved approximation to household fringe benefit 
shares. And second, they will certainly yield information about the 
sensitivity of parameter estimates to the specification of the dependent 
variable.
This discussion suggests that two different sets of compensation 
shares could be constructed and used with the EEEC survey data. The 
first would use the average disposable earnings of each worker-group in 
computing total compensation shares. For example, the share of total 
compensation received as pension contributions would be computed as:
Sr^ZrPr/kvPv + ZrPr + ZHpJ (3.1)
where the notation is the same as that developed in chapter 2. In 
particular, zwpw is the dollar amount of after-tax earnings received by 
the average member of the worker-group.
The second set of compensation shares would use the imputed house 
hold income of each worker-group in computing total compensation 
shares. In this latter case, the share of total compensation received as 
pension contributions would be computed as:
sr =zrpr/(zwpw +zrpr +zhph +r) (3.2)
where / is the after-tax income, excluding fringe benefits, received by 
other household members. Again, shares computed in this second way 
do not truly measure the share of household total compensation received 
as pensions, because they fail to consider the fringe benefits received by 
other members of the household. But again, such shares may neverthe 
less give us an idea of how sensitive are estimates of the tradeoff between 
wages and fringe benefits to different specifications of the dependent 
variable.
It will be convenient to refer to shares computed with regard only to 
the earnings and benefits of each worker-group, as in equation (3.1), as 
individual measures of compensation shares. Shares computed with 
regard to all household income and each worker-group's benefits, as in 
equation (3.2), will be referred to as household measures of compensa 
tion shares.
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Recall from the discussion of marginal tax rates in the subsection on 
Relative Prices that we have two methods of computing the taxes paid by 
each worker-group: One method uses an imputation based on the tax 
code, and the other method assigns an observed marginal tax rate 
directly to each worker-group based on its gross household income. 
Hence, there will be two ways of computing the individual compensa 
tion shares from equation (3.1), since zwpw, which is after-tax earnings, 
will differ depending on the method of computing taxes. Also, there will 
be two ways of computing the household compensation shares from 
equation (3.2), since zwpw and / will both differ depending on the 
method of computing taxes.
As a result, four separate sets of compensation shares are computed in 
the EEEC data base, as follows: (a) individual compensation shares that 
use imputed tax rates to calculate after-tax earnings; (b) household 
compensation shares that use imputed tax rates to calculate after-tax 
earnings; (c) individual compensation shares that use direct tax rates to 
calculate after-tax earnings; and (d) household compensation shares that 
use direct tax rates to calculate after-tax earnings. These four sets of 
compensation shares will result in four different sets of estimates of 
equations (2.34) and (2.35).
3. Real Total Compensation. The real total compensation variable 
(ra/P*) poses a problem in the EEEC data because it is likely to be 
correlated with the error term. To see why, consider an establishment 
that offers its workers unusually generous pension and health insurance 
benefits, and think of this generosity as a positive disturbance to the 
random error terms ur and uh in equations (2.34) and (2.35). For a given 
level of wages, both total compensation and the shares of total compen 
sation received as pensions and health insurance by workers in such an 
establishment will be high. Hence, there is simultaneity between the 
fringe benefit shares and total compensation: Our model implies that 
total compensation affects the fringe benefit shares, and now it appears 
that in a stochastic setting in which compensation shares experience 
random disturbances-the shares may affect total compensation. 
Hence, total compensation is no longer independent of the error terms.
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This is a significant problem when one uses establishment-level data, 
because such random disturbances are likely to be significant at the 
establishment level. With industry-level data, much of the random error 
is washed out in aggregation to the industry level. Hence, there was no 
need to consider this problem when estimating the model using the 
NIPA data.
The endogeneity of total compensation in the establishment-level data 
is handled here by the method of instrumental variables. Total compen 
sation (in) of workers in each worker-group is constructed in the usual 
way by summing average after-tax earnings of workers in the group with 
average employer contributions to retirement, health insurance, and 
savings and thrift plans. (There are actually four measures of total 
compensation, one corresponding to each of the four sets of compensa 
tion shares discussed in the previous section.) The instrument for total 
compensation, denoted by m', is the after-tax earnings of the average 
worker in the worker-group divided by the two-digit industry average 
share of total compensation received as wages. The resulting variable, 
m', is highly correlated with actual total compensation, but uncorrelated 
with the error terms. Indeed, m' seems a nearly ideal instrument for m. 
Use of the industry average share of wages in computing total compensa 
tion purges the correlation between m' and the error terms. But m' still 
incorporates some establishment level information about the total com 
pensation of each worker-group, because the numerator of m' is average 
after-tax wages for the worker-group.
4. Control Variables. The above variables are essential to the model 
and are derived from the EEEC survey with some supplementation from 
the CPS and Statistics of Income. These variables are further supple 
mented by additional control variables from the EEEC, the CPS, and the 
National Medical Care Expenditure Survey. Again, these control vari 
ables are the xks in equations (2.34) and (2.35).
First, several variables are available directly from the EEEC file, and 
are specific to each worker-group record. These variables are: (a) the 
number of employees in each establishment, which is included to 
control for economies of scale in the provision of fringe benefits, (b) a
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dummy variable equal to one if the workers in the unit were covered by a 
collective bargaining contract, (c) a dummy variable equal to one if the 
worker-group was composed of white-collar workers, (d) a dummy 
variable equal to one if the unit was located in a Standard Metropolitan 
Statistical Area (SMSA), and (e) a set of dummy variables modeling the 
regional location of the worker-group (northeast, north central, south, 
or west).
Second, Alpert (1982, pp. 186-187) has suggested that the ratio of 
paid leave hours (vacation, holiday, sick leave, and personal leave) to 
total hours worked is a good proxy for the level of firm-specific human 
capital possessed by a group of workers. His reasoning is that paid leave 
time tends to increase with job tenure, and hence should be highly 
correlated with job-specific skills. It is possible to compute this ratio 
variable for each worker-group in the EEEC sample using available 
data. The resulting ratio variable, which will be referred to as the "skill 
proxy," is included among the xks.
Third, because part-time workers often fail to qualify for certain 
fringe benefit plans, it is important to control for the presence of part- 
time workers in each worker-group. A variable measuring the preva 
lence of part-time workers in each worker-group can be constructed 
from the EEEC data. The variable is constructed by dividing the total 
number of workers in the group (both full-time and part-time) by the 
estimated number of full-time equivalent workers in the group. The 
larger the value of this variable, the greater the proportion of part-time 
workers in the group.
Fourth, as noted above, several group means tabulated from the 1977 
Current Population Survey are matched with each EEEC worker-group 
record. The variables added to each EEEC record in this way are: (a) 
average number of years of schooling, (b) proportion of workers who 
are female, (c) proportion of workers who are white, (d) proportion of 
workers under age 30, and (e) proportion of workers over age 50. 
Addition of these variables is an attempt to overcome the lack of data on 
characteristics of workers in each group. As discussed above, coeffi 
cients of these "stretched" variables should be interpreted with caution.
Finally, a set of 50 two-digit industry dummy variables was included
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to control for otherwise unmeasured differences that might exist across 
industries. (Fifty-one two-digit industries are represented in the sample; 
the dummy variable for metal mining is omitted from the estimation.) 
Descriptive statistics for each variable used in the analysis are dis 
played in table 3.4. The means displayed are all simple averages of the 
worker-groups in the sample.
Results from the Survey of Employer Expenditures 
for Employee Compensation
The results of applying the two-equation demand system specified by 
equations (2.34) and (2.35) to the EEEC survey data are displayed in 
table 3.5. Four sets of estimates are shown. The first two columns  
labeled "Imputed Tax Rates" display estimates obtained with marginal 
taxes on wage income and the derived tax-price of wage income imputed 
by the algorithm described above. The second two columns labeled 
"Direct Tax Rates" display estimates obtained with marginal taxes 
assigned directly from Statistics of Income based on gross household 
income. The first and second columns differ in that the first column 
displays estimates obtained using individual compensation shares de 
fined by equation (3.1) as the dependent variables, whereas the second 
column displays estimates obtained using household compensation 
shares defined by equation (3.2). The same difference distinguishes the 
third column from the fourth. All estimates shown are weighted joint 
generalized least squares estimates, with before-tax total compensation 
of the worker-group serving as the weight. Weighting is used to correct 
for possible heteroscedasticity, although unweighted joint GLS results 
are qualitatively similar.
1. Relations Between Control Variables and Fringe Benefit Shares. 
We turn first to the coefficients of the control variables; that is, the xks. 
These appear under the headings "Variables in the Pension Equation" 
and "Variables in the Health Insurance Equation" of table 3.5.
The first five variables shown average schooling, proportion of 
workers female, proportion of workers white, and proportion of work-
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Table 3.4 Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
in the EEEC Survey Data
Variable Mean
Variables from imputed tax rates,
sw (wage share) 0.916
sr (pension share) 0.041





m'/P* (instrument for real
total compensation, $) 8,877
Variables from imputed tax rates,
sw (wage share) 0.940
sr (pension share) 0.030





m'/P* (instrument for real


















































Variables from direct tax rates, individual shares:
sw (wage share) 0.915
sr (pension share) 0.042





m'/P* (instrument for real


























Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum
Variables from direct tax rates, household shares:
sw (wage share)
sr (pension share)


















































































































NOTES: The sample is composed of 5,234 observations on groups of workers in 3,320 establish 
ments in the U.S. in 1977. Worker-groups are of either blue-collar workers (that is, nonoffice 
workers) or white-collar (office) workers. EEEC worker-group data are supplemented with data 
from the Current Population Survey and National Medical Care Expenditure Survey (see text).
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Table 3.5 Estimated Coefficients of the Fringe Benefit 
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NOTES: Estimates result from applying an iterative weighted version of Zellner's seemingly 
unrelated regression procedure to equations (2.34) and (2.35). Before-tax total compensation is the 
weight used. "Imputed Tax Rates" indicates that marginal tax rates (and the implied tax-price of 
wages) were imputed from information contained in the federal tax codes. "Direct Tax Rates" 
indicates that marginal tax rates were assigned directly to each observation from Statistics of Income 
based on gross household income.
The dependent variables are the shares of total compensation received as pensions and as health 
insurance. "Individual Shares" denotes use of equation (3.1) to compute compensation shares; 
"Household Shares" denotes use of equation (3.2).
Asymptotic standard error of each coefficient is shown in parentheses. Parameters computed from 
restrictions placed on the model are indicated by (-).
Coefficients of the nonprice variables (shown under "Variables in the Pension Equation" and 
"Variables in the Health Equation") are interpretable simply as the change in the share of total 
compensation received as pension benefits (or as health insurance benefits) resulting from a unit 
change in the independent variable, all else equal.
Each equation includes a set of two-digit industry dummy variables, in addition to the control 
variables shown.
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ers younger than 30 and older than 50 were appended to each EEEC 
worker-group record from the CPS. The schooling and age variables are 
related in a straightforward way to fringe benefit shares. Worker-groups 
with greater schooling receive a greater share of total compensation as 
both pensions and health insurance; a one-year increase in a group's 
average schooling adds .2 or .3 percentage point to the share of compen 
sation received as pensions, and adds .2 percentage point to the share 
received as health insurance. Young worker-groups receive a smaller 
proportion of their total compensation as pensions; a group of workers 
composed entirely of workers under 30 would receive 2 or 3 percentage 
points less of its total compensation as pensions than would a group 
composed entirely of workers over 30. But older worker-groups receive 
a smaller proportion of their compensation as health insurance', a group 
of workers, all of whom were over 50, would receive about 1 percentage 
point less of its compensation as health insurance than would another 
group, all of whom were under 50.
The relation between race and fringe benefit shares is relatively weak. 
If a larger proportion of a worker-group is white, that group may receive 
a slightly larger share of compensation as pensions, and a slightly 
smaller share of compensation as health insurance.
The effect of the proportion of workers who are female differs 
dramatically depending on whether individual or household shares are 
used as the dependent variable. When individual shares are used as the 
dependent variable, the results suggest that a higher proportion of 
women increases fringe benefit shares, as has been found in several 
previous investigations, including ours (above) using the NIPA. But 
when household shares are used as the dependent variable, the opposite 
is found: A higher proportion of women lowers fringe benefit shares, as 
would be suggested by the reasoning that women tend to rely on the 
pension and health insurance benefits of their spouses. This finding is 
useful because it backs up the interpretation that has been given to the 
often-found positive relation between the proportion of women in a 
group and the provision of fringe benefits: that fringe benefits are 
frequently a fixed sum per worker, and hence a larger share of the 
compensation of women, whose total compensation tends to be lower
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than men's. This interpretation would seem to be correct. As the findings 
in table 3.5 show, the positive relation between women and fringe 
benefits disappears when household shares of total compensation are 
used as the dependent variable. Hence, the frequent finding that a higher 
proportion of women increases fringe benefits would seem to be a result 
of using individual worker shares of total compensation as the dependent 
variable. When a more appropriate household measure of the share of 
fringe benefits is adopted, a more plausible negative relation emerges.
Establishment size appears to have an effect on fringe benefit shares 
that is statistically significantly different from zero, but quite small. For 
every additional 1,000 workers, establishments pay about. 1 percentage 
point more in pensions and .05 percentage point less in health insurance. 
These findings relating establishment size to fringe benefit shares are 
discussed further below.
The results in table 3.5 suggest a much smaller effect of collective 
bargaining on fringe benefit provision than earlier studies using the 
EEEC. For example, both Freeman (1981) and Alpert (1983) used 
EEEC data and found that unions shift the mix of compensation toward 
fringe benefits. But the table 3.5 results suggest that coverage by a 
collective bargaining contract is unrelated to the pension share of 
compensation, and has only a small effect on the health insurance share. 
(Collective bargaining increases the health insurance share of compen 
sation by about .5 percentage point.)
Several factors may explain the differences between the table 3.5 
results on unions and the findings of Freeman and Alpert on unions and 
fringe benefits. For example, Freeman (1981) did not attempt to control 
for the marginal tax rate facing each group of workers. Moreover, 
Alpert (1983), who did control for marginal tax rates, found the union 
effect on fringe benefits to be strongly interdependent with industrial 
concentration and the specific human capital of a group of workers.
It is true that excluding certain variables from the equations reported 
in table 3.5 would lead to larger union impacts. To the extent that 
industry and occupation are correlated with unionism, the industry 
dummy variables and the white-collar dummy variable undoubtedly 
reduce the size of the union coefficient. Note, for example, that white-
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collar workers, who tend to be nonunion, receive a smaller share of their 
compensation as pensions and health insurance than do blue-collar 
workers. But if any single conclusion can be drawn from the enormous 
existing body of research on union effects, it is that the net independent 
impact of collective bargaining is extremely difficult to pin down. 
Perhaps the safest conclusion to draw from table 3.5 is that once all of 
the factors determining the demand for fringe benefits are adequately 
controlled for, the net independent impact of unions and collective 
bargaining on the mix of compensation is rather small. 15
Independent of their influence on health insurance prices, location, 
and region do not appear to be important determinants of the compensa 
tion mix. Location in an SMSA is unrelated to either pensions or health 
insurance. Workers in the northeast do receive a larger share of compen 
sation as pensions (about 1.5 percentage points more), and workers in 
the south receive a smaller share of compensation as health insurance 
(about .5 percentage point less). But no other regional impacts appear in 
these results.
Greater skill, as approximated by the ratio of paid leave hours to 
total hours worked, has a large impact on the mix of compensation. A 
1 percentage point increase in the ratio of paid leave hours to total hours 
worked (say, from 7 to 8 percent of total hours) is related to a 3 to 4 
percentage point increase in the pension share of compensation, and to a 
1.5 to 2 percentage point increase in the health insurance share of 
compensation. In that the skill proxy's influence on deferred compensa 
tion (that is, pensions) is greater than its influence on current compensa 
tion (health insurance), these results again provide evidence in favor of 
the agency hypothesis. 16
A greater proportion of part-time workers in a worker-group de 
presses both the pension and health insurance shares of compensation. 
An increase in the ratio of the total workers (full-time and part-time) to 
full-time equivalent workers from 1 to 2 would reduce the pension share 
of compensation by 4 to 6 percentage points, and reduce the health 
insurance share of compensation by 3 to 4 percentage points. Although 
statistically different from zero, this relation is less strong than might be 
expected. For example, it implies that if a group of 50 full-time workers
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became a group of 100 half-time workers, the share of their compensa 
tion received as fringe benefits would fall by only 4 or 5 percentage 
points. The implication is that even voluntarily provided pensions and 
health insurance are an important fixed cost of employing workers, 
whether part-time or full-time.
In order to conserve space, we do not report the coefficients of the 50 
included two-digit industry dummy variables, but offer a brief summary 
of these findings in a footnote. 17
2. Price, Income, and Substitution Elasticities. The parameters 
shown in table 3.5 can be transformed into compensated price elas 
ticities (ti*j), uncompensated price elasticities (17,-,), income elasticities 
(rj J/7J), and elasticities of substitution (atj). These elasticities, all com 
puted at the sample mean, are displayed in table 3.6, and the standard 
error of each elasticity is shown in parentheses below each elasticity. 
(See chapter 2 for a discussion of how these standard errors were 
computed.) The elasticities displayed in the four columns of table 3.6 
correspond to the parameter estimates given in the four columns of 
table 3.5.
As noted in the discussion of the NIPA data, the compensated and 
uncompensated price elasticities (rjj, and 17^) can be derived by the 
Slutsky equation from the compensation shares, the income elasticities 
(r//w), and the elasticities of substitution (afj). Hence, it is again useful to 
focus on the latter two elasticities.
The estimated income elasticities of demand for wages, pensions, and 
health insurance (rjim) are similar in each of the four estimated equation 
systems. As was true in the NIPA data, there is again strong evidence 
that the demand for wage benefits is income inelastic, with a point 
estimate of j\ wm in the range of 0.90 to 0.95. Also in accord with the 
NIPA estimates, these results suggest that the demand for both pensions 
and health insurance is income elastic. For pensions, the income elas 
ticity of demand for pensions is around 1.6. For health insurance, the 
income elasticity is somewhat lower, around 1.2 to 1.5. Note that the 
income elasticities of demand for both pensions and health insurance are 
statistically significantly greater than unity at roughly the 5-percent
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level using a two-tailed test. Hence, the income elasticity estimates from 
the EEEC tend to confirm the conclusion reached earlier that the growth 
of pensions during the post-World War II years cannot be explained by 
rising marginal income tax rates alone.
The degree of uniformity exhibited by the four different estimated 
elasticities of substitution (a#) is less in the case of the EEEC than was 
true with the NIPA data. Nevertheless, the EEEC elasticity estimates 
accord in general with the NIPA estimates reported above. Specifically, 
the EEEC estimates tend to confirm that pensions and health insurance 
benefits both substitute for wages, and that pensions and wages are 
probably better substitutes than health benefits and wages. In the EEEC, 
the evidence is stronger than in the NIPA data that awr exceeds unity. But 
again the evidence suggests that awh is probably insignificantly different 
from unity. Although we can again conclude with some confidence that 
both pensions and health insurance are substitutes for wages, we must 
again be more tentative in concluding that the possibilities for substitu 
tion between wages and health insurance are great.
The estimated elasticity of substitution between pensions and health 
insurance (arh) is never statistically significantly different from zero, but 
the point estimates range between 3 to 4 when imputed tax rates are 
used, and between   1 and  2 when direct tax rates are used. Hence, 
there is only weak evidence to support the notion, suggested rather 
weakly by the NIPA estimates, that pensions and health insurance are 
complements.
Comparative Discussion
The two empirical investigations one using the NIPA data and the 
other using the EEEC survey data have offered many results that are in 
accord and a few that conflict. The most important results pertain to the 
effects of income and prices (or taxes) on the mix of compensation, and 
on these points the two data sets offer strikingly similar implications.
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Table 3.6 Price, Income, and Substitution Elasticities
Computed from Fringe Benefit Demand System
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NOTES: Elasticities computed from the parameter estimates displayed in table 3.5. (See chapter 
2 for a discussion of the elasticities and details of their computation.) Standard error of each 
elasticity is in parentheses below each elasticity. (Standard errors are computed by taking a Taylor 
approximation at the sample mean.)
These findings can be summarized as follows.
(a) The findings from both data sets indicate that the demand for wage 
benefits is income inelastic, whereas the demand for pensions and health 
insurance is income elastic. Hence, a doubling of total compensation
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would result in less than a doubling of wage benefits, whereas the same 
doubling of income would substantially more than double pension and 
health insurance benefits.
(b) The findings from both data sets indicate that both pensions and 
health insurance are good substitutes for wage benefits, and that pen 
sions are probably a better substitute for wages than health insurance. 
(We infer that pensions are a better substitute for wages than health 
insurance from the point estimates rather than from formal statistical 
tests.)
(c) Evidence on whether pensions and health insurance are substitutes 
or complements is relatively weak. Findings from both data sets suggest 
that pensions and health insurance may be complements, but in no case 
do statistical tests offer a rejection of the hypothesis that the elasticity of 
substitution between pensions and health insurance is zero. Hence, it is 
safest to conclude that pensions and health insurance are separable in 
consumption.
It is important that the two separate investigations offer similar results 
about the effects of income and prices on the mix of total compensation, 
because these are the fringe benefit determinants that have changed most 
over the last 20 years. Demographic changes, however inexorable, have 
been more gradual. Moreover, it is through the income and price effects 
that changes in tax policy have made their mark on the mix of total 
compensation. The sensitivity of compensation shares to changes in tax 
policy will become clearer in the next chapter, where simulations of 
various tax policy changes are presented.
The two empirical analyses are in somewhat less agreement on the 
effects of other variables on the mix of compensation. Undoubtedly, part 
of the problem here is that whatever control variables were at hand were 
used in each investigation. The lack of uniformity between the two data 
sets in available control variables could itself lead to important differ 
ences in the measured effects of included variables. Nevertheless, sev 
eral findings in common emerge, and these can be summarized as 
follows.
(a) Older workers tend to receive a greater share of compensation as 
pensions, other things equal. The two data sets are in conflict, and hence
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yield no conclusive finding, on whether older workers receive more or 
less health insurance, other things equal.
(b) Blue-collar workers tend to receive a greater share of compensa 
tion as pensions, other things equal. But again, the two data sets conflict 
on whether blue-collar workers receive more or less health insurance.
(c) Greater firm-specific skill increases the pension share of total 
compensation, and has a greater positive effect on pensions than on 
health insurance. This finding strongly supports the agency hypothesis 
that employers use deferred compensation, such as pensions, to create a 
bond between the firm and workers who have skills that can be acquired 
only through tenure with the firm.
(d) When the unit of observation is properly defined as the house 
hold as is done in the investigation using the EEEC survey  it can be 
seen that women receive a smaller share of their compensation as both 
pensions and health insurance, other things equal. This suggests that 
women tend to rely on the fringe benefits of their spouses and may also 
suggest discrimination in compensation.
(e) The findings about the effects of establishment size on the mix of 
compensation are rather weak. This is in contrast to the findings of many 
previous studies but accords with results reported in Hamermesh and 
Woodbury (1990). Results from the NIPA data suggest that larger 
establishments provide a smaller share of compensation as pensions, 
whereas the EEEC survey results suggest that larger establishments 
provide a slightly larger share of compensation as pensions. Regarding 
health insurance provision, results from the NIPA data suggest no 
relationship between establishment size and provision of health benefits, 
whereas the EEEC survey suggests a very slight negative effect of 
establishment size on health benefits. Interpreting the relationship be 
tween establishment size and fringe benefit provision is a difficult matter 
because many factors may be associated with establishment size  
industry concentration, the need to monitor and regiment the work 
force, and economies of scale (Mellow 1983). It is usually supposed that 
larger groups of workers are able to take advantage of scale economies 
in the provision of fringe benefits especially health and life insur 
ance but the results reported here offer only weak support for such a
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hypothesis. Rather, our results suggest that establishment size plays a 
limited role in the provision of fringe benefits, which suggests in turn 
that the positive relationships between establishment size and fringe 
benefit provision found in previous studies may be the result of an 
inability to control fully for income, tax-price, and other effects.
In completing this comparative discussion, it is useful to examine the 
industry composition of the two samples used. Table 3.7 displays, for 
each of the two samples, the percentage of employment accounted for 
by each industry, and the percentage of establishments (for the NIPA) or 
worker-groups (for the EEEC) accounted for by each industry. The 
NIPA percentages can be thought of as population percentages, since the 
NIPA attempt to account for all private economic activity that takes 
place in the nation. How closely the EEEC percentages correspond to 
the NIPA percentages can give an idea of how representative is the 
EEEC survey.
Table 3.7 suggests that manufacturing (especially durable goods 
manufacturing) and utilities are overrepresented in the EEEC survey, 
and that construction, retail trades, services, and agriculture (the only 
evident omission) are underrepresented. This is not surprising in that the 
EEEC survey is a stratified random sample, as any nationally represen 
tative survey of establishments must be in order to yield reliable in 
ferences about the population of establishments. Stratification implies 
oversampling establishments in industries that have relatively few, but 
large, establishments (such as manufacturing and utilities), and conse 
quently implies undersampling establishments in industries that have 
many small establishments (such as construction, retail trade, and 
services).
That the EEEC survey drew establishments from all segments of the 
private economy (except agriculture) makes the similarities between the 
two empirical analyses presented above somewhat less surprising than 
might otherwise be the case. But there remain basic differences between 
the two data sets. The NIPA data set used in estimation is a pooled time- 
series of cross sections from 1968 through 1982, with the two-digit 
industry as the unit of observation. The EEEC survey is a cross section
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Table 3.7 Comparison of NIPA and 1977 EEEC Survey Samples:
Percentages of Employment and Establishments 









































































NOTES: Agriculture excludes farms, and hence includes only agricultural services, forestry, and 
fisheries. Transportation excludes railroads. National Income and Product Accounts data are for 
1977. In the National Income and Product Accounts data, total full-time equivalent employment in 
the industries listed was 61.1 million, and there were a total of 4.01 million establishments accounted 
for (see U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, County Business Patterns). In the 
1977 EEEC survey, 2.12 million workers were employed in the 5,234 worker-groups used in 
estimation.
of establishments in 1977. Nevertheless, differences between the two 
data sets in industry composition cannot explain the remaining relatively 
minor differences between the two sets of results.
Estimates of the Demand for Fringe Benefits 85
Appendix to Chapter 3 
A Hedonic Price Index of Health Insurance
This appendix develops the measure of the employer's cost of health 
insurance (CA) that is used with both the National Income and Product 
Accounts (NIPA) data and the 1977 EEEC survey in this chapter. Recall 
that in the empirical work using the NIPA data, variation over time in the 
cost of health insurance (ch) was measured by observing the health 
insurance price index published in the NIPA (U.S. Department of 
Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, 1986, Table 7. 10). There is 
no ready source of data on industry-to-industry variations in health 
insurance costs, however. The solution adopted here is to estimate a so- 
called hedonic model of the cost of health insurance, and to construct an 
index of health insurance price based on that model. It is worth noting at 
the outset that only one set of interindustry price differentials is com 
puted in the work presented here. When applied to the NIPA data for 
1968 through 1982, this set of interindustry cost differentials is assumed 
to be constant over the 15 years in question.
Basically, the hedonic approach is a way of estimating how changes in 
the quality of a good affect the price of that good. For example, 
automobiles are sold in many varieties with many different options, and 
it would be interesting to know how different options affect the price of 
an automobile. Zvi Griliches (1971) has applied the hedonic approach 
to precisely this case. He regresses the price of an automobile (PJ on the 
various characteristics of the automobile (Char} , Char2 , • • . ,
i +f2 Char2 + . . . +fNCharN +e. (3.3)
In equation (3.3), Char\ might be the horsepower of the engine, Char2 
the shipping weight in pounds, and so on. (Griliches includes a constant 
term,/), and a random error term (e) in the equation.) Ordinary least 
squares estimation of equation (3.3) yields estimates of the coefficients 
C/i» fz> • • • >Ar)> eacn of which provides an estimate of the change in the 
price of an automobile that would accompany a change in the associated 
characteristic. For example, Griliches used 1960 data and found that an
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increase of 10 units of horsepower would on average result in a 1.2 
percent increase in the price of a car, other things equal.
The same basic idea may be applied to health insurance. Health 
insurance is a highly heterogeneous good, and different premiums are 
charged for health insurance plans that have different features. If we 
could observe the premiums paid for many individual primary health 
insurance holders and the characteristics of the health insurance plans 
purchased, then we could estimate a hedonic equation for the price of 
health insurance patterned after (3.3). Specifically, we could regress the 
annual premium (Pretri) on the characteristics of the health insurance 
plan:
Prem=f0 +fl Charl +f2 Char2 + . . . +fNCharN+e. (3.4)
In equation (3.4), the variables Char l , Char2 , . . . , CharN, now refer to 
the features of the health insurance plan. These would include, for 
example, the deductible (the flat payment that must be paid before the 
insurance covers medical care charges), the coinsurance rate (the frac 
tion of the price of medical services that the insurance pays for), and any 
limits or maximums on reimbursement to the policyholder for medical 
care received. Each of the coefficients (/, , /2 , . . . ,fN) in equation (3.4) 
provides an estimate of the change in the health insurance premium that 
would accompany a change in the associated characteristic of the health 
insurance plan.
Our main interest, however, is in obtaining estimates of how health 
insurance costs vary from industry to industry. To obtain such estimates, 
we could add to equation (3.4) variables that capture the industry in 
which the insured individual works. Making such a modification, we 
would have:
Prem=f0 +fl Charl +f2Char2 + . . . +fNCharN + (3.5) 
v l lndl +v2lnd2 + . . . +
In equation (3.5), Indl would equal one if the insured individual worked 
in industry 1 (zero otherwise), Ind2 would equal one if the insured 
individual worked in industry 2, and so on. The coefficients of these 
industry dummy variables can be interpreted as the health insurance
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cost differentials faced by firms in each industry, other things equal. 
That is, the coefficient oflnd^ shows the amount by which the cost to an 
employer in industry 1 of providing a standardized health insurance plan 
deviates from a norm. These coefficients, then, provide the basis for a 
health insurance cost index.
The hedonic health insurance price function (eq. 3.5) can be esti 
mated using a unique data base that became available only in 1987. The 
National Medical Care Expenditure Survey (NMCES) is a 1977-78 
survey of roughly 14,000 households that was designed to obtain data on 
the health status, access to health care, and health insurance coverage of 
a representative sample of the civilian, noninstitutional U.S. popula 
tion. The NMCES is in two parts. The first part a household survey- 
contains standard demographic data, as well as the data on health status 
and access to health care that were the primary reasons for conducting 
the survey (Kasper, Walden, and Wilson 1983). The second part the 
Health Insurance/Employer Survey is a supplement to the NMCES 
that includes data obtained from employers on (a) premiums paid for the 
health insurance of each covered worker in the sample, and (b) the 
benefits available and services covered under each health insurance plan 
(Cantor 1986).
In order to obtain the hedonic health insurance price function, we 
created a sample of approximately 5,000 private sector workers who 
were covered by health insurance and for whom complete information 
on premiums and benefits were available. The hedonic function esti 
mated differed depending on whether the price index being created was 
to be matched with the NIPA data, or with the 1977 EEEC survey data.
To obtain the price index that is matched with the NIPA data, estimat 
ing the hedonic function (3.5) involves regressing the health insurance 
premium paid for each worker on the characteristics of the health 
insurance plan, a vector of individual characteristics, and a set of 
industry dummy variables. Appendix table A3.1 displays the estimated 
coefficients of the industry dummy variables.
The individual characteristics included in the equation are age, age- 
squared, and dummy variables for female, white, black, and Hispanic 
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NOTES: The equation estimated is an ordinary least squares regression of the primary insured's 
total annual group health insurance premium on the variables shown in the table, a set of 
independent variables characterizing the health insurance package (see the text), and the following 
additional independent variables: age, age-squared, and dummy variables for female, white, black, 
and Hispanic origin. The mean of the dependent variable (the annual health insurance premium) is 
$829.74 (with a standard deviation of $552.33). A sample of 4,764 individuals from the 1977-78 
National Medical Care Expenditure Survey was used to estimate the equation.
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order for the coefficients of the industry dummies to be uncontaminated 
by the characteristics of each industry's workforce. The characteristics 
of the health insurance plan included in the equation are as follows: (a) a 
set of dummy variables characterizing type of coverage (covered by 
basic benefits only, covered by both major medical and basic benefits); 
(b) a set of dummy variables indicating the number of individuals 
covered by the plan (coverage of only the primary-insured worker, 
coverage of the primary-insured worker and one additional person, 
coverage of all family members); (c) a set of variables indicating the 
generosity of major medical benefits (the major medical coinsurance 
rate, a dummy variable equal to one if out-of-pocket expenses from part 
of a prior deductible period can be applied to the current deductible 
period, a dummy variable equal to one if the maximum amount payable 
out-of-pocket by the insured for major medical is $750 or less, a dummy 
variable equal to one if there is no limit on the amount payable out-of- 
pocket by the insured); (d) a set of variables indicating breadth of 
coverage (coverage for services related to pregnancy, coverage for 
vision care, coverage for hearing exams, coverage for a routine physical 
examination, coverage for physician office services, and the deductible 
for physician office services); (e) a set of variables characterizing the 
psychiatric services covered (coverage for outpatient psychiatric care, 
and whether the outpatient psychiatric services for diagnosis are the 
same as for general outpatient benefits); (f) a set of dummy variables 
indicating the generosity of hospital benefits (hospital benefits generous 
and no deductible, hospital benefits generous but there is a deductible, 
hospital benefits less generous and there is a deductible) 18 ; (g) a dummy 
variable equal to one if a second opinion is required before inpatient 
surgery; and (h) a set of variables characterizing the outpatient services 
covered (whether outpatient hospital services are covered, whether 
outpatient diagnostic procedures such as X-ray and laboratory tests are 
covered, and the deductible for outpatient diagnostic services). Several 
of these variables are similar to those used by Wilensky, Parley, and 
Taylor (1984) to describe the coverage provided by health insurance 
plans using the NMCES data. It should be clear that these variables
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provide a comprehensive profile of the health insurance plan that cov 
ered each primary-insured worker in the sample.
The estimates in table A3.1 suggest that health insurance costs are 
relatively high in mining, transportation, and manufacturing, and rela 
tively low in sales and services generally (as well as agriculture). The 
findings accord with the idea that industries in which jobs pose greater 
hazards to health are the industries in which health insurance costs tend 
to be high. Recall that these estimates control for both the individual 
characteristics of the primary-insured worker and the characteristics of 
the health insurance package, so that the relatively low health insurance 
costs in sales cannot be explained, for example, by the overrepresenta- 
tion in that industry of women who are provided relatively meager 
health benefits. Rather, the coefficients provide a "pure" estimate of the 
cost to employers in each industry of a standardized package of health 
insurance benefits.
The coefficients displayed in table A3.1 can be converted into a price 
index by the following procedure. First, evaluate the health insurance 
premium at the mean of all the independent variables excluding the 
industry dummy variables. Call this Prerri. Then divide each industry 
coefficient by Prem' and add one to obtain the health insurance price 
index for each industry.
To obtain the price index that is matched with the 1977 EEEC survey, 
the health insurance premium paid for each worker is regressed on the 
characteristics of the health insurance plan, a set of industry dummy 
variables, and a set of dummy variables that result from interacting 
region, urban/nonurban location, and white-collar/blue-collar occupa 
tion. Appendix table A3.2 displays the estimated coefficients of the 
industry dummy variables and the interaction terms. (The charac 
teristics of the health insurance plan included in the equation are enu 
merated above. Because individual characteristics are controlled for 
explicitly in the fringe benefit demand equations estimated using the 
EEEC data, they are excluded from this hedonic health insurance price 
equation.)
The estimates of the industry dummy variables displayed in table 
A3.2 are qualitatively similar to those shown in table A3.1. This result
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Table A3.2 Hedonic Price Function for Health Insurance: Estimates 

























































































































































NOTES: The equation estimated is an ordinary least squares regression of the primary insured's 
total annual group health insurance premium on the variables shown in the table, and a set of 
independent variables characterizing the health insurance package (see the text). The mean of the 
dependent variable (the annual health insurance premium) is $829.74 (with a standard deviation of 
$552.33). A sample of 4,764 individuals from the 1977-78 National Medical Care Expenditure 
Survey was used to estimate the equation.
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suggests that the industry effects are robust to relatively minor changes 
in specification. The coefficients of the interaction terms suggest three 
findings. First, health insurance costs tend to be higher in urban than in 
rural areas (with the exception of white-collar workers in the South). 
Second, health insurance costs tend to be higher for blue-collar than for 
white-collar workers (with the rural South again providing the excep 
tion). Third, regional variations in health insurance are somewhat 
erratic and depend on occupation (white-collar or blue-collar) and 
urban-rural location. Indeed, it seems best to conclude that occupation 
and urban-rural location are considerably more important than region in 
determining health insurance costs.
The coefficients displayed in table A3.2 can be converted into a price 
index by a procedure similar to that outlined above for the industry price 
index. First, evaluate the health insurance premium at the mean of all the 
independent variables excluding the industry dummy variables and the 
region-location-occupation interaction terms. Call this Prem". Take the 
sum of an industry coefficient and an interaction term coefficient. Since 
there are 10 industries that are of interest and 16 region-location- 
occupation groupings, there are a total of 160 such sums. Divide each 
sum by Prem" and add one to obtain the health insurance price index for 
each grouping. Each observation in the 1977 EEEC sample is assigned 
the appropriate price index value, based on its industry, region, urban- 
rural location, and whether the workers in the unit observed are white- 
collar or blue-collar.
NOTES
1 It is tempting to apologize for the fact that the 1977 EEEC data are over a decade old, but they 
are the most recent firm-level data that are available for our purposes. The establishment-level data 
underlying the Employment Cost Index would be extremely useful, but they are unavailable. In 
using the 1977 EEEC data, we are forced to maintain the hypothesis that the economic relationships 
we estimate have not changed dramatically in the last 10 to 15 years.
2 Note again that equations (2.5) and (2.36) define the inverse of(pr/pw) and (ph/pw), which 
are the relative prices used to estimate equations (2.34) and (2.35).
3 We are grateful to Martin Murphy of the Bureau of Economic Analysis for allowing us access 
to the unpublished two-digit industry data from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA). 
Since the 1968-1982 data were obtained, the Bureau of Economic Analysis has discontinued
94 Tax Treatment of Fringe Benefits
separating other labor income into pensions and group insurance at the two-digit industry level, 
even for internal (unpublished) use. Hence, the 1968-1982 series used here is the most up-to-date 
that can be obtained.
4 Clearly, this is an undesirable assumption necessitated by the lack of available data similar to 
the National Medical Care Expenditure Survey for each year we examine. If the assumption is 
incorrect, we have an errors-in-variables problem. There is, however, no a priori reason to believe 
that interindustry relative costs of health insurance change dramatically over time.
5 In calculating industry averages, we have used full-time equivalent employment in each 
industry, as reported in the NIPA. The NIPA also reports full-time and part-time employment in 
each industry. Using the latter as a measure of industry employment would give undue weight to 
part-time workers in industries that use part-timers heavily.
6 Again, in calculating averages per employee, we have used the figures on full-time equivalent 
employees in each industry. Note that the measure of industry employment used matters to the 
computation of after-tax wages and salaries per employee because this is an imputation based on 
applying the industry average taxable income to the tax schedule. Total compensation is also 
affected by the use of full-time equivalent employment, because total compensation is the sum of 
after-tax wages and salaries, pension contributions, and health insurance contributions.
7 The term "blue-collar worker" will be used throughout the discussion as synonymous with 
"production worker" or "nonoffice worker"; "white-collar worker" will be used as synonymous with 
"nonproduction worker" or "office worker." Different data sets use different terminology for the 
same concept, and it seems best to choose standard terminology.
8 The use of interpolation and extrapolation for median age by industry and year may result in 
measurement error and its attendant problems. In this case, the only alternative would be to omit the 
variable.
9 Note that the minimum capital-labor ratio displayed in table 3.1 is zero. This occurs because 
in 1968 and 1969, the legal services industry had no capital consumption allowance.
10 We believe it would be useful to use an industry-specific estimate of job tenure as a proxy for 
specific human capital in future work. Unfortunately, although the data to obtain such estimates 
exist, no one has yet derived the estimates.
1 ' We have not attempted to include any variable indicating the degree to which compensation is 
determined by collective bargaining in the present analysis (although we do so in the analysis that 
uses the EEEC data). The NIPA data do not report any measure of unionization by industry, and 
although it might be possible to construct such a variable from the Current Population Survey (or 
some other source) and match it to the NIPA data, we are willing to view unionization as an 
industry-specific effect that is captured by the industry dummies included in this model.
12 We assume that an increase in the share of total compensation paid as pensions or health 
insurance implies greater total expenditure on pensions or health insurance. So long as total 
compensation is growing, this assumption is correct.
13 The 1976 EEEC survey was alone among the EEEC surveys in being limited to establish 
ments with at least 20 employees.
14 The EEEC survey refers to workers as either office or nonoffice workers. In keeping with our 
standard terminology, these groups will be referred to as white-collar or blue-collar.
15 It is worth noting that the results on unionism reported here are in accord with time-series 
estimates of the impact of unions on the mix of total compensation (Long and Scott 1982; Alpert 
1987).
16 It could be argued that the skill proxy is in fact an endogenous variable-that workers who are
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provided more fringe benefits will accumulate longer tenure and greater firm-specific human 
capital. It turns out, however, that the other coefficients estimated in the model are robust to the 
exclusion of the skill proxy variable.
17 Industries showing consistently high shares of pension benefits, other things equal, include: 
anthracite mining and oil and gas extraction; petroleum and coal manufacturing; a relatively small 
part of the transportation sector (local transit, water transport, and pipelines); and motion pictures. 
Four manufacturing industries (food, paper, printing and publishing, and instruments) show 
especially low shares of pension benefits, as do security services, and health and educational 
services.
In addition to having high shares of pension compensation, anthracite mining and motion 
pictures also have unusually high shares of health insurance. Six manufacturing industries have 
unusually low shares of health insurance: food, tobacco, printing and publishing, chemicals, 
petroleum and coal, and instruments. A significant part of the transportation and utilities sector 
(trucking and warehousing, air transport, communication, and electricity and gas) provide low 
shares of health insurance, other things equal. The same is true of much of the financial sector 
(banking, credit agencies, security services, and insurance carriers) and of business, health, and 
educational services.
We find two points interesting in these industry results. First, there is much diversity of fringe 
benefit provision within each major (one-digit) industry grouping. This suggests that, if possible, it 
is useful to control for industry at the two-digit level. Second, other things equal, an industry that 
tends to offer a high share of compensation as pensions tends also to offer a high share of 
compensation as health insurance.
18 "Generous" hospital benefits are defined as 365 days or more of basic hospital benefits, or, for 
those with no basic hospital benefits, $250,000 of major medical coverage.

Simulation of Alternative Policies
The empirical work developed in chapter 3 yielded a variety of 
information about the demand for fringe benefits and the existence of 
tradeoffs among different components of compensation. Three main 
findings about the effects of income and tax-prices on the demand for 
fringe benefits emerged. First, the demand for wage benefits is income 
inelastic, whereas the demand for pensions and health insurance is 
income elastic. Second, both pensions and health insurance are good 
substitutes for wage benefits, and pensions appear to be a better sub 
stitute for wages than is health insurance. And third, pensions and health 
insurance may be complements, but the evidence on this point is not 
strong. (In a strictly statistical sense, one would have to conclude that 
the elasticity of substitution between pensions and health insurance is 
zero. There is nevertheless a strong hint of complementarity between 
pensions and health insurance.) The price, income, and substitution 
elasticities that underlie these three summary statements constitute our 
basic findings.
In this chapter, the elasticities derived in chapter 3 are used to gain an 
understanding of how various tax policy changes would influence the 
demand for, and provision of, fringe benefits. In many ways, the 
simulations presented in this chapter are the real payoff to the chapter 3 
empirical work.
We present simulations of three alternative policies. First, we investi 
gate the impact of the 1986 Tax Reform Act on the provision of fringe 
benefits. Second, we simulate the effects of taxing health insurance 
contributions as income. Finally, we examine how taxing employer 
contributions to both pensions and health insurance would affect the 
provision of fringe benefits.
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The latter two simulated policies involve a basic change in the tax 
base, that is, taxation of one or more components of compensation that 
are presently untaxed. Indeed, one of the main reasons for broadening 
the tax base by taxing employer contributions to pensions and health 
insurance is to raise federal revenues and forestall further erosion of the 
tax base. Hence, it is important to simulate the effects of the changes in 
tax policy on federal revenues. As will become clear below, estimated 
revenue effects can be computed in a straightforward way in the course 
of the simulation. Accordingly, this chapter also presents estimates of 
the effects of each simulated policy on federal revenues.
Simulation Strategy
Simulating Compensation Shares
The simulation strategy can be outlined in two steps. First, suppose 
that one of the four models estimated using the National Income and 
Product Accounts (NIPA) data in the last chapter represents the mecha 
nism by which fringe benefit shares are determined in the U.S. econ 
omy. Using a superscript A (hat) to denote estimated coefficients and 
predicted values of compensation shares, any one of these estimated 
models may be written:
sr =ar +brr[ln(pr/Pw)] +brh[ln(ph/Pw)] + (4. 1) 
br[ln(m/P*)]+drl (Xl]+ . . .
sh =ah +brh[ln(pr/pj] +bhh[ln(ph/pw)] + (4.2) 
bh [ln(m/P*)]+dhl [Xl]+ . . . +dhK[xK].
Equations (4.1) and (4.2) show the predicted (or estimated or forecast) 
shares of pensions and health insurance (sr and sh) as a function of 
relative prices [(pr/pw) and (/V/OL real total compensation (m/P*), 
and other characteristics, such as age and gender (jci, . . . , XK). The #,, 
6y, bf, and dik are estimated parameter values.
Second, in order to simulate the effect of any alternative tax system on 
fringe benefit provision, we use an algorithm to simulate the relative
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prices [(pr//O and (phlp^j\ and income (m/P*) implied by that alter 
native tax system. Each of these algorithms is similar to the algorithm 
that imputed marginal taxes and after-tax income in the last chapter. 
Denoting these new simulated relative prices and income by a super 
script ~ (tilde), equations (4.1) and (4.2) may be rewritten:
(4.3) 
br[ln(m/P*)]+drl [Xl ] + . . . +drK[xK}
Sh =ah +br^pJpJ] +bhh[ln(j^J] '+ (4.4) 
bh[ln(m/P*)]+dhl [Xl ] + . . . +dhK[xK].
Substituting the simulated relative prices [(pr/pw) and (phlp^\ and 
income [(m/P*)] into equations (4.3) and (4.4) results in a set of 
simulated shares of pension benefits and health insurance benefits under 
the new tax system. These simulated compensation shares are denoted 
by sr and sh . (The simulated share of wages, Sw, is obtained as a residual, 
since sw +sr +sh =l.) A main goal of this chapter is to obtain these 
simulated compensation shares and to compare them with predicted and 
other simulated compensation shares.
The simulation strategy just outlined is a single-step approach. In 
fact, the simulations presented in this chapter are augmented by a 
second step. This is because the compensation sharesused to construct 
P* in the simulated real total compensation term [ln(m/P*)] of equations 
(4.3) and (4.4) are actual (that is, historically observed) shares, rather 
than the shares that the single-step simulation suggests would occur 
under the alternative tax policy. [Recall from equation (2.20) that P* is a 
share- weighted sum of logarithmic prices.] Recomputing P* using the 
new simulated compensation shares, and resimulating equations (4.3) 
and (4.4), yields second-step simulated compensation shares that fre 
quently differ substantially from the single-step simulated shares. It is 
possible, of course, to iterate this procedure, recomputing P* after the 
second step using the second-step simulated shares, and again re- 
simulating the model. However, experimentation has shown that the 
differences between the second- and third-step simulated shares are 
minimal, and certainly not worth the added computational expense.
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Note that the simulation strategy assumes that simulated changes in 
marginal tax rates and the tax treatment of employer contributions have 
no effect on (a) before-tax total compensation, (b) the demographic and 
other control variables (x\ through XK) included in the estimated equa 
tions, or (c) the structure of demand for compensation that is, that the 
parameter estimates (dif 6^, £,, and dik) of the model used in the 
simulation.
Simulating Real Expenditures on Compensation
The simulation strategy outlined above yields simulated shares of 
wages, pensions, and health insurance. It is useful for some purposes to 
convert these shares into real expenditures on wages, pensions, and 
health insurance. Knowing about real expenditures on compensation  
that is, the quantities of various forms of compensation that workers 
receive is useful for three reasons. First, real or constant-dollar expen 
ditures on compensation have been a perennial concern of employers. 
Second, from the point of view of policy, it is more important to know 
how changes in the tax treatment of fringe benefits would alter real bene 
fits received by workers than to know whether the compensation pack 
age shifted toward or away from a given component of compensation.
Third, consumer theory offers no prediction about what will happen 
to the share of total compensation received in form i in response to a 
change in tax treatment. 1 For example, taxing health insurance contri 
butions (that is, raising the price of health insurance) could either 
increase or decrease the share of compensation received as health 
insurance depending on the elasticity of demand for health insurance. 
But consumer theory implies that the compensated demand curve for 
health insurance must be downward-sloping, and that taxing health 
insurance should lead to reduced quantities of health insurance de 
manded (holding constant real purchasing power and all other demand- 
determining factors). In general, it is simpler to interpret simulations 
that are stated in terms of changes in compensation quantities (that is, 
real expenditures) than in terms of compensation shares. Retrieving 
simulated real expenditures on each form of compensation from our
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estimates is straightforward. By definition, the share of compensation 
received in form i is:
Si=piZi/m. (4.5)
It follows that simulated real expenditures on compensation received in 
form i (£,-) can be obtained by substituting the simulated s{ , m, andp, into 
identity (4.5) and solving for zt :
(4.6)
Simulated Comparisons
Two kinds of simulated comparison prove useful and are presented 
below. First, we ask how a different tax treatment of fringe benefits 
would have altered fringe benefit provision during the past 20 years. 
That is, how would fringe benefit provision have differed if fringe 
benefits had been treated differently under the tax system that existed in 
each year from 1969 through 1982? These simulations are referred to as 
simulations under the tax systems existing in 1969-1982.
Second, from the point of view of current policy, it is important to 
understand how changes in the tax treatment of fringe benefits could be 
expected to alter fringe benefit provision under the current tax system  
that is, the system initiated under the Tax Reform Act of 1986. These 
simulations are referred to as simulations under the 1986 tax reform.
These two simulated comparisons are discussed further presently.
1. Simulations Under Tax Systems Existing in 1969-1982. Simulat 
ing the effects of changes in the tax treatment of fringe benefits under the 
tax systems that existed in each year from 1969 through 1982 is accom 
plished in two steps. First, the shares of wages, pensions, and health 
insurance predicted under the tax system in effect in each year are 
obtained from equations (4.1) and (4.2). These shares provide the 
basis or "counterfactual" for the simulated comparisons. Second, the 
simulated shares under the same tax system, but with an altered tax
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treatment of fringe benefits superimposed, are obtained by the method 
described above [see equations (4.3) and (4.4)].
The result is a comparison of simulated shares with predicted shares. 
Comparing the simulated shares with actually observed shares would be 
inappropriate because the actual shares incorporate a random error that 
the simulations cannot incorporate. To see why, examine equations (4.1) 
through (4.4). These suggest that a comparison of predicted with simu 
lated shares should be a clean comparison: the predicted shares indicate 
what the model predicts compensation shares would be under a set of 
actually observed conditions, whereas the simulated shares indicate 
what the model predicts compensation shares would be under some 
hypothetical conditions. If instead of using the predicted shares as the 
"counterfactual" to the simulated shares, we used the actual shares, we 
would contaminate the comparison with random errors for which the 
simulation, by definition, does not control. Accordingly, the tables in 
this chapter that report simulations under the tax systems existing in 
1969-1982 compare simulated with predicted shares (or real expendi 
tures), in order to present a clean picture of how a different tax treatment 
of fringe benefits would have altered compensation in 1969 through 
1982.
2. Simulations Under the 1986 Tax Reform. Simulating the effects of 
changes in the tax treatment of fringe benefits under the 1986 tax reform 
is also accomplished in two steps. First, we simulate the shares of 
wages, pensions, and health insurance that would have been observed in 
each year from 1969 through 1982 if the 1986 tax system had been in 
effect. These shares provide the counterfactual for the 1986 tax reform 
simulation. Second, we simulate the shares that would have been ob 
served in each year if an altered tax treatment of fringe benefits had been 
superimposed on the basic 1986 tax system. [In both of these steps, we 
use the method developed earlier and summarized by equations (4.3) 
and (4.4).]
The result is a comparison between two simulated shares one under 
the 1986 tax reform, the other under the 1986 tax reform with a changed 
tax treatment of fringe benefits. The comparison is a clean one, in that
Simulation of Alternative Policies 103
in that there is no random error in either of the simulated shares used in 
the comparison.
Revenue Effects
The effects of each simulated tax policy on federal revenues can be 
appraised by an extension of the two-step simulation procedure. The 
strategy here is to simulate, for each observation, a new level of before- 
tax wages that accounts for the fact that the mix of wages and fringe 
benefits may change as a result of the simulated tax law. Once computed, 
this new level of before-tax wages is applied to the tax law being 
simulated in order to obtain (again for each observation) a simulated tax 
bill under the new law. If the simulated law taxes one or more kinds of 
fringe benefits in addition to wages, then the dollar expenditure on 
taxable fringe benefits is added to the new level of before-tax wages 
before computing the tax bill.
The new simulated level of before-tax wages, which we will call 
(zwpw), is computed by subtracting from the observed before-tax total 
compensation (TC^ the simulated expenditure on fringe benefits. (TCb 
is simply the sum of observed before-tax wages and expenditures on 
fringe benefits.) Simulated expenditures on fringe benefits are com 
puted by multiplying simulated after-tax total compensation (TCa , 
which is the sum of simulated after-tax earnings and observed fringe 
benefits) by the simulated share of after-tax compensation allocated to 
fringe benefits (sr +sh). (The simulated fringe benefit shares must be 
multiplied by after-tax compensation because the simulated benefit 
shares predict the proportion of after-tax total compensation that will be 
allocated to fringe benefits.)
Accordingly, the new simulated level of before-tax wages is:
(wJ = TCb -[TCa(Sr +Sj]. (4.7)
This is the dollar amount that, either by itself or with taxable fringe 
benefits added to it, is applied to whichever tax schedule is being 
simulated in order to compute the tax bill of each observation in the
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sample. We compute the aggregate tax bill by summing the taxes paid by 
each observation in the sample.
Distributional Effects
Finally, it is important to understand whether changing the tax treat 
ment of fringe benefits would have uneven effects on different groups of 
workers depending on their income. To gain some insight into the 
distributional effects of changing the tax treatment of fringe benefits, we 
offer summaries of effects for three groups of industries those in which 
average earnings were between $11,630 and $17,041, those in which 
average earnings were between $17,643 and $22,550, and those in 
which average earnings were between $23,103 and $39,498, all in 1982 
current dollars.
The unit of observation we are using for our simulations is the 
industry, which is not an ideal unit of observation for a distributional 
analysis. Clearly, the individual or the household would be preferable. 
Nevertheless, an understanding of how changing the tax treatment of 
fringe benefits would have a differential impact on industries in which 
average earnings differ should provide some notion of how taxing fringe 
benefits would affect households in different income categories.
Further Issues
A variety of further issues must be handled in implementing the 
simulations. Three of these deserve general mention here because they 
apply to all of the simulations discussed. Specifics of these issues will be 
raised below in discussing the simulations.
1. Selection of Estimates Used in Simulations. Recall that chapter 3 
reported estimates using two different data sets, a variety of methods of 
imputing the marginal tax rates (and hence relative prices) facing a 
group of workers, and both weighted and unweighted joint generalized 
least squares. Clearly, any of the sets of parameter values estimated in 
the last chapter could serve as a basis for simulation.
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With one modification noted in the next subsection, the simulations 
presented below are based on estimates from the NIPA data, using the 
joint-filing tax scheme and weighted joint generalized least squares 
(WJGLS). These estimates appear in chapter 3, tables 3.2 and 3.3. We 
have used these estimates because they are arguably the most represen 
tative of the entire private U.S. economy (both because they are 
weighted by total compensation and because they use the NIPA data). 
Hence, the simulations can be directly interpreted as representing policy 
impacts on the private U.S. economy.
In order to ensure that the results of our simulations are not peculiar to 
our choice of underlying estimates, we have computed a variety of 
alternative simulations. We have used estimates from both the NIPA and 
Employer Expenditure for Employee Compensation (EEEC) data sets, 
based on different imputations of marginal tax rates, and based on 
weighted and unweighted estimation procedures. It turns out that varia 
tion among these alternative simulations is minor, which is not surpris 
ing given the congruence of the various estimates reported in chapter 3. 
Hence, we report only the simulations based on the NIPA estimates 
using joint-filing and WJGLS.
2. Model Restrictions. We have modified the estimates of the joint- 
filing, WJGLS model in one way. Rather than allow the elasticity of 
substitution between pensions and health insurance (arh) to take its 
estimated value of -3.24 (see the row labeled arh in table 3.3), we 
restrict arh to  1.0 in all simulations. This restriction is imposed 
because the standard error of arh is so high that (statistically) arh itself 
cannot be distinguished from zero. Although it could be argued that arh 
should be restricted to zero, it seems reasonable to allow some degree of 
complementarity between pensions and health insurance, in view of the 
large negative point estimates of arh . Hence we compromise by setting 
arh equal to one. We have checked the degree to which this restriction 
affects the simulations and found the effects to be surprisingly minor.
3. Decomposition of Simulated Effects . Understanding of the simula 
tions is aided by decomposing the simulated effects of any change in tax
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regime into three parts. Recall that the simulated shares of pensions and 
health insurance are computed as:
(4.3) 
br[ln(m/P*)]+3rl [Xl ]+ . . . +drK[xK]
(4.4) 
bh [ln(m/P*)]+dhl [Xl ]+ . . . +dhK[xK],
where sr and sh denote simulated compensation shares , (pr/pw) and 
(Ph/Pw) denote simulated relative prices, and (m/P*) denotes simulated 
real income. In simulations under the tax systems existing in 1969- 
1982, these simulated shares are compared with the compensation 
shares predicted for 1969-1982 (sr and sh), which are computed from 
equations (4.1) and (4.2). In our simulations under the 1986 tax reform, 
these simulated shares are compared with another set of simulated 
shares  the shares that our model tells us would prevail if fringe benefits 
remained untaxed under the 1986 tax reform.
The difference between each simulated share and each predicted (or 
other simulated) share can be decomposed into the following three 
parts:
(a) the change in compensation share that results from changing only 
the relative price terms [(pr/pw) and (ph/pw)] in equations (4.3) and 
(4.4), but holding real compensation and all other terms constant;
(b) the change that results from changing the price index (P*) of the 
real income term (m/P*), but holding constant money income (m) and 
all other terms in equations (4.3) and (4.4); and
(c) the change that results from changing money income (rri) in the 
real income term (w/P*), but holding constant all other terms in equa 
tions (4.3) and (4.4).
The first of these three effects can be recognized as a pure substitution 
(or price) effect, the second as an ordinary income effect, and the third 
and an additional income effect that we will call the "extra" income 
effect. This "extra" income effect is unconventional, but it may occur if a 
change in the tax system, in addition to altering relative prices, also 
alters the level of total compensation available to workers. The existence
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of the extra income effect will be discussed further in the context of each 
simulation. 2
Impact of the 1986 Tax Reform
The 1986 Tax Reform
Primarily because it lowered marginal tax rates under the federal 
individual income tax, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 has potentially 
important implications for the provision of fringe benefits by employ 
ers. Several existing studies bear out the hypothesis that rising marginal 
tax rates on wages during the 1960s and 1970s led to increases in the 
fringe benefit share of compensation, and it follows that lowering the 
tax-price of wages should have the opposite effect. Such a hypothesis 
could be based loosely on a theory like that outlined in chapter 2: since 
lower marginal tax rates on wages reduce the tax-price of wages relative 
to fringe benefits, it stands to reason that the quantity of wage compensa 
tion will increase, and the quantity of fringe benefit compensation will 
decrease, as a result of tax reform. That is, the reduced tax rates on 
earnings should result in substitution of wages for fringe benefits. 3
Although the substitution or tax-price effect is the most obvious 
avenue by which the 1986 reform could be expected to affect the mix of 
compensation, income effects are also possible. Indeed, two separate 
income effects, both of which would tend to offset the pure substitution 
of tax reform, may arise (see above). The first is the ordinary income 
effect that arises because price changes lead to changes in real pur 
chasing power. The second income effect may arise because the 1986 
tax reform increased the proportion of total federal revenues raised 
by the corporation income tax, lowering the burden placed directly 
on households through the individual income tax. If corporations 
bear the full burden of increases in the corporation income tax, it is 
possible that the household sector will experience an increase (or at least 
a perceived increase) in disposable income as a result of the 1986 
reform. If so, then the reform would have an additional income effect 
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or what we called the "extra" income effect above on the demand for 
fringe benefits. Both of these income effects would tend to offset the 
substitution effect of the reform; the empirical findings of chapter 3 
suggest that lowered marginal tax rates will tend to dampen the demand 
for fringe benefits, but that increased incomes will tend to strengthen 
that demand.
Whether the extra income effect actually occurs is an awkward 
question, depending as it does on who bears the burden of the corpora 
tion income tax. The controversy over who bears the corporation in 
come tax is as profound as any in economics see Pechman (1987, pp. 
141-145) for a sampling of conclusions about the incidence of the tax. It 
is not at all clear whether corporations bear the full burden, part of the 
burden, or none of the burden of the corporation income tax. But an 
assumption about the burden of the corporation income tax is in effect an 
assumption about whether the 1986 Tax Reform Act has raised house 
holds' nominal disposable incomes. Given the controversy surrounding 
the burden of the corporation income tax, it seems important to examine 
the simulated effects of the 1986 tax reform under alternative assump 
tions about whether households experience increased incomes as a 
result of the reform, and we provide such an examination below.
The 1986 tax reform is simulated by the procedure outlined above. 
First, an algorithm is constructed that creates the relative prices (pr/pvv) 
and (ph/pw) and income (m/P*) that would have prevailed in each 
industry and each year from 1969 through 1982 if the 1986 tax reform 
legislation had existed in those years. Since we are relying on the 
estimates from the joint-filing tax scheme, relative prices are simulated 
by applying taxable income, computed as annual gross earnings minus 
three exemptions and the joint-filing standard deduction, to the 1988 
joint-filing tax table. (The 1988 tax system is used to simulate the tax 
reform because 1988 was the first year the system was fully in effect.) It 
is necessary to deflate the complete tax system exemptions, standard 
deduction, and tax brackets to a level appropriate to the year in 
question. We do so using the Consumer Price Index.
The simulated relative prices and income are then substituted into 
equations (4.3) and (4.4) to obtain the simulated shares of pensions and
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health insurance benefits (sr and sh~). Note again that the demographic 
and other control variables (x l through*^), which also influence the mix 
of compensation, are held constant in the simulation because they are 
assumed unaffected by tax reform.
In summary, simulations based on the chapter 3 estimates of prefer 
ences for wages and nonwages are needed in order to answer questions 
about the effects of the 1986 tax reform on the provision of fringe 
benefits. Questions about the 1986 tax reform to be addressed in the 
remainder of this section include the following: How would we expect 
tax reform to affect the shares of wages, pensions, and health insurance 
in total compensation, and how would we expect tax reform to affect real 
expenditures on each component? To what degree is tax reform respon 
sible for substitution of wages for fringe benefits? Have pensions and 
health insurance benefits been differently affected by the reform? Have 
the fringe benefits of different groups of workers been differently af 
fected? What are the effects of the reform on tax revenues?
Simulated Effects of the 1986 Tax Reform
Table 4.1 shows how the tax system enacted by the 1986 tax reform 
would have altered real expenditures on compensation, and compensa 
tion shares, if it had been in effect during 1969 through 1982. All effects 
are in percentage terms and averaged over the 1969-1982 period. The 
first panel shows the total effects of the 1986 tax reform that is, the sum 
of the substitution, ordinary income, and extra income effects. The 
second panel isolates the substitution effects. The third panel disaggre 
gates the total effects on real expenditures into effects on low-wage, 
medium-wage, and high-wage industries.
Consider the following pair of entries in table 4.1. The first entry in 
the first panel (9.4) indicates that real wage expenditures (or the quantity 
of wages) would have been 9.4 percent greater on average during 1969- 
1982 if the 1986 tax reform system had been in effect in those years. The 
first entry in the second panel (1.6) indicates that the lower marginal tax 
rates (lower tax-price of wages) implied by the 1986 reform would by 
themselves have increased real wage expenditures by just 1.6 percent. It
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Table 4.1 Simulated Effects of the 1986 Tax Reform: Average 
Percentage Changes Under Tax Systems Existing 1969-1982
Health 
Wages Pensions Insurance
Total Effects of 1986 Tax Reform on:
Real Expenditures 9.4 0.9 10.4 
Compensation Shares -0.3 -1.4 7.7
Substitution Effects of 1986 Tax Reform on:
Real Expenditures 1.6 -18.5 -6.1 
Compensation Shares 0.7 -13.1 0.7
Total Effects on Real Expenditures, by Industry Group: 
Aggregate 9.4 0.9 10.4 
Low-Wage Industries 5.0 1.9 8.2 
Medium-Wage Industries 8.9 0.5 11.3 
High-Wage Industries 13.5 0.7 10.4
NOTES: The figures show how replacing the tax systems in effect during 1969 through 1982 with 
the tax system implied by the 1986 tax reform would have changed real expenditures on compensa 
tion and shares of compensation. Changes are shown in annual percentage terms, averaged over the 
14 years. "Total effect" refers to the sum of the substitution, ordinary income, and extra income 
effects. The substitution effect isolates the impact of the changing tax-price of wages relative to 
pensions and health insurance.
follows that most of the simulated total increase of 9.4 percent is the 
result of the income effects of tax reform, rather than lower marginal tax 
rates. If the 1986 tax reform implied a tax system that lowered marginal 
tax rates without changing households' real purchasing power, the simu 
lated increase in real expenditures on wages would be only 1.6 percent. 
Other entries in table 4.1 may be interpreted and compared similarly.
1. Aggregate Effects. The results shown in table 4.1 suggest that, 
overall during 1969-1982, the tax system represented by the 1986 
reforms would have increased real expenditures on wages and health 
insurance received by workers, and would have had little effect on real 
expenditures on pensions. These are the total effects of the tax reform, 
which assume that tax reform has the capacity to change real purchasing 
power (see the "Graphical Treatment of the Decomposition" below). The
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increase in real expenditures on health insurance is driven by the large 
income effect of tax reform, whereas the increase in real expenditures on 
wages results from both income and substitution effects.
One could also consider the effects of the 1986 tax reform absent any 
income effects (see the substitution effects in the second panel of table 
4.1). But it seems implausible that the tax reform included some auto 
matic mechanism for holding purchasing power constant; hence, the 
total effects in the top panel are the preferred simulations of the 1986 tax 
reform.
Regarding compensation shares, the simulations suggest that the mix 
of compensation would have shifted toward health insurance and away 
from pensions, with little effect on the wage share. Keep in mind that 
consumer theory offers no prediction about the direction of changes in 
shares, since these latter changes are determined by changes in both 
relative prices and quantities. Again, the increase in the health insurance 
share in this simulation appears to be driven mainly by the income 
effects of tax reform, which lead to a large increase in health insurance 
quantities.
2. Distributional Effects. The bottom panel of table 4.1 divides the 
total effects of the tax reform on real expenditures into effects on 
different groups of workers. The simulations suggest that workers in 
high-wage industries experience much larger increases in real expendi 
tures on wages than do workers in low-wage industries. This difference 
results because most of the increase in wage expenditures is driven by 
the income effects of the tax reform, with workers in high-wage indus 
tries experiencing greater income effects than others.
The 1986 tax reform appears to have relatively even distributional 
effects on pension and health insurance expenditures. Workers in low- 
wage industries have a somewhat larger increase in demand for pen 
sions, and only slightly lower increase in demand for health insurance, 
than do workers in medium- and high-wage industries.
3. Decomposing the Simulated Effects. Further insight into the re 
sults displayed in table 4.1 can be obtained by decomposing the effects












































































































































































NOTES: Columns (b) through (e) show real wage expenditures by year (these may also be thought of as quantities or constant dollar expenditures). The 
predicted figures (column (b)) provide the base for our comparisons, showing wage expenditures predicted by our model under prices and income that existed 
in each year. Column (c) shows wage expenditures if only the substitution effect occurred, column (d) shows wage expenditures if both substitution and 
ordinary income effects occurred, and column (e) shows wage expenditures if substitution, ordinary income, and extra income effects occurred.
Columns (f) through (i) show substitution, ordinary income, extra income, and total effects in percentage terms, and are computed from the figures in 
columns (b) through (e)
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of the 1986 tax reform into substitution and income effects. Table 4.2 
shows the results of decomposing the effect of tax reform on real wage 
expenditures (or quantities), and tables 4.3 and 4.4 show the decomposi 
tions for pensions and health insurance.
Columns (b) and (e) of tables 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 give the information 
needed to compute the total effect of the 1986 tax reform. The columns 
labeled "Predicted" (b) show the real expenditures on wages, pensions, 
and health insurance predicted by the model for each year from 1969 
through 1982, given the relative prices and income that actually existed. 
This is the counterfactual that is, the base against which all the simu 
lated changes are to be compared. The columns labeled "Simulated: 
Relative Prices, P*, and m Changed" (e) show the real expenditures that 
would have prevailed in each year if the 1986 tax reform had been in 
effect. Hence, the difference between columns (b) and (e) is the total 
effect of the tax reform.
Columns (b) and (c) give the information needed to compute the 
substitution effect. The columns labeled "Simulated: Only Relative 
Prices Changed" (c) show the simulated effect of changing relative 
prices but holding all else constant. Hence, the difference between 
columns (b) and (c) is the substitution effect of the tax reform.
The ordinary income effect is obtained from columns (c) and (d). The 
columns labeled "Simulated: Relative Prices and P* Changed" (d) show 
the simulated effect of changing relative prices an d the price index (P*) 
in the denominator of the real income term, but holding all else constant. 
Hence, the difference between columns (c) and (d) is the ordinary 
income effect. Finally, since column (e) shows the total simulated effect 
[that is, the effect of changing relative prices, the price index (P*), and 
the money income term (m)], the difference between columns (d) and (e) 
is the extra income effect.
The remaining columns of tables 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 show the various 
effects of tax reform in percentage terms. Specifically, the substitution 
effect in column (f) is calculated by dividing the difference between 
columns (b) and (c) by column (b). Similarly, the ordinary income effect 
in column (g) is calculated by dividing the difference between columns 














































































































































































NOTES: Columns (b) through (e) show real pension expenditures by year (these may also be thought of as quantities or constant dollar expenditures). The 
predicted figures (column (b)) provide the base for our comparisons, showing pension expenditures predicted by our model under prices and income that 
existed in each year. Column (c) shows pension expenditures if only the substitution effect occurred, column (d) shows pension expenditures if both 
substitution and ordinary income effects occurred, and column (e) shows pension expenditures if substitution, ordinary income, and extra income effects 
occurred.
Columns (f) through (i) show substitution, ordinary income, extra income, and total effects in percentage terms, and are computed from the figures in 
columns (b) through (e).












































































































































































NOTES: Columns (b) through (e) show real health insurance expenditures by year (these may also be thought of as quantities or constant dollar 
expenditures). The predicted figures (column (b)) provide the base for our comparisons, showing health insurance expenditures predicted by our model under 
prices and income that existed in each year. Column (c) shows health insurance expenditures if only the substitution effect occurred, column (d) shows health 
insurance expenditures if both substitution and ordinary income effects occurred, and column (e) shows health insurance expenditures if substitution, 
ordinary income, and extra income effects occurred.
Columns (f) through (i) show substitution, ordinary income, extra income, and total effects in percentage terms, and are computed from the figures in 
columns (b) through (e).
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computed by dividing the difference between columns (e) and (d) by 
column (b). Finally, the total effect in column (i) is computed by 
dividing the difference between columns (e) and (b) by column (b).
The decompositions shown in tables 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 are useful 
because they yield information about the relative sizes of the substitu 
tion, ordinary income, and extra income effects. For example, table 
4.2's decomposition of the effect of tax reform on wage expenditures 
shows that all three effects are positive, as expected. Also, even without 
the extra income effect (2.26 percent), the 1986 tax reform could be 
expected to increase wage quantities substantially (that is, by 7.15 
percent, the sum of the substitution and ordinary income effects).
Table 4.3 shows that the substitution effect of the 1986 tax reform on 
real pension expenditures is very large (-18.46 percent), and domi 
nates the ordinary income effect (13.87 percent). Only because the extra 
income effect is fairly large (5.47 percent) does the computed total effect 
emerge as positive (0.88 percent). It follows that the effect of tax reform 
on real pension expenditures depends on whether corporations or house 
holds bear the burden of the corporation income tax. As discussed 
above, the decreased importance of the personal income tax and the 
increased importance of the corporate income tax under the 1986 tax 
reform could raise workers' money compensation if the incidence of the 
corporation income tax is not shifted to workers through lower wages or 
to consumers through higher prices. Even if we assume that corpora 
tions bear the burden of the tax, we must conclude that the 1986 tax 
reform has only slightly increased real pension expenditures (0.88 
percent). Accordingly, it seems safest to conclude that the 1986 tax 
reform resulted in a small change in pension expenditures probably a 
decrease if households share the burden of the increase in the corpora 
tion income tax.
Table 4.4's decomposition of the effect of tax reform on real health 
insurance expenditures shows that the 1986 tax reform can be expected 
to increase health insurance expenditures, even absent the extra income 
effect. The substitution effect, although negative (-6.05 percent) is 
dominated by the ordinary income effect (11.88 percent). It follows that
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Figure 4.1. Effect of the 1986 tax reform on 
wages and pensions decomposed.
H C V z.
the 1986 tax reform can be expected to lead to increased pressure on the 
demand for health insurance.
4. Graphical Treatment of the Decomposition. Figure 4.1 illustrates 
the decomposition discussed above by showing graphically the effects of 
the 1986 tax reform on pension quantities. The axes of figure 4.1 show 
the quantities of (real expenditures on) wage compensation (zw) and 
pension compensation (zr). The budget constraint facing the worker 
before tax reform is AB, which is shown for simplicity as a linear 
constraint. The worker maximizes well-being by choosing the mix of 
compensation shown by point EQ . The 1986 tax reform results in a new 
budget constraint, shown as the kinked constraint AFGH. This budget
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constraint implies lower marginal tax rates on wages than does AB— that 
is, a more favorable tradeoff between pension contributions and wages, 
which we would expect to result in more wage compensation and less 
pension compensation. AFGH is kinked to show the increasing marginal 
tax rates faced by workers as wage compensation increases.
The post-tax-reform equilibrium is shown at point E'r The worker has 
optimized by locating on segment FG of the new post-tax-reform budget 
constraint. The movement from the original equilibrium E0 , to Ef , can 
be divided into three parts, which correspond to the three-way decom 
position shown in tables 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4. First, we can show the 
substitution effect by pivoting the budget constraint through E0 until it is 
parallel to line segment FG. This yields budget constraint RS. Given her 
preferences, if the worker faced RS as a constraint, she would optimize 
by locating at point Es. The movement from E0 to Es represents the pure 
substitution effect of the tax reform on the worker's choice of wages and 
pensions.
Second, we can show the ordinary income effect by shifting RS 
outward in a parallel manner until the vertical intercept passes through 
point A. This yields budget constraint AC. Again given her preferences, 
if the worker faced AC as a constraint, she would optimize by locating at 
point Et. The movement from Es to Et represents the ordinary income 
effect of the tax reform.
Finally, because of the nonlinearity of the new budget constraint, 
AFGH, there is an extra income effect, which is represented by the 
movement from Ef to E'r In effect, the tax reform has increased the 
worker's disposable money income, which results in a parallel shift 
outward of the budget constraint.
The quantity changes shown in figure 4.1 are as we would expect from 
the familiar indifference curve analysis. The substitution effect unam 
biguously increases wage compensation and reduces pensions. The 
income effects have an ambiguous effect in this case the income effects 
are both positive, although the extra income effect on wages is only 
slightly so.
Note also that budget shares can be read from figure 4.1. For exam-
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pie, at the initial equilibrium E0 , the share of compensation received as 
pensions equals distance E^B divided by distance AB.
5. Revenue Effects. Revenue effects of all tax policy changes consid 
ered in this chapter are collected in appendix table A4.1. The top panel 
of table A4.1 shows the aggregate revenue effect of the 1986 tax reform, 
and also the tax reform's effects on workers in low-wage, medium-wage, 
and high-wage industries. The simulation shows an effect of the tax 
reform that is nearly proportional across industries. The aggregate 
effect of the tax reform is to decrease revenues from the federal personal 
income tax by over 21 percent. This estimate seems in accord with the 
intent of the tax reform (to reduce the importance of the personal income 
tax and increase the importance of the corporation income tax).
Summary of the Effects of the 1986 Tax Reform
The effects of the 1986 tax reform on compensation can be summa 
rized as follows. First, and most important, the tax reform is responsible 
for significant increases in real health insurance expenditures and in the 
share of compensation taken as health insurance. This increase in health 
insurance seems at first paradoxical: It occurs in spite of the reduced 
incentive to receive compensation as health insurance that results from 
lower marginal tax rates on wages. The increase in health insurance is 
attributable to two factors: the large income effects of the tax reform, 
and the inelastic demand for health insurance. Regarding the former, 
the increase in health insurance is predicted even without any of the 
increase in households' disposable incomes that would occur if corpora 
tions bore the burden of the increased corporation income tax under the 
tax reform. Regarding the latter, the inelastic demand for health insur 
ance contributions implies that raising the tax-price of health insurance 
increases the share of compensation demanded as health insurance.
Second, the tax reform is responsible for significantly increasing real 
wage expenditures. The increase in wage compensation results because 
of the reduced tax-price of wages implied by lower marginal tax rates.
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Nevertheless, the share of compensation received as wages is little 
affected by the tax reform due to the relatively larger increase in health 
insurance compensation.
Third, the 1986 tax reform is responsible for shifting the mix of 
compensation away from pensions and toward health insurance. (As just 
noted, there is only an insignificant shift of the mix of compensation 
between wages, on the one hand, and fringe benefits taken together, on 
the other.)
Fourth, the simulations suggest that tax reform is responsible for a 
significant drop in revenues from the federal personal income tax a 
drop of over 21 percent.
Fifth, the distributional effects of the tax reform appear to be quite 
even. The revenue effect just mentioned appears to be, in proportional 
terms, similar across industries. Also, the effects of the reform on 
compensation appear to be similar across industries. Workers in high- 
wage industries experience greater increases in wages than workers in 
low-wage industries, but other differences between high- and low-wage 
industries are not great.
Of these findings, the most significant are that (a) the 1986 tax reform 
is responsible for increasing real health insurance expenditures and an 
increasing share of compensation taken as health insurance, and (b) the 
reform is responsible for shifting the mix of compensation away from 
pensions and toward health insurance. The increase in health insurance 
occurs (as noted above) because of the income effects of tax reform, and 
because the demand for health insurance contributions is very inelastic, 
or unresponsive to changes in tax-prices. The implication is that raising 
the tax-price of health insurance increases the share of compensation 
demanded as health insurance. The shift away from pensions and 
toward health insurance occurs because workers are very willing to 
substitute back and forth between pensions and wages. That is, the 
demand for pensions is highly elastic, or responsive to changes in tax- 
prices. It follows that raising the tax-price of pensions reduces the share 
of compensation demanded as pension compensation.
The results of simulating the 1986 tax reform are troubling because 
they suggest that it will be difficult to bring down health insurance
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expenditures or the health insurance share of compensation. Indeed, 
because the 1986 tax reform has such large income effects, it increases 
the demand for health insurance even though it reduces the tax-price 
incentives to demand health insurance. The growth of health insurance 
expenditures has been a major concern of economists who believe that 
too-generous health insurance has contributed to overexpansion of the 
health care sector, exploding health care costs, and inefficient resource 
allocation. This concern will recur in the next section, which treats 
schemes to tax health insurance contributions.
Tax Caps on Health Insurance Contributions
Background on Taxing Health Insurance Contributions
The taxation of employer contributions to health insurance has been 
much discussed and debated since the 1970s. Martin Feldstein (1973) 
seems to have triggered the debate with his argument that excluding 
health insurance contributions from taxation distorts the incentive to 
demand health insurance, and ultimately leads to increased use of the 
health care system.
The arguments of Feldstein (and of others who have followed him) 
have both a pragmatic and a welfare-theoretic aspect. The pragmatic 
aspect is that the tax-favored status of health insurance is responsible for 
the rising cost of medical care: "the tax laws give an incentive to 
purchase more health insurance, and.. .health insurance encourages 
consumers to purchase more medical care than they would in the 
absence of health insurance" (Vogel 1980, p. 220). The welfare- 
theoretic aspect is that a tax subsidy for health insurance is inefficient: 
The government could provide the same amount of health care directly, 
finance the health care through lump-sum taxes, and have revenue left 
over that could be returned to taxpayers or used to buy other public 
goods or services. 4
Since Feldstein raised his concern, at least three studies have ap 
peared that estimate how taxing health contributions would alter the
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provision of health insurance by employers (Taylor and Wilensky 1983; 
Phelps 1984-85; Adamache and Sloan 1985). Although these studies 
are difficult to compare with each other, their results appear to be rather 
divergent. Adamache and Sloan (1985, pp. 53-55) find the largest 
impacts of taxing health insurance contributions. They conclude that 
taxing contributions over $1,200 would reduce health insurance contri 
butions by 18 percent, and that taxing all health contributions would 
reduce those contributions by 94 percent. Taylor and Wilensky (1983) 
find that a moderate tax cap ($1,800 for family policies, $720 for 
individual policies) would reduce health insurance contributions by 
about 7 percent, and that taxing all health contributions would reduce 
those contributions by about 17 percent. In a treatment that blends 
theoretical and institutional issues, Phelps (1984-85) has concluded that 
the tax cap proposed by the Reagan administration in 1984 ($2,100 for 
family policies and $840 for individual policies) would fail to stem the 
use of basic physician and hospital services, and would fail also to raise 
significant revenues. His reasoning is that a moderate or high tax cap 
would reduce the demand only for what he calls "fringe" medical 
services, such as dental care, eye care, and drugs. He reasons that only a 
low tax cap, or taxation of all health contributions, would significantly 
reduce health insurance contributions and raise revenues.
A potentially important improvement to these earlier studies of a tax 
cap on health insurance contributions needs to be explored: the existing 
studies have not taken account of the presence of pensions (or other 
fringe benefits) in the compensation package. Doing so could be impor 
tant for at least two reasons. First, the complementarity between pen 
sions and health insurance found in chapter 3 could imply that taxing 
health contributions would have a significant impact on the provision of 
pensions by employers. Second, if a tax cap on health insurance did 
affect pension provision, then it would be important to take account of 
that effect in determining the revenue effects of taxing health contribu 
tions. Failure to do so could lead to a biased estimate of the revenues that 
would be raised by taxing health insurance contributions.
Most theoretical discussions of a tax cap on health insurance have 
implied that a tax cap would lead to significant decreases in the share of
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compensation taken as health insurance. However, as discussed above, 
consumer theory makes no prediction about how a compensated price 
change affects the share of a good in the consumer's budget that is, the 
sign of the substitution effect in share terms is indeterminate.
Consumer theory predicts only that the substitution effect in quan 
tity (or real expenditure) terms of taxing health insurance contribu 
tions will be negative. Estimates of the substitution effect obtained in 
chapter 3 accord with this prediction. In addition, we know from the 
chapter 3 estimates that the demand for health insurance is income 
elastic. Since taxing health insurance both raises the price of health 
insurance and lowers incomes, we can predict that taxing health insur 
ance will depress the quantity demanded of health insurance that both 
the substitution and income effects of the tax will work to reduce the 
quantity of health insurance demanded (or real expenditures on health 
insurance). But the same intuition does not apply to the effects of 
taxation on health insurance shares. To predict the effects on shares, we 
need to know the full structure of preferences for compensation.
In this section, we simulate the effects of taxing health insurance 
contributions by the procedure outlined earlier. We first simulate the 
effects of treating all employer contributions to health insurance as 
taxable income, and then simulate the effects of treating as taxable 
income employer contributions to health insurance over $1,125 per year 
(in 1982 dollars). This latter tax cap is similar to the most restrictive of 
the tax caps simulated by Taylor and Wilensky (1983), short of taxing all 
health insurance contributions.
For each case (taxing all contributions and taxing contributions over 
$ 1,125), we offer two sets of simulations. The first are simulations under 
the tax systems existing in 1969-1982. These simulations entail con 
structing an algorithm that creates the relative prices of pensions and 
health insurance (prlp^) and (ph/pw) and real income (ra/P*) that would 
have prevailed in each industry and each year from 1969 through 1982 if 
employer contributions for health insurance had been taxed as income. 
(That is, we start with the tax system in effect in each year and modify 
the system so that the tax treatment of health insurance contributions is 
altered.) The simulated relative prices and income obtained in this way
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are then substituted into equations (4.3) and (4.4) to obtain the simulated 
shares of pensions and health insurance benefits (sr and sh), and subse 
quently real expenditures on each component of compensation. As was 
true in the simulation of the 1986 tax reform, the demographic and other 
control variables (x l through XK) are assumed unaffected by the change 
in tax treatment of health contributions, and hence are held constant in 
the simulation. These simulations show how taxing health insurance 
contributions during the 1969-1982 period would have altered fringe 
benefit provision in those years.
The second set of simulations are under the 1986 tax reform. In these, 
we simulate the shares and real expenditures that would be observed if 
health insurance contributions were taxed under the system represented 
by the 1986 tax reform. These shares are compared with the shares and 
real expenditures that would be observed under the 1986 tax reform 
without taxing health insurance contributions. This second set of simu 
lations offers a picture of what could be expected if health insurance 
contributions were taxed under the current tax system.
Taxing All Health Insurance Contributions
1. Simulations Under Tax Systems Existing in 1969-1982. Table 4.5 
shows how taxing all health insurance contributions under the tax 
systems in effect during 1969 through 1982 would have changed real 
expenditures on compensation, and compensation shares, in each of 
those years. The effects shown are in percentage terms and averaged 
over the full 1969-1982 period. The first panel shows the total effects of 
taxing health contributions, the second isolates the substitution effects, 
and the third shows a disaggregation of the total effects on real expendi 
tures by industry. (See the previous discussions of decomposing the total 
effect into substitution and income effects, and of disaggregating by 
industry.)
Table 4.5 suggests that, overall during the 1969-1982 period, taxing 
all health insurance contributions would have reduced employers' real 
health insurance expenditures by over 22 percent. About three-quarters
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Table 4.5 Simulated Effects of Taxing Health Insurance Contributions: 




Real Expenditures -1.8 -5.8 -22.3 
Compensation Shares 0.2 -4.7 2.2
Substitution Effects on:
Real Expenditures 1.0 2.8 -16.9 
Compensation Shares -0.2 -0.6 4.6
Total Effects on Real Expenditures, by Industry Group: 
Aggregate -1.8 -5.8 -22.3 
Low-Wage Industries -0.7 -1.9 -20.0 
Medium-Wage Industries -1.5 -6.0 -19.9 
High-Wage Industries -2.9 -5.6 -26.2
NOTES: The figures show how treating employer contributions to health insurance as taxable 
income under the tax systems in effect during 1969 through 1982 would have changed real 
expenditures on compensation and shares of compensation. Changes are shown in annual percent 
age terms, averaged over the 14 years. Total effect" refers to the sum of the substitution, ordinary 
income, and extra income effects. The substitution effect isolates the impact of the changing tax- 
price of health insurance.
of this reduction can be attributed to substitution away from health 
insurance as a result of a higher tax-price of health insurance (since the 
substitution effect accounts for 16.9 percent out of the 22.3 percent 
decrease). The rest of the decrease results from the negative income 
effect of taxing health insurance contributions.
The substitution effects of taxing health insurance on wages and 
pensions are positive (1.0 percent and 2.8 percent). But because of the 
negative income effects of taxing health insurance, the total effects on 
real expenditures of both wages and pensions are negative.
The simulation suggests that taxing health insurance during the 
1969-1982 period would actually have increased the share of health 
insurance in total compensation. The reason is that the demand for 
health insurance is inelastic. Also, the share of pensions would have 
been lower, and the share of wages roughly constant.
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The bottom panel of table 4.5 shows how taxing health insurance 
would have affected different groups of workers. The simulation sug 
gests that taxing health insurance would have decreased income in 
equality. Workers in low-wage industries would have experienced 
smaller decreases in wages, pensions, and health insurance than work 
ers in high-wage industries. But these distributional effects are not 
dramatic: The decrease in health insurance for workers in high-wage 
industries would have been 26.2 percent, compared with 20 percent for 
workers in low-wage industries.
Table A4.1 displays estimates of how federal personal income tax 
revenues would have increased if health insurance had been taxed during 
the 1969-1982 period (see the second panel, left column). The overall 
increase in revenues would have been nearly 9 percent per year. The 
distribution of this revenue increase would have decreased income 
inequality: workers in low-wage industries would have experienced a 
6.9-percent increase in income taxes, whereas workers in high-wage 
industries would have experienced nearly a 13-percent increase.
2. Simulations Under the 1986 Tax Reform. Table 4.6 displays esti 
mates of how taxing all health insurance contributions under the 1986 
tax reform could be expected to alter real expenditures on compensation 
and compensation shares. The effects are in percentage terms, with total 
effects displayed in the first panel, substitution effects in the second 
panel, and the disaggregation of total effects by industry in the third 
panel.
Table 4.6 suggests that taxing all health insurance contributions 
would reduce employers' real health insurance expenditures by nearly 
15 percent. Substitution away from health insurance as a result of a 
higher tax-price of health insurance accounts for most of this effect 
( 11.9 percent out of  14.7 percent). The negative income effect of 
taxing health insurance is responsible for the remainder.
The substitution effects on wages and pensions of taxing health 
insurance are slightly positive (0.7 percent and 0.1 percent). But the 
total effects on both wage and pension expendutures are negative (be-
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Table 4.6 Simulated Effects of Taxing Health Insurance Contributions: 




Real Expenditures -0.7 -4.3 -14.7 
Compensation Shares 0.1 -3.7 1.8
Substitution Effects on:
Real Expenditures 0.7 0.1 -11.9 
Compensation Shares -0.1 -1.5 3.1
Total Effects on Real Expenditures, by Industry Group: 
Aggregate -0.7 -4.3 -14.7 
Low-Wage Industries -0.4 -5.9 -12.8 
Medium-Wage Industries -0.5 -4.7 -13.8 
High-Wage Industries -1.1 -3.7 -15.9
NOTES: The figures show how treating employer contributions to health insurance as taxable 
under the 1986 tax reform would have changed real expenditures on compensation and shares of 
compensation. "Total effect" refers to the sum of the substitution, ordinary income, and extra 
income effects. The substitution effect isolates the impact of the changing tax-price of health 
insurance.
cause the negative income effects of taxing health insurance dominate 
the small positive substitution effects).
We found above that if health insurance had been taxed during the 
1969-1982 period, the health insurance share of total compensation 
would have increased. Taxing health insurance under the 1986 tax 
reform also increases the health insurance share (by 1.8 percent), again 
because of the inelastic demand for health insurance. Pensions would 
fall as a share of compensation if health insurance were taxed (the 
substitution effect is -1.5 percent, and the total effect is -3.7 percent), 
but the share of wages would be virtually unchanged.
The distributional effects shown in the bottom panel of table 4.6 
suggest that taxing health insurance under the 1986 tax reform would 
have similar effects on different groups of workers. Workers in low- 
wage industries would experience somewhat smaller decreases in wages
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and health insurance than workers in high-wage industries, but some 
what larger decreases in pensions. Note that the 13 percent reduction in 
health insurance predicted for workers in low-wage industries could turn 
a marginally adequate health insurance plan into an inadequate plan. 
Such an impact would need to be considered in appraising the desir 
ability of taxing health insurance contributions, and could offset what 
may be viewed as a desirable (although small) increase in overall 
distributional equality.
The revenue estimates shown in table A4.1 (second panel, right 
column) suggest that taxing all health insurance contributions would 
increase personal income tax revenues by over 8 percent per year. The 
distribution of this revenue increase would tend to increase equality: 
Workers in low- and medium-wage industries would experience an 
increase of 7 to 8 percent in income taxes, whereas workers in high- 
wage industries would experience an increase of nearly 11 percent.
Tables 4.7, 4.8, and 4.9 decompose the effects of taxing health 
insurance into substitution, ordinary income, and extra income effects. 5 
Table 4.7 shows the results of decomposing the effect of taxing health 
insurance on real wage expenditures, and tables 4.8 and 4.9 show the 
decompositions for real expenditures on pensions and health insurance. 
(See above for a detailed treatment of the decomposition.)
Table 4.7 shows that taxing health insurance would have virtually no 
impact on real wage expenditures absent the extra income effect that 
is, if taxing health insurance had no effect on money disposable in 
comes. Even with the extra income effect, the impact of taxing health 
insurance on wages is small.
Table 4.8 shows that taxing health insurance has an ambiguous 
substitution effect on real pension expenditures. Because pensions and 
health insurance are weak complements in our simulation model, a 
compensated increase in the price of health insurance can either increase 
or decrease real pension expenditures. Both the ordinary and extra 
income effects are consistently negative, and either by itself would 
dominate the substitution effect. We conclude that taxing health insur 
ance would lead to a moderate decrease in real pension expenditures.
Table 4.9 shows that taxing fringe benefits has a large substitution












































































































































































NOTES: Columns (b) through (e) show real wage expenditures by year (these may also be thought of as quantities or constant dollar expenditures). The 
predicted figures (column (b)) provide the base for our comparisons, showing wage expenditures predicted by our model in each year if the 1986 tax reform 
(with health insurance untaxed) had been in effect. Columns (c), (d), and (e) show the simulated effects of taxing health insurance under the 1986 tax reform. 
Column (c) shows wage expenditures if only the substitution effect occurred, column (d) shows wage expenditures if both substitution and ordinary income 
effects occurred, and column (e) shows wage expenditures if substitution, ordinary income, and extra income effects occurred.
Columns (f) through (i) show substitution, ordinary income, extra income, and total effects in percentage terms, and are computed from the figures in 
columns (b) through (e).



































































































































































NOTES: Columns (b) through (e) show real pension expenditures by year (these may also be thought of as quantities or constant dollar expenditures). The 
predicted figures (column (b)) provide the base for our comparisons, showing pension expenditures predicted by our model in each year if the 1986 tax reform 
(with health insurance untaxed) had been in effect. Columns (c), (d), and (e) show the simulated effects of taxing health insurance under the 1986 tax reform. 
Column (c) shows pension expenditures if only the substitution effect occurred, column (d) shows pension expenditures if both substitution and ordinary 
income effects occurred, and column (e) shows pension expenditures if substitution, ordinary income, and extra income effects occurred.
Columns (f) through (i) show substitution, ordinary income, extra income, and total effects in percentage terms, and are computed from the figures in 
columns (b) through (e).


































































































































































NOTES: Columns (b) through (e) show real health insurance expenditures by year (these may also be thought of as quantities or constant dollar 
expenditures). The predicted figures (column (b)) provide the base for our comparisons, showing health insurance expenditures predicted by our model in 
each year if the 1986 tax reform (with health insurance untaxed) had been in effect. Columns (c), (d), and (e) show the simulated effects of taxing health 
insurance under the 1986 tax reform. Column (c) shows health insurance expenditures if only the substitution effect occurred, column (d) shows health 
insurance expenditures if both substitution and ordinary income effects occurred, and column (e) shows health insurance expenditures if substitution, 
ordinary income, and extra income effects occurred.
Columns (f) through (i) show substitution, ordinary income, extra income, and total effects in percentage terms, and are computed from the figures in 
columns (b) through (e).
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effect on health insurance (  11.9 percent). Income effects, although 
also negative, are relatively minor. It follows that taxing health insur 
ance would reduce the demand for health insurance by nearly 15 
percent. This is remarkably close to Taylor and Wilensky's (1983) 
estimate of the effect of taxing health insurance a reduction of 17 
percent. 6
A Low Tax Cap on Health Insurance Contributions
1. Simulations Under Tax Systems Existing in 1969-1982. Table 4.10 
summarizes how taxing health insurance contributions over $1,125 per 
year (in 1982 dollars) would have affected compensation during the 
1969-1982 period. (Such a policy is often referred to as a low tax cap on 
health insurance contributions.) A comparison of table 4.10 with table 
4.5 shows that the differences between taxing all health insurance and 
taxing only contributions over $1,125 are strictly a matter of magni 
tude all effects have the same direction. The effects of the low tax cap 
tend to be about one-half the size of the effects of taxing all benefits. 
(This is simply a matter of the level of the tax cap we have simulated.)
Aside from the smaller magnitude of effects under the low tax cap, 
one further difference between a low tax cap and taxing all health 
insurance contributions is worth noting: The distributional impacts of 
the low tax cap are more equalizing than are those of taxing all benefits. 
This can be seen in the third panel of table 4.10, where the reduction in 
health insurance experienced by workers in high-wage industries is well 
above the average for all workers. Also, the revenue increases resulting 
from a low tax cap are concentrated on workers in high-wage industries, 
as can be seen from table A4.1 (third panel, left column). Whereas 
workers in low- and medium-wage industries experience very small 
income tax increases, workers in high-wage industries experience in 
creases over 5 percent.
2. Simulations Under the 1986 Tax Reform. Effects of a low tax cap 
on health insurance under the 1986 tax reform are shown in table 4.11.
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Table 4.10 Simulated Effects of a Low Tax Cap on
Health Insurance Contributions: Average Percentage




Real Expenditures -0.4 -2.6 -13.9 
Compensation Shares 0.1 -1.8 0.7
Substitution Effects on:
Real Expenditures 0.7 1.6 -11.3 
Compensation Shares -0.1 -0.4 1.8
Total Effects on Real Expenditures, by Industry Group: 
Aggregate -0.4 -2.6 -13.9 
Low-Wage Industries -0.0 -0.6 -2.5 
Medium-Wage Industries -0.0 -1.5 -7.4 
High-Wage Industries -1.1 -3.7 -22.3
NOTES: The figures show how taxing annual employer contributions to health insurance over 
$1,125 (in 1982 dollars) under the tax systems in effect during 1969 through 1982 would have 
changed real expenditures on compensation and shares of compensation. Changes are shown in 
annual percentage terms averaged over the 14 years. "Total effect" refers to the sum of the 
substitution, ordinary income, and extra income effects. The substitution effect isolates the impact 
of the changing tax-price of health insurance.
Comparing table 4.11 with table 4.6 shows again that the effects of 
taxing health insurance contributions over $1,125 are in the same 
direction as the effects of taxing all health contributions. The effects of 
the low tax cap are simply smaller.
A more significant difference between the low tax cap and taxing all 
benefits under the 1986 tax reform is that (as under the 1969-1982 tax 
systems) the distributional impacts of the low tax cap are more equaliz 
ing. The reduction in health insurance experienced by workers in high- 
wage industries is far greater than the reduction experienced by other 
workers (table 4.11, third panel). Also, workers in high-wage industries 
experience a far greater increase in federal personal income taxes than 
do workers in low- and medium-wage industries (table A4.1, third 
panel, right column).
134
Table 4.11 Simulated Effects of a Low Tax Cap on
Health Insurance Contributions: Average Percentage




Real Expenditures -0.1 -1.7 -8.7 
Compensation Shares 0.0 -1.5 0.4
Substitution Effects on:
Real Expenditures 0.4 0.2 -7.4 
Compensation Shares -0.0 -0.6 1.0
Total Effects on Real Expenditures, by Industry Group: 
Aggregate -0.1 -1.7 -8.7 
Low-Wage Industries -0.0 -0.5 -1.7 
Medium-Wage Industries -0.0 -0.9 -5.1 
High-Wage Industries -0.3 -2.5 -13.5
NOTES: The figures show how taxing annual employer contributions to health insurance over 
$1,125 (in 1982 dollars) under the 1986 tax reform would change real expenditures on compensation 
and shares of compensation. "Total effect" refers to the sum of the substitution, ordinary income, and 
extra income effects. The substitution effect isolates the impact of the changing tax-price of health
Summary of the Effects of Taxing Health Insurance
The effects of treating employer contributions to health insurance as 
taxable income can be summarized as follows. First, taxing health 
insurance under the current tax system can be expected to substantially 
reduce employers' real expenditures on health insurance. Our simula 
tions suggest that taxing all health insurance contributions would reduce 
real health insurance expenditures by nearly 15 percent (table 4.6), 
whereas taxing all contributions in excess of $1,125 per year (in 1982 
dollars) would reduce real health insurance expenditures by nearly 9 
percent (table 4.11).
Second, real expenditures on wages and pensions would also fall if 
health insurance contributions were taxed. These decreases result be 
cause taxing health insurance would reduce real incomes, which would 
lead in turn to reductions in both wages and pensions.
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Third, the simulations suggest that taxing all health insurance contri 
butions would increase revenues from the federal personal income tax 
by over 8 percent annually, and that taxing health contributions over 
$1,125 would increase income tax revenues by 1.5 percent (table A4.1).
Fourth, the distributional effects of taxing all health insurance contri 
butions are not dramatic. Workers in low-wage industries would experi 
ence somewhat smaller decreases in wages and health insurance than 
workers in high-wage industries. Also, workers in high-wage industries 
would experience somewhat larger increases in their income tax bills. 
But the differences among different groups of workers are not great.
In contrast, the distributional effects of taxing health insurance contri 
butions over $1,125 are significant. Under the low tax cap, workers in 
high-wage industries would experience a 13.5 percent decrease in health 
insurance, whereas workers in low- and medium-wage industries would 
experience a decrease of only 2 to 5 percent. Also, the income taxes of 
workers in high-wage industries would rise by over 4 percent, whereas 
the income taxes of other workers would rise by under 1 percent.
The picture that emerges from our simulations is that a tax cap on 
health insurance would both reduce employers' real health insurance 
expenditures and have distributional effects that appear to increase 
income equality. The low tax cap on health insurance that we have 
examined would raise far less revenue than would taxing all health 
insurance it would raise income tax revenues by only 1.5 percent. But 
it would nevertheless limit the extent to which health insurance contribu 
tions escape taxation and would likewise limit further erosion of the tax 
base as health insurance costs and contributions increase.
Taxing All Fringe Benefit Contributions
Why Tax All Benefits?
Students and critics of the U.S. retirement income system have 
followed the lead of the health economists and advocated taxing em 
ployer contributions to private pensions as well as to health insurance.
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Alicia Munnell has been perhaps the leading proponent of taxing pen 
sion contributions, arguing that the tax-favored treatment of pensions 
(as well as health insurance) has led to both erosion of the income and 
payroll tax bases and a more regressive tax system (Munnell 1984, 
1985). As the growth of voluntary fringe benefits has slowed (Woodbury 
and Huang 1988), these arguments have lost some of their force. But 
more recently, Munnell (1988a, 1988b) has generally criticized the 
private pension system in the U.S. on the grounds that it covers too small 
a proportion of households, reduces mobility of the workforce, and 
provides benefits whose real purchasing power is vulnerable to inflation. 
She advocates expansion of the public pension system OASI and 
contraction of the private pension system. Taxing employer contribu 
tions to private pensions is clearly one possible way of reducing the 
importance of private pensions in the U.S.
It is also possible to make the same type of welfare-theoretic case for 
taxing pension contributions that health economists have made regard 
ing health insurance: A tax subsidy for pension contributions can be 
seen as inefficient in that the government could provide a retirement 
income of equal value that would be financed out of lump-sum taxes, and 
still have revenue left over. But the pragmatic case for taxing health 
insurance that the tax-favored status of health insurance distorts incen 
tives to use health care and leads ultimately to an inefficiently large 
health care sector cannot be applied to pensions. To our knowledge, no 
one has argued that saving in general or saving for retirement is exces 
sive. On the contrary, there is much concern about the relatively low rate 
of saving in the United States, and about the slow growth of that capital 
stock and aggregate output that has resulted (Seidman 1990). Nor has 
anyone argued that incomes of retirees are excessive.
The case for taxing pension contributions seems weaker a priori than 
the case for taxing health insurance. Nevertheless, enough serious 
consideration has been given to the policy option of taxing all fringe 
benefits to make taxation of pension contributions a serious issue. 
Indeed, even with the current administration's aversion to tax increases, 
the issue of taxing pension contributions continues to be discussed 
(Birnbaum 1989).
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Accordingly, in this section we discuss simulations of the impacts of 
treating employer contributions to both pensions and health insurance as 
taxable income. To our knowledge, these are the first such simulations, 
so there are no previous estimates with which to compare them. We use 
the same procedure as with our simulations of taxing health insurance. 
Also as with taxing health insurance, we offer two sets of simulations. 
The first, simulations under the tax systems existing in 1969-1982, show 
how taxing pensions and health insurance during the 1969-1982 period 
would have altered fringe benefit provision in those years. The second, 
simulations under the 1986 tax reform, show what could be expected if 
pensions and health insurance were taxed under the current tax system.
Results of Simulating a Tax on All Fringe Benefits
1. Simulations Under Tax Systems Existing in 1969-1982. How 
would compensation have changed if all fringe benefits had been taxed 
during 1969 through 1982? Table 4.12 displays results of our simulation 
and offers some answers. The effects on real expenditures on compensa 
tion and on compensation shares are all shown in percentage terms and 
averaged over the 1969-1982 period. As in previous summary tables, 
the first panel shows total effects, the second isolates the substitution 
effects, and the third shows a disaggregation of the total effects by 
industry. (See our earlier discussions of decomposing the total effect into 
substitution and income effects and of disaggregating by industry.)
The simulation in table 4.12 suggests that treating all employer 
contributions to pensions and health insurance as taxable income would 
have dramatically changed the pattern of compensation during the 
1969-1982 period. Pension benefits would have been lower by 64 
percent, and health insurance benefits lower by nearly 28 percent. Most 
of these cuts can be attributed to substitution away from fringe benefits 
as a result of a higher tax-price of fringes: the substitution effect 
accounts for 84 percent ( 53.97 64.1) of the pension decrease and for 
65 percent (-18.27-27.9) of the health insurance decrease. The re-
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Table 4.12 Simulated Effects of Taxing All Fringe Benefit
Contributions: Average Percentage Changes




Real Expenditures -0.8 -64.1 -27.9 
Compensation Shares 3.0 -53.9 -2.4
Substitution Effects on:
Real Expenditures 4.3 -53.9 -18.2 
Compensation Shares 2.4 -46.1 2.4
Total Effects on Real Expenditures, by Industry Group: 
Aggregate -0.8 -64.1 -27.9 
Low-Wage Industries 0.8 -81.1 -19.8 
Medium-Wage Industries -0.2 -70.2 -24.9 
High-Wage Industries -3.0 -57.2 -32.7
NOTES: The figures show how treating employer contributions to both pensions and health 
insurance as taxable income under the tax systems in effect during 1969 through 1982 would have 
changed real expenditures on compensation and shares of compensation. Changes are shown in 
annual percentage terms, averaged over the 14 years. "Total effect" refers to the sum of the 
substitution, ordinary income, and extra income effects. The substitution effect isolates the impact 
of the changing tax-price of pensions and health insurance relative to wages.
mainder of the decreases result from the negative income effect of taxing 
fringe benefits.
The substitution effect on wages is positive (4.3 percent), but is 
dominated by the negative income effect of taxing fringe benefits. 
Hence, the total effect of taxing fringe benefits on wage compensation is 
negative.
Taxing pensions and health insurance during the 1969-1982 period 
would also have dramatically decreased the share of pensions in total 
compensation. But the substitution effect on the health insurance share 
is actually positive (2.4 percent). The reason is that the demand for 
health insurance is highly inelastic. The total effect on the health 
insurance share is negative ( 2.4 percent) only because of the negative 
income effects of taxing all fringe benefits.
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The distributional effects of taxing all fringe benefits can be seen in 
the bottom panel of table 4.12. Although workers in low-wage industries 
would have experienced smaller (or no) reductions in wages and health 
insurance than workers in high-wage industries, workers in low-wage 
industries would have experienced larger cuts in pensions than workers 
in higher wage industries. This is a potentially troubling distributional 
effect of taxing all fringe benefits.
Table A4.1 shows that, if all fringe benefits had been taxed during the 
1969-1982 period, federal personal income tax revenues would have 
been greater by 19 percent annually (bottom panel, left column). The 
burden of this revenue increase would have fallen more heavily on 
workers in high-wage industries (who would have paid nearly 30 percent 
more in income taxes) than on other workers (who would have paid only 
13 to 15 percent more).
2. Simulations Under the 1986 Tax Reform. How would the pattern of 
compensation change if all fringe benefit contributions were taxed under 
the current tax system? The results of our simulation, displayed in table 
4.13, suggest that taxing all fringe benefit contributions would reduce 
employers' real pension expenditures by nearly one-half, and would 
reduce real health insurance expenditures by over 20 percent. Substitu 
tion away from pensions and health insurance as a result of the higher 
tax-price of fringe benefits accounts for most of these effects ( 38.7 
percent out of -48.8 percent in the case of pensions, -12.1 percent out 
of  20.1 percent in the case of health insurance). The negative income 
effect of taxing all fringe benefits is responsible for the remainder of the 
decreases.
The distributional effects shown in the bottom panel of table 4.13 
suggest that taxing all fringe benefits under the current system would 
have different effects on different groups of workers. Workers in all 
industries would make dramatic substitutions away from both pensions 
and health insurance. Workers in low-wage industries would experience 
larger declines in pensions than would workers in other industries, but 
smaller declines in health insurance and wages.
The revenue estimates shown in table A4.1 (bottom panel, right
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Table 4.13 Simulated Effects of Taxing All Fringe Benefit
Contributions: Average Percentage Changes




Real Expenditures -0.4 -48.8 -20.1 
Compensation Shares 2.2 -39.3 -1.6
Substitution Effects on:
Real Expenditures 3.4 -38.7 -12.1 
Compensation Shares 1.7 -33.8 1.4
Total Effects on Real Expenditures, by Industry Group: 
Aggregate -0.4 -48.8 -20.1 
Low-Wage Industries -0.9 -68.4 -15.9 
Medium-Wage Industries -0.7 -52.3 -16.7 
High-Wage Industries -2.8 -42.9 -23.9
NOTES: The figures show how treating employer contributions to both pensions and health 
insurance as taxable income under the 1986 tax reform would change real expenditures on 
compensation and shares of compensation. "Total effect" refers to the sum of the substitution, 
ordinary income, and extra income effects. The substitution effect isolates the impact of the 
changing tax-price of pensions and health insurance relative to wages.
column) suggest that taxing all fringe benefit contributions under the 
current system would increase personal income tax revenues by over 17 
percent annually. The distribution of this revenue increase would tend to 
decrease income inequality: workers in low- and medium-wage indus 
tries would experience an increase of 14 to 15 percent in income taxes, 
whereas workers in high-wage industries would experience an increase 
of nearly 26 percent.
Tables 4.14,4.15, and 4.16 decompose the effects of taxing all fringe 
benefits into substitution, ordinary income, and extra income effects. 7 
Table 4.14 shows the decomposition of the total effect on wages, table 
4.15 shows the pension decomposition, and table 4.16 shows the health 
insurance decomposition.
Table 4.14 shows why taxing all fringe benefits would have almost no 
net impact on wage quantities: the positive substitution effect is approxi 
mately offset by negative ordinary and extra income effects.












































































































































































NOTES: Columns (b) through (e) show real wage expenditures by year (these may also be thought of as quantities or constant dollar expenditures). The 
predicted figures (column (b)) provide the base for our comparisons, showing wage expenditures predicted by our model in each year if the 1986 tax reform 
(with fringe benefits untaxed) had been in effect. Columns (c), (d), and (e) show the simulated effects of taxing pensions and health insurance under the 1986 
tax reform. Column (c) shows wage expenditures if only the substitution effect occurred, column (d) shows wage expenditures if both substitution and 
ordinary income effects occurred, and column (e) shows wage expenditures if substitution, ordinary income, and extra income effects occurred.
Columns (f) through (i) show substitution, ordinary income, extra income, and total effects in percentage terms, and are computed from the figures in 
columns (b) through (e).












































































































































































NOTES: Columns (b) through (e) show real pension expenditures by year (these may also be thought of as quantities or constant dollar expenditures). The 
predicted figures (column (b)) provide the base for our comparisons, showing pension expenditures predicted by our model in each year if the 1986 tax reform 
(with fringe benefits untaxed) had been in effect. Columns (c), (d), and (e) show the simulated effects of taxing pensions and health insurance under the 1986 
tax reform. Column (c) shows pension expenditures if only the substitution effect occurred, column (d) shows pension expenditures if both substitution and 
ordinary income effects occurred, and column (e) shows pension expenditures if substitution, ordinary income, and extra income effects occurred.
Columns (f) through (i) show substitution, ordinary income, extra income, and total effects in percentage terms, and are computed from the figures in 
columns (b) through (e).












































































































































































NOTES: Columns (b) through (e) show real health insurance expenditures by year (these may also be thought of as quantities or constant dollar 
expenditures). The predicted figures (column (b)) provide the base for our comparisons, showing health insurance expenditures predicted by our model in 
each year if the 1986 tax reform (with fringe benefits untaxed) had been in effect. Columns (c), (d), and (e) show the simulated effects of taxing pensions and 
health insurance under the 1986 tax reform. Column (c) shows health insurance expenditures if only the substitution effect occurred, column (d) shows health 
insurance expenditures if both substitution and ordinary income effects occurred, and column (e) shows health insurance expenditures if substitution, 
ordinary income, and extra income effects occurred.
Columns (f) through (i) show substitution, ordinary income, extra income, and total effects in percentage terms, and are computed from the figures in 
columns (b) through (e).
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Table 4.15 shows that, even in the absence of negative income effects, 
taxing all fringe benefits would lead to a large decline in employer 
provision of pensions: the substitution effect alone implies a decrease of 
nearly 39 percent in pension provision by employers.
Table 4.16 shows that the substitution effect on health insurance is 
weaker than on pensions: absent the negative income effects of taxing all 
fringe benefits, health insurance provision would fall by only 12 per 
cent. The reason for this smaller substitution effect in the case of health 
insurance is that the elasticity of substitution between wages and health 
insurance is lower than between wages and pensions health insurance 
is not as good a substitute for wages as are pensions.
Summary of the Effects of Taxing All Fringe Benefits
The effects of treating all employer contributions to pensions and 
health insurance as taxable income are quite dramatic. First, our simula 
tions indicate that taxing all fringe benefits under the current system 
would lead to enormous reductions in employers' real expenditures on 
both pensions and health insurance: Pension provision would be cut by 
nearly 50 percent, and health insurance provision by over 20 percent 
(table 4.13).
Second, real wage expenditures would also fall (but far less than 
pensions or health insurance) if all fringe benefits were taxed. This 
small decrease results because taxing all fringe benefits would reduce 
real incomes, which would lead in turn to reduced real wage 
expenditures.
Third, taxing all fringe benefits would lead to a major shift in the mix 
of compensation away from pensions and health insurance and toward 
wages. The share of compensation received as pensions would be most 
affected our simulations suggest a decrease in the pension share of 
nearly 40 percent.
Fourth, the simulations suggest that taxing all health insurance con 
tributions would increase revenues from the federal personal income tax 
by over 17 percent annually (table A4.1). Also, the distribution of this 
tax increase would tend to increase income equality. Workers in low 
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wage industries would experience income tax increases of 14 to 15 
percent, whereas workers in high-wage industries would experience tax 
increases of nearly 26 percent.
The interesting question is: why are pensions devastated by taxing all 
fringe benefits, whereas health insurance is cut by only 20 percent? The 
answer is that pensions and wages are far better substitutes than are 
health insurance and wages. It follows that when pensions are taxed, 
workers are readily willing to substitute wages for pensions. Although 
they are also willing to substitute wages for health insurance, the drive to 
do so is not nearly as strong.
If our simulations of the effects of taxing all fringe benefits are 
accurate, then reforming the tax system so that all fringe benefits are 
taxed would very likely be politically infeasible. If employers and 
workers are aware of the incentives they face and comfortable with the 
status quo then major change is unlikely.
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Table A4.1 Simulated Effects of Policy Changes 
on Federal Personal Income Tax Revenues


























































NOTES: The "Aggregate" figures show average annual percentage changes in federal revenues 
from the personal income tax that are predicted under the specified policies. "Low-Wage Industry" 
estimates show how the tax bill of the average worker in low-wage industries would change, and 
similarly for the "Medium-Wage Industry" and "High-Wage Industry" estimates.
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NOTES
1 Vroman and Anderson (1984) make this point explicitly.
2 The extra income effect could also be conceptualized as an "endowment" income effect, as 
Varian (1987) has called it. Oddly, the discussion in Varian's intermediate text appears to be the only 
full discussion of the endowment income effect in the literature. I am grateful to Carl Davidson for 
discussion of this point.
3 Note that whether the share of wages increases as the quantity of wages increases depends on 
the relative decrease in the tax-price of wages.
4 It has usually gone unmentioned that lump-sum taxes are at best difficult to implement, and 
that efficient government provision of health care services (as of any good or service) entails myriad 
organizational problems.
5 The decompositions are shown for each year of the 1969-1982 period. The "Predicted" figures 
in column (b) are real expenditures (or quantities) predicted by our model for each year under tax 
reform (with health insurance untaxed), and the "Simulated: Relative Prices, P*, and m Changed" 
figures in column (e) are real expenditures (or quantities) simulated under tax reform with health 
insurance taxed.
6 Adamache and Sloan's (1985) estimate is far larger, and Phelps (1984-85) offered no directly 
comparable estimate.
7 The decompositions are shown for each year of the 1969-1982 period. The "Predicted" figures 
in column (b) are real expenditures (or quantities) predicted by our model for each year under tax 
reform (with fringe benefits untaxed), and the "Simulated: Relative Prices, P*, and m Changed" 




Our goal in this monograph has been to explore the implications for 
fringe benefits and tax revenues of three major changes in tax policy. The 
first major change we consider is the 1986 tax reform, which signifi 
cantly lowered the marginal tax rates on wage income facing most 
households in the United States. The second is a policy of treating 
employer contributions to health insurance as taxable income. We 
consider separately the consequences of taxing all employer contribu 
tions, and of taxing only health insurance contributions over $1,125 
annually. The final policy we consider is treating all employer contribu 
tions to both pensions and health insurance as taxable income. The latter 
two changes would contrast sharply with the current tax-favored status 
that employer contributions to pensions and health insurance have 
enjoyed in the U.S.
The Model
The approach we have taken is to estimate a consumer theoretic model 
of fringe benefits that takes account of the possibilities for substitution 
among wages, pension benefits, and health insurance benefits. The 
model, which is set out in detail in chapter 2, assumes that the employer 
offers a menu of compensation packages to workers, who select the 
package that maximizes their well-being. The menu offered by employ 
ers implies certain tradeoffs between components of compensation that 
the employer is willing to make, and these tradeoffs depend in turn on 
the employer's cost of providing each benefit. The package that workers 
choose from the menu depends on their preferences (which depend in 
part on characteristics such as age and marital status), on their level of
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total compensation, and on the prices of the components of compensa 
tion. The prices facing workers depend both on the employer's costs of 
providing each type of benefit and on the differential tax treatment of 
each benefit.
More formally, we follow Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a) and spec 
ify a' flexible expenditure function that yields the following system of 
demand equations for wages, pensions, and health insurance benefits:
J + (2.33) 
.. . +dwKxK +uw
sr =ar +brrln(prlpw)+brhln(phlpw} + (2.34) 
brln(m/P*)+drlx l + . . . +drKxK +ur
sh =ah +brhln(Pr/Pw)+bhhln(Ph/PJ + (2-35) 
bhln(m/P*)+dhlx v + . . . +dhKxK+uh .
This is a standard set of demand equations, in the sense that the demand 
for each component of compensation is modeled as a function of the 
prices of those benefits, income, and other characteristics such as age 
and gender. In these equations, sw , sr , and sh are the shares (or propor 
tions) of total compensation received in the form of wages, pension 
contributions, and health insurance benefits; (pr/pw) and (Ph/Pw) are the 
prices of pensions and health insurance, relative to wages, that face 
workers; m is total compensation in dollars; P* is a price index approxi 
mated by In P*=swln Pw +srln pr +shln ph \ x l through XK are control 
variables other than prices and income, such as demographic charac 
teristics, that might affect the demand for fringe benefits; and uw, ur , and 
uh , are random disturbance terms that are assumed to be normally 
distributed with zero mean.
The at , btj , and bt are parameters that, once estimated, can be 
converted into the price, income, and substitution elasticities that are 
needed to determine the effect of changing tax policy on the provision of 
the different forms of compensation (see chapter 2). The dik show the 
influence of the demographic and other characteristics on each compen 
sation share, all else equal.
Two further aspects of this model deserve mention. First, the relative
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prices in the demand system take account of both the employer's cost of 
providing each component of compensation, and the tax treatment of 
each component. Specifically, the relative prices are defined by:
pjpr =(cjcr)/(l-t), (2.5) 
and
t), (2.36)
where cw, cr , and ch are the employer's cost of providing a unit of pension 
benefits, a unit of wage benefits, and a unit of health insurance benefits; 
and t is the marginal tax on income faced by the worker. Measurement of 
these relative prices is an important part of the work (see the appendix to 
chapter 3).
Second, earlier work on fringe benefits has examined only the choice 
between wages and fringe benefits taken as a whole. The demand system 
set out above specifies separate equations for pensions and health insur 
ance, and hence allows examination of tradeoffs within the fringe benefit 
package.
Summary of Basic Estimates
In chapter 3, we report the results of estimating the model specified 
above using two entirely different data sets. The first is a pooled time- 
series of cross sections for 1969-1982 created from the unpublished 
two-digit industry data underlying the National Income and Product 
Accounts "other labor income" series (U.S. Department of Commerce, 
Bureau of Economic Analysis, 1986), and supplementary data bases. 
The second is a data base created from the 1977 Survey of Employer 
Expenditures for Employee Compensation (EEEC), the Current Popu 
lation Survey, and supplementary data bases. We use two separate data 
bases in exploring tradeoffs among wages, pensions, and health insur 
ance, because each data base has different advantages and disadvan 
tages, and we are able to check the results of the two analyses against 
each other.
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Our two empirical investigations agree in most important respects. In 
particular, they agree on the effects of income and prices (or taxes) on 
the mix of compensation, as follows:
(a) The demand for wage benefits is income inelastic, whereas the 
demand for pensions and health insurance is income elastic. Hence, a 
doubling of total compensation would result in less than a doubling of 
wage benefits, whereas the same doubling of income would more than 
double pension and health insurance benefits.
(b) Both pensions and health insurance are good substitutes for wage 
benefits and pensions are probably a better substitute for wages than are 
health insurance benefits. These inferences are based on point estimates 
of the elasticities of substitution between wages and pensions and be 
tween wages and health insurance. Formal statistical tests lend only 
weak support to the notion that the elasticity of substitution between 
wages and pensions exceeds that between wages and health insurance.
(c) Evidence on whether pensions and health insurance are substitutes 
or complements is relatively weak. Findings from both data sets suggest 
that pensions and health insurance may be complements, but in no case 
do statistical tests offer a strong rejection of the hypothesis that the 
elasticity of substitution between pensions and health insurance is zero.
It is important that the two separate investigations offer similar results 
about the effects of income and prices on the mix of total compensation, 
because these are the influences on fringe benefits that have changed 
most over the last 20 years. Also, it is through income and price effects 
that changes in tax policy make their mark on the mix of total 
compensation.
The two empirical analyses are in somewhat less agreement on the 
effects of other variables on the mix of compensation. Nevertheless, 
several findings in common emerge, and these can be summarized as 
follows.
(a) Older workers tend to receive a greater share of compensation as 
pensions, other things equal. But our empirical work is inconclusive 
about whether older workers receive more or less health insurance, 
other things equal.
(b) Blue-collar workers tend to receive a greater share of compensa-
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tion as pensions, other things equal. But again, our empirical work is 
inconclusive about whether blue-collar workers receive more or less 
health insurance.
(c) Greater firm-specific skill increases the pension share of total 
compensation, and has a greater positive effect on pensions than on 
health insurance. This finding strongly supports the so-called agency 
hypothesis that employers use deferred compensation such as pen 
sions to create a bond between the firm and workers who have skills that 
can be acquired only through tenure with the firm.
(d) When we define the unit of observation as the household (as we are 
able to do in one of our investigations), we find that women receive a 
smaller share of their compensation as both pensions and health insur 
ance, other things equal. This finding suggests the importance of includ 
ing fringe benefits in future analyses of earnings differences between 
men and women. It also may imply that women tend to rely on the fringe 
benefits of other household members.
(e) In contrast to previous findings, our findings on the relationship 
between establishment size and the mix of compensation suggest that 
firm size plays a limited role in the provision of fringe benefits. This 
surprising finding suggests that the positive relationship between firm 
size and fringe benefit provision found in previous studies may be the 
result of an inability to control fully for income, tax-price, and other 
influences, and also suggests the importance of further research on the 
relationship between firm size and benefit provision.
Policy Simulations
In chapter 4, we report simulations of the effects on compensation of 
three alternative changes in tax policy: (a) the 1986 tax reform; (b) 
treating employer contributions to health insurance as taxable income 
(both a policy of taxing all health insurance contributions, and a policy 
of taxing only contributions over $1,125 annually); and (c) treating all 
employer contributions to both pensions and health insurance as taxable
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income. These simulations are based on the modeling and estimation 
reported in chapters 3 and 4.
Effects of Policy Changes on Compensation
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 summarize the effects of the policy changes on 
compensation. Table 5.1 shows how each of the four simulated policy 
changes would have altered real expenditures on each form of compen 
sation and compensation shares if the policies had been in effect during 
1969 through 1982. All effects are shown in percentage terms, averaged 
over the 1969-1982 period. Panel A shows the total effects of the policy 
changes that is, the sum of the substitution, ordinary income, and 
extra income effects. Panel B isolates the substitution effects of each 
policy change that is, the effect of each policy if only the change in tax- 
price implied by each were to occur (and if real total compensation and 
all other independent variables were held constant).
In contrast, table 5.2 shows our estimates of how each policy change 
would affect real expenditures on compensation and compensation 
shares if enacted under the existing tax system. (Note that the 1986 tax 
reform is not shown in table 5.2 because comparison of each policy 
change is with respect to the tax system implied by the 1986 reform.) 
Again, all changes are shown in percentage terms, and Panel A shows 
the total effects of each policy change, whereas Panel B shows the 
substitution effects.
1. Effects of the 1986 Tax Reform. Our simulations suggest the 
following effects of the 1986 tax reform (see table 5.1). First, and most 
important, the tax reform can be expected to lead to significant increases 
in real expenditures and the share of compensation taken as health 
insurance. This increase in health insurance occurs in spite of the 
reduced incentive to receive compensation as health insurance that 
results from lower marginal tax rates on wages (that is, in spite of a 
negative substitution effect). The increase in health insurance is at 
tributable to the large income effects of the tax reform.
Table 5.1 Summary of Effects of Policy Changes on Fringe Benefit Provision: 
Average Percentage Changes Under Tax Systems Existing 1969-1982
Panel A: Total Effects
Health 
Policy Wages Pensions Insurance
Panel B: Substitution Effects
Health 
Policy Wages Pensions Insurance
Effects of 1986 Tax Reform on:
Real Expenditures 9.4 0.9 10.4 
Compensation Shares  0.3  1.4 7.7
Effects of Taxing Health Insurance Contributions on: 
Real Expenditures -1.8 -5.8 -22.3 
Compensation Shares 0.2  4.7 2.2
Effects of Low Tax Cap on Health Insurance on: 
Real Expenditures -0.4 -2.6 -13.9 
Compensation Shares 0.1 -1.8 0.7
Effects of Taxing All Benefits on: 
Real Expenditures -0.8 -64.1 -27.9 
Compensation Shares 3.0 -53.9 -2.4
Effects of 1986 Tax Reform on:
Real Expenditures 1.6 -18.5 -6.1 
Compensation Shares 0.7  13.1 0.7
Effects of Taxing Health Insurance Contributions on: 
Real Expenditures 1.0 2.8 -16.9 
Compensation-Shares  0.2 -0.6 4.6
Effects of Low Tax Cap on Health Insurance on: 
Real Expenditures 0.7 1.6  11.3 
Compensation Shares  0.1  0.4 1.8
Effects of Taxing All Benefits on: 
Real Expenditures 4.3 -53.9 -18.2 
Compensation Shares 2.4  46.1 2.4
SOURCES: Tables 4.1, 4.5, 4.10, and 4.12.
NOTES: The figures show how replacing the tax systems in effect during 1969 through 1982 with the specified tax-policy changes would have changed real 
expenditures on compensation and shares of compensation. Changes are shown in annual percentage terms, averaged over the 14 years. The total effects show 
the sum of the substitution, ordinary income, and extra income effects. The substitution effects isolate the impact of the changing tax-price of wages, pensions, 
and health insurance implied by each policy change.
Table 5.2 Summary of Effects of Policy Changes on Fringe Benefit Provision: 
Average Percentage Changes under 1986 Tax Reform
Panel A: Total Effects
Health 
Policy Wages Pensions Insurance
Panel B: Substitution Effects
Health 
Policy Wages Pensions Insurance
Ul
ON
Effects of Taxing Health Insurance Contributions on:
Real Expenditures -0.7 -4.3 -14.7 
Compensation Shares 0.1  3.7 1.8 
Effects of Low Tax Cap on Health Insurance on:
Effects of Taxing Health Insurance Contributions on:
Real Expenditures 0.7 0.1 -11.9 
Compensation Shares -0.1 -1.5 3.1 



































SOURCES: Tables 4.6, 4.11, and 4.13.
NOTES: The figures show how the specified tax-policy changes under the 1986 tax reform would change real expenditures on compensation and shares of 
compensation. The total effects show the sum of the substitution, ordinary income, and extra income effects. The substitution effects isolate the impact of the 
changing tax-price of wages, pensions, and health insurance implied by each policy change.
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Second, the 1986 tax reform will shift the mix of compensation away 
from pensions and toward health insurance.
Our basic predictions that the reform will (a) increase real expendi 
tures on health insurance and the share of compensation taken as 
health insurance, and (b) shift the mix of compensation away from 
pensions and toward health insurance can be explained by noting three 
points. First, as already noted, the tax reform has large income effects 
that increase the demand for health insurance. Second, the demand for 
health insurance contributions is inelastic, or unresponsive to changes 
in tax-prices. Hence, raising the tax-price of health insurance will 
increase the share of compensation received as health insurance. 
Third, workers are very willing to substitute back and forth between 
pensions and wages. That is, the demand for pensions is highly 
elastic, or responsive to changes in tax-prices. It follows that raising 
the tax-price of pensions will reduce real expenditures on pension 
compensation.
The results of simulating the 1986 tax reform are troubling because 
they suggest that it will be difficult to bring down health insurance 
expenditures or the health insurance share of compensation. Indeed, 
because the 1986 tax reform entailed such large income effects, it has 
likely been an underlying cause of recent increases in the demand for 
health insurance, even though it has reduced the tax incentives to 
demand health insurance.
2. Effects of Taxing Health Insurance Contributions . Our simulations 
suggest that treating all health insurance contributions as taxable income 
would have a strong effect on the provision of health insurance by 
employers. Taxing health insurance during the 1969-1982 period would 
have reduced real expenditures on employer-provided health insurance 
by over 22 percent (table 5.1), and taxing health insurance under the 
current system could be expected to reduce real expenditures on em 
ployer-provided health insurance by nearly 15 percent (table 5.2).
Similarly, taxing health insurance contributions in excess of $1,125 
annually (in 1982 dollars) would substantially reduce real expenditures 
on employer-provided health insurance. Such a policy during the 1969-
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1982 period would have reduced real expenditures on health insurance 
by nearly 14 percent (table 5.1), and doing so under the current tax 
system would reduce real expenditures on health insurance by nearly 9 
percent (table 5.2).
An apparent side effect of taxing health insurance contributions would 
be a reduction in real expenditures on wages and pensions provided by 
employers. These decreases result because taxing health insurance 
would reduce real incomes, which would lead in turn to reductions in 
both wages and pensions. Although neither reduction would be enor 
mous, the decrease in pension provision should be considered in any 
public discussion of the merits of taxing health insurance, and ways of 
offsetting the decrease might be considered if it were viewed as 
undesirable.
3. Effects of Taxing All Fringe Benefit Contributions. Our simula 
tions imply that treating all employer contributions to pensions and 
health insurance as taxable income would dramatically reduce the 
provision of both pensions and health insurance. Taxing all fringe 
benefits would have cut pension provision by 64 percent during the 
1969-1982 period, and would cut pensions nearly in half under the 
current tax system. Health insurance would have been reduced by nearly 
14 percent during the 1969-1982 period, and would fall by 20 percent 
under the current system. These results suggest that reforming the tax 
system to include employer contributions to both pensions and health 
insurance as taxable income would be politically difficult.
Another consequence of taxing all fringe benefits would be a major 
shift in the mix of compensation away from pensions and health insur 
ance and toward wages. The share of compensation received as pensions 
would be most affected-our simulations suggest a decrease in the 
pension share of nearly 40 percent.
Pensions are devastated by taxing all fringe benefits, but health 
insurance is cut by only 20 percent, for a simple reason: Pensions and 
wages are better substitutes than are health insurance and wages. It 
follows that when pensions are taxed, workers are readily willing to
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substitute wages for pensions, but less willing to substitute wages for 
health insurance.
Effects of Policy Changes on Revenues
Appendix table A4.1 shows how each tax policy change considered 
would alter revenues collected under the federal personal income tax. 
All changes are in percentage terms, and the table shows both aggregate 
revenue effects and the effects on the tax bill of the average worker in 
low-wage, medium-wage, and high-wage industries. (We consider these 
industry disaggregations under "Distributional Effects" below.)
The 1986 tax reform is predicted to decrease revenues from the 
federal personal income tax by over 21 percent (top panel of table 
A4.1). Interestingly, this revenue loss could be nearly recouped by 
taxing all fringe benefits the simulations suggest that taxing all fringe 
benefits under the current system would increase revenues by 17.6 
percent (bottom right panel of table A4.1).
The simulated revenue effects of taxing only employer contributions 
to health insurance are less dramatic, but appear substantial neverthe 
less. Taxing all health insurance contributions under the current system 
would increase income tax revenues by over 8 percent annually. Taxing 
health contributions over $1,125 would increase income tax revenues by 
1.5 percent.
Distributional Effects of the Policy Changes
The distributional effects of the tax policy changes can be seen in two 
ways. Table A4.1 shows the effect of each policy change on the tax bill of 
the average worker in low-wage, medium-wage, and high-wage indus 
tries. Table 5.3 disaggregates the total effects of each policy change 
into effects on workers in low-wage, medium-wage, and high-wage 
industries.
The simulations suggest that the effects of the 1986 tax reform are 
roughly proportional across industries. Both the revenue effects and the
Table 5.3 Effects of Policy Changes on Real Expenditures on Components of Compensation, by Industry Group £
Panel A: Average Percentage Changes Under lax Systems Existing 
1969-1982
Health 
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SOURCES: Tables 4.1, 4.5, 4.6, 4.10, 4.11, 4.12, and 4.13.
NOTES: The figures show how the specified tax policy changes would alter real expenditures on compensation. Panel A shows changes under the tax 
systems in effect during 1969-1982. Panel B shows changes under the current tax system. All changes are total effects (sum of substitution, ordinary income, 
and extra income effects) in annual percentage terms.
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effects of the reform on compensation appear to be similar across 
industries.
Similarly, the distributional effects of taxing all health insurance 
contributions are not dramatic. Workers in low-wage industries would 
experience somewhat smaller decreases in wages and health insurance 
than workers in high-wage industries. Also, workers in high-wage 
industries would experience somewhat larger increases in their income 
tax bills. But the differences among the three groups of workers are not 
great.
In contrast, the distributional effects of taxing health insurance contri 
butions over $1,125 are significant. Under the low tax cap, workers in 
high-wage industries would experience a 13.5 percent decrease in health 
insurance, whereas workers in low- and medium-wage industries would 
experience a decrease of only 2 to 5 percent. Also, the income taxes of 
workers in high-wage industries would rise by over 4 percent, whereas 
the income taxes of other workers would rise by less than 1 percent. We 
conclude that a low tax cap on health insurance has distributional effects 
that would increase income equality.
Similarly, the simulations suggest that taxing all health insurance 
contributions would tend to increase income equality. Workers in low- 
wage industries would experience income tax increases of 14 to 15 
percent, whereas workers in high-wage industries would experience tax 
increases of nearly 26 percent.
Implications for Public Policy
A multitude of public policy issues currently surround the tax treat 
ment of employee benefits. In particular, the tax-favored status of 
employer contributions to pensions and health insurance has been 
blamed for numerous ills: a shrinking tax base that has exacerbated the 
federal budget deficit; an inefficient and bloated health care sector, 
overinsurance by many recipients of employer-provided health insur 
ance, and rising health care costs; and a tax system that is made more
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regressive because those who receive tax-favored fringe benefits tend to 
be in higher-income households than those who do not.
In addition to being held responsible for these perceived ills, the 
tax-favored status of fringe benefits is implicitly blamed for failing to 
solve completely the problems one would expect it to address. Why do 
some workers still lack health insurance coverage? Why do many 
lack private pensions? Why, if tax-favored treatment of pension contri 
butions is responsible for the growth of private pensions, is the rate of 
private saving in the United States nevertheless so low by international 
standards?
Some Options
Policies suggested to deal with these perceived problems have often 
addressed one problem without handling another. Two such proposals 
are (1) taxing all employer contributions to pensions and health insur 
ance, and (2) requiring employers to provide some minimum level of 
health insurance to all employees mandated health benefits. We dis 
cuss each in turn.
1. Taxing All Fringe Benefit Contributions. We suggest that the 
taxation of all employee benefits is too sweeping a policy change to 
implement in the foreseeable future. Our estimates suggest that taxing 
all employer contributions would cut in half employer contributions to 
private pension plans. Perhaps the simplest implication of this finding is 
that a policy of taxing all fringe benefits would be politically difficult to 
implement.
Even if it were not a politically difficult option, our findings suggest 
that taxing all benefits would dramatically reduce retirement saving 
through the private pension system, and it is not at all clear that this 
would be desirable. First, the U.S. economy has a low rate of private 
saving by international standards, and a policy that would further reduce 
private saving would be counter to the goal of long-run economic growth 
(Seidman 1990). Second, taxing all benefits would, by cutting in half the 
size of private pension contributions, place on the public retirement
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system an increased long-run burden. If policy makers wish to tax 
pension contributions, they must in turn be willing either to increase the 
size of the social security system, or to see the income replacement rates 
of retirees fall substantially. Neither of these alternatives seems desir 
able or easy to defend.
In short, because its effects on the private pension system appear to be 
so dramatic, the policy of taxing all fringe benefits seems both politi 
cally infeasible and economically unwise.
2. Mandated Benefits. The idea of mandating health benefits has 
recently caught the attention of the public and many policymakers. A 
full treatment of mandated health benefits is beyond the scope of this 
discussion, but three points should be made. First, discussions of 
mandated benefits often seem to imply that mandating would do away 
with the problem of uninsured individuals, when of course mandating 
would only do away with the problem of uninsured workers. It follows 
that mandated health insurance is an incomplete policy that would need 
to be supplemented by a large and expensive public program of health 
care provision to individuals who would remain uninsured. Only rarely 
have advocates of mandated health insurance clearly specified the nature 
of the problem posed by the uninsured, or clearly delineated who would 
and who would not benefit from mandated benefits (but see Goddeeris 
1991). The degree to which mandating would be an efficient way of 
solving the social problem posed by uninsured individuals is largely an 
unanswered question.
Second, the effects of mandated benefits on labor markets, especially 
low-wage labor markets, have yet to be examined in any systematic way. 
It seems likely that mandated benefits could have the same adverse 
effects on employment of low-wage workers as a large increase in the 
minimum wage, but the needed research on this question does not exist.
Third, mandating health care benefits could contribute to further 
increases in health care costs, and further inefficient use of the health 
care system. The reason is that, to the extent mandating is successful in 
extending health insurance to currently uninsured workers and house 
holds, it would increase use of the health care system. In part, such an
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increase would be desirable, but (depending on the package of benefits 
mandated) it is also possible that further overuse of health services 
would result.
We conclude that the case for mandating health insurance benefits is 
far from clear-cut at this time. Too little research, either theoretical or 
empirical, has been conducted to offer a well-reasoned judgement. 
What is clear is that mandating benefits, like the favorable tax treatment 
of health insurance contributions, may create its own set of problems 
without providing a complete solution to the problems it is intended to 
address.
A Proposal for Marginal Change
We believe that a relatively low tax cap on health insurance contribu 
tions would be a sensible and efficiency-improving policy. A policy of 
taxing employer contributions to health insurance in excess of a rela 
tively low amount ($1,125 annually, for example, as simulated in chap 
ter 4) has at least five points in its favor.
First, it partially addresses the problems of rising health care costs, 
overuse of the health care system, and an inefficiently large health care 
sector. It does so by reducing the incentive for employers to provide 
compensation in the form of health insurance beyond a given level. As a 
result, the health insurance provided by employers would be more likely 
to be true insurance against large and unexpected health expenses, 
rather than simply a tax subsidy to consumption of health care services 
that are regular and predictable.
Second, a low tax cap on health insurance addresses the concern that 
the tax base will continue to be eroded as health care costs rise, and as 
employer contributions to health insurance increase. Many predictions, 
including ours, suggest that employer contributions to health insurance 
will continue to rise in real terms. By limiting the extent to which 
employer contributions to health insurance are excluded from the tax 
base, erosion of the tax base would be halted.
Third, a low tax cap on health insurance would not limit or reduce 
access to basic health care by any currently insured or potentially
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insurable worker. It would likely reduce the degree to which workers 
who are currently overinsured consume health care services. That is, it 
would tend to reduce the provision by employers of extremely generous 
insurance that covers regular and predictable health care (Phelps 1984- 
85). But again, the low tax cap would be unlikely to reduce workers' 
coverage by employer-provided major medical insurance.
Fourth, in reducing the provision of health insurance for regular and 
predictable health care, the low tax cap would imply an improvement in 
the equity of the tax system. Our simulations suggest strongly that a low 
tax cap on health insurance contributions would have a favorable dis 
tributional impact. Because workers who have the highest total compen 
sation tend to be covered by the most generous employer-provided 
health insurance, taxing health contributions over a specified maximum 
would be a progressive tax measure.
Fifth, a low tax cap on health insurance contributions would not 
foreclose the option of mandating health insurance benefits, should 
policy makers choose to pursue mandating. If all health insurance con 
tributions were taxed, it would be extremely awkward to mandate health 
insurance coverage because the two policies would tend to work at cross 
purposes. Taxing benefits above the mandated level would not pose this 
problem, however. Essentially, a policy of mandating with taxation of 
benefits over a specified level could be viewed as a statement of what 
level of health insurance benefits is in the public interest. But again, the 
case for mandating health insurance is not clear-cut at present.
In short, a low tax cap on health insurance contributions would tend to 
alleviate each of the perceived problems outlined above without exacer 
bating other problems or shutting out other policy options. Accordingly, 
we believe the low tax cap to be a sensible and economically sound 
policy, and would urge its adoption.

References
Adamache, Killard W. and Frank A. Sloan. "Fringe Benefits: To Tax or Not to 
Tax?" National Tax Journal 38 (March 1985): 47-64.
Alien, Steven G. and Robert L. Clark. "Pensions and Firm Performance." 
In Human Resources and the Performance of the Firm, edited by Morris 
M. Kleiner, Richard N. Block, Myron Roomkin, and Sidney W. Sals- 
burg. Madison, WI: Industrial Relations Research Association, 1987. 
Pp. 195-242.
Alpert, William T. "Unions and Private Wage Supplements." Journal of Labor 
Research 3 (Spring 1982): 179-199.
Alpert, William T. "Manufacturing Workers' Private Wage Supplements: A 
Simultaneous Equations Approach. "Applied Economics 15 (June 1983): 
363-378.
Alpert, William T. "An Analysis of Fringe Benefits Using Time Series Data." 
Applied Economics 19 (January 1987): 1-16.
Anderson, Gordon and Richard Blundell. "Testing Restrictions in a Flexible 
Dynamic Demand System." Review of Economic Studies 50 (July 1983): 
397-410.
Anderson, Gordon and Richard Blundell. "Consumer Non-Durables in the 
U.K.: A Dynamic Demand System." Economic Journal 94 (Supplement 
1984): 35-44.
Anderson, Richard G. and Jerry G. Thursby. "Confidence Intervals for Elas 
ticity Estimators in Translog Models." Review of Economics and Statis 
tics 68 (November 1986): 647-656.
Antos, Joseph R. "Wages and Compensation of White-Collar Workers." BLS 
Working Paper 123, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of 
Labor, Washington, D.C., 1981.
Antos, Joseph R. "Analysis of Labor Cost: Data Concepts and Sources." In The 
Measurement of Labor Cost, edited by Jack E. Triplet!. Chicago: Univer 
sity of Chicago Press and NBER, 1983. Pp. 153-172.
Atrostic, B.K. "Comment on Leibowitz." In The Measurement of Labor Cost, 
edited by Jack E. Triplett. Chicago: University of Chicago Press and 
NBER, 1983. Pp. 389-394.
167
168 Tax Treatment of Fringe Benefits
Atrostic, B. K. and Len Burman. "Report to the Congress on Certain Employee 
Benefits Not Subject to Federal Income Tax." Office of Tax Analysis, 
U.S. Department of the Treasury, June 1988.
Bell, David N. F. and Robert A. Hart. "Effort, Worker Quality, Wage Rates, and 
Firm-Specific Training." Discussion Paper, Department of Economics, 
University of Stirling, 1990.
Birnbaum, Jeffrey H. "Revenue Hunt: With Tax-Rise Talk Reviving, Legisla 
tors Line Up Candidates." Wall Street Journal, January 6, 1989, p. 1.
Burkhauser, Richard V. and John A. Turner. "Is the Social Security Payroll Tax a 
Tax?" Public Finance Quarterly 13 (July 1985): 253-267.
Burtless, Gary and Jerry A. Hausman. 'The Effect of Taxation on Labor 
Supply: Evaluating the Gary Negative Income Tax Experiment. "Journal 
of Political Economy 86 (December 1978): 1103-1130.
Cantor, J. C. National Medical Care Expenditure Survey Health Insurance/ 
Employer Survey Data: Person Record Public Use Tape Documentation 
for Premium Data and Benefit Data. Rockville, MD: National Center for 
Health Services Research and Health Care Technology Assessment, 
1986.
Chollet, Deborah J. Employer-Provided Health Benefits. Washington, D.C.: 
Employee Benefits Research Institute, 1984.
Christensen, Laurits R. and Marilyn E. Manser. "Cost-of-Living Indexes and 
Price Indexes for U.S. Meat and Produce, 1947-1971." In Household 
Production and Consumption, edited by Nestor E. Terleckyj. New York: 
Columbia University Press and NBER, 1976. Pp. 399-446.
Christensen, Laurits R. and Marilyn E. Manser. "Estimating U.S. Consumer 
Preferences for Meat with a Flexible Utility Function. "Journal of Econo 
metrics 5 (January 1977): 37-53.
Congressional Budget Office. Tax Policy for Pensions and Other Retirement 
Saving. Washington, D.C.: Congress of the United States, Congressional 
Budget Office, April 1987.
Deaton, Angus and John Muellbauer. 1980a. "An Almost Ideal Demand 
System." American Economic Review 70 (June 1980): 312-326.
Deaton, Angus and John Muellbauer. 1980b. Economics and Consumer Behav 
ior. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980.
Feldstein, Martin S. 'The Welfare Loss of Excess Health Insurance." Journal of 
Political Economy SI (March/April 1973): 251-280.
Freeman, Richard B. "The Effects of Unionism on Fringe Benefits." Industrial 
and Labor Relations Review 34 (July 1981): 489-509.
Goddeeris, John H. "Universal Health Insurance Through Combining Ex 
panded Private Coverage with Public Programs." In Improving 
Access to Health Care: What Can the States Do? edited by S. E.
References 169
Berki, John H. Goddeeris, and Andrew J. Hogan. Kalamazoo, 
MI: W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 1991. 
Forthcoming.
Goldstein, Gerald S. and Mark V. Pauly. "Group Health Insurance as a Local 
Public Good." In The Role of Health Insurance in the Health Services 
Sector, edited by Richard N. Rosett. New York: Columbia University 
Press and NBER, 1976. Pp. 73-110.
Gordon, Roger H. "Social Security and Labor Supply Incentives." Contempo 
rary Policy Issues (April 1983): 16-22.
Grant, James H. and Daniel S. Hamermesh. "Labor Market Competition 
Among Youths, White Women, and Others." Review of Economics and 
Statistics 63 (August 1981): 354-360.
Greenberg, Edward, Walker A. Pollard, and William T. Alpert. "Statistical 
Properties of Data Stretching." Journal of Applied Econometrics 4 
(October-December 1989): 383-391.
Griliches, Zvi. "Hedonic Price Indexes for Automobiles: An Econometric 
Analysis of Quality Change." In Price Indexes and Quality Change, 
edited by Zvi Griliches. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971. 
Pp. 55-87.
Hall, Robert E. "Wages, Income, and Hours of Work in the U.S. Labor Force." 
In Income Maintenance and Labor Supply, edited by Glen G. Cain and 
Harold W. Watts. New York: Academic Press, 1973. Pp. 102-162.
Hamermesh, Daniel S. "New Measures of Labor Cost: Implications for De 
mand Elasticities and Nominal Wage Growth." In The Measurement of 
Labor Cost, edited by Jack E. Triplett. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press and NBER, 1983. Pp. 287-305.
Hamermesh, Daniel S. and Stephen A. Woodbury. 'Taxes, Fringe Benefits, and 
Faculty." Working Paper No. 3455, National Bureau of Economic Re 
search, September 1990.
Hart, Robert A. The Economics of Non-Wage Labour Costs. London: George 
Alien and Unwin, 1984.
Hart, Robert A., David N. F. Bell, Rudolf Frees, Seiichi Kawasaki, and 
Stephen A. Woodbury. Trends in Non-Wage Labor Costs and Their 
Effects on Employment. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of 
the European Communities, 1988.
Hausman, Jerry A. "The Econometrics of Nonlinear Budget Sets." Econo- 
metrica 53 (November 1985): 1255-1282.
Holmer, Martin. "Tax Policy and the Demand for Health Insurance." Journal of 
Health Economics 3 (December 1984): 203-221.
Johnston, J. Econometric Methods, third edition. New York: McGraw-Hill, 
1984.
170 Tax Treatment of Fringe Benefits
Kang, Suk. Estimation of an Almost Ideal Demand System from Panel Data. 
Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1983.
Kasper, Judith A., Louis F. Rossiter, and Renate Wilson. "A Summary of 
Expenditures and Sources of Payment for Personal Health Services from 
the National Medical Expenditure Survey." Data Preview 24, National 
Center for Health Services Research, Rockville, MD, May 1987.
Kasper, J. A., D. C. Walden, and R. Wilson. National Medical Care Expendi 
ture Survey Household Data: Person Records Documentation and Code- 
book. Rockville, MD: National Center for Health Services Research, 
1983.
Kmenta, Jan. Elements of Econometrics, second edition. New York: Mac- 
millan, 1986.
Korczyk, Sophie M. Retirement Security and Tax Policy. Washington, D.C.: 
Employee Benefit Research Institute, 1984.
Krinsky, Itzhak and A. Leslie Robb. "On Approximating the Statistical Proper 
ties of Elasticities." Review of Economics and Statistics 68 (November 
1986): 715-719.
Lau, Lawrence J., Wuu-Long Lin, and Pan A. Yotopoulos. "The Linear 
Logarithmic Expenditure System: An Application to Consumption- 
Leisure Choice." Econometrica 46 (July 1978): 843-868.
Lazear, Edward P. "Agency, Earnings Profiles, Productivity, and Hours Re 
strictions. " American Economic Review 71 (September 1981): 606-620.
Leibowitz, Arlene. "Fringe Benefits in Employee Compensation." In The 
Measurement of Labor Cost, edited by Jack E. Triplett, 1983. Pp. 371- 
389.
Lewbel, Arthur. "A Unified Approach to Incorporating Demographic or Other 
Effects into Demand Systems." Review of Economic Studies 52 (January 
1985): 1-18.
Long, James E. and Frank A. Scott. "The Income Tax and Nonwage Compen 
sation." Review of Economics and Statistics 64 (May 1982): 211-219.
Megdal, Sharon Bernstein. "The Econometrics of Piecewise-Linear Budget 
Constraints: A Monte Carlo Study." Journal of Business and Economic 
Statistics 5 (April 1987): 243-248.
Mellow, Wesley. "Employer Size, Unionism, and Wages." In Research in Labor 
Economics, Supplement 2: New Approaches to Unions, edited by Ronald 
G. Ehrenberg. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1983. Pp. 253-282.
Mitchell, Olivia S. "Employee Benefits in the U.S. Labor Market." In Proceed 
ings of the Fortieth Annual Meeting, Industrial Relations Research Asso 
ciation. Madison, WI: IRRA, 1988. Pp. 213-219.
References 171
Mitchell, Olivia S. and Emily S. Andrews. "Scale Economies in Private Multi- 
Employer Pension Systems." Industrial and Labor Relations Review 34 
(July 1981): 522-530.
Moffitt, Robert. "The Econometrics of Piecewise-Linear Budget Constraints: 
A Survey and Exposition of the Maximum Likelihood Method. "Journal 
of Business and Economic Statistics 4 (July 1986): 317-328.
Moffitt, Robert. "The Econometrics of Kinked Budget Constraints. "Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 4 (Spring 1990): 119-139.
Moulton, Brent R. "An Illustration of a Pitfall in Estimating the Effects of 
Aggregate Variables on Micro Units." Review of Economics and Statis 
tics 72 (May 1990): 334-338.
Mumy, Gene E. and William D. Manson. "The Relative Importance of Tax and 
Agency Incentives to Offer Pensions: A Test Using the Impact of 
ERISA." Public Finance Quarterly 13 (October 1985).
Munnell, Alicia H. "Employee Benefits and the Tax Base." New England 
Economic Review (January 1984): 39-55.
Munnell, Alicia H. "The Economic Effects of the Growth of Employer- 
Provided Fringe Benefits." In Distribution and Economics of Employer- 
Provided Fringe Benefits, Hearings before the Committee on Ways and 
Means, U.S. House of Representatives, September 17-18, 1984. Wash 
ington, D.C.: USGPO, 1985. Pp. 421-428.
Munnell, Alicia H. "Public versus Private Provision of Retirement Income. 
New England Economic Review (May/June 1988): 51-58.
Munnell, Alicia H. "It's Time to Tax Employee Benefits." In Proceedings of the 
Forty-First Annual Meeting, Industrial Relations Research Association. 
Madison, WI: IRRA, 1989. Pp. 374-386.
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. The Taxation of 
Fringe Benefits. Paris: OECD, 1988.
Parsons, Donald O. "Specific Human Capital: An Application to Quit Rates 
and Layoff Rates." Journal of Political Economy 80 (November/ 
December 1972): 1120-1143.
Pechman, Joseph A. Federal Tax Policy, third edition, fifth edition. Wash 
ington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1977, 1987.
Phelps, Charles E. "Taxing Health Insurance: How Much Is Enough?" Contem 
porary Policy Issues 3 (Winter 1984-85): 47-54.
Phlips, Louis. Applied Consumption Analysis, revised and enlarged edition. 
Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1982.
Pollak, Robert A. and Terence J. Wales. "Demographic Variables in Demand 
Analysis." Econometrica 49 (November 1981): 1533-1551.
Rice, Robert G. 1966a. An Analysis of Private Wage Supplements. Ph.D. 
Dissertation, Columbia University, 1966.
172 Tax Treatment of Fringe Benefits
Rice, Robert G. 1966b. "Skill, Earnings, and the Growth of Wage Supple 
ments." American Economic Review 56 (May 1966): 583-593.
Seidman, Laurence S. Saving for America's Economic Future. Armonk, NY: 
M. E. Sharpe, 1990.
Shephard, Ronald W. Theory of Cost and Productions. Princeton, NJ: Prince- 
ton University Press, 1970.
Sloan, Frank A. and Killard W. Adamache. "Taxation and the Growth of 
Nonwage Compensation." Public Finance Quarterly 14 (April 1986): 
115-137.
Smeeding, Timothy M. "The Size Distribution of Wage and Nonwage Compen 
sation: Employer Cost versus Employee Value." In The Measurement of 
Labor Cost, edited by Jack E. Triplett. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press and NBER, 1983. Pp. 237-277.
Smith, Robert S. and Ronald G. Ehrenberg. "Estimating Wage-Fringe Trade 
offs: Some Data Problems." In The Measurement of Labor Cost, edited 
by Jack E. Triplett. Chicago: University of Chicago Press and NBER, 
1983. Pp. 347-369.
Stafford, Frank. "Forestalling the Demise of Empirical Economics: The Role 
of Microdata in Labor Economics Research." In Handbook of Labor 
Economics, edited by Orley Ashenfelter and Richard Layard. Amster 
dam: North-Holland, 1986. Pp. 387-423.
Taylor, Amy K. and Gail R. Wilensky. 'The Effect of Tax Policies on Expendi 
tures for Private Health Insurance." In Market Reforms in Health Care, 
edited by Jack A. Meyer. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise In 
stitute, 1983. Pp. 163-184.
Theil, Henri. The System-Wide Approach to Microeconomics. Chicago: Uni 
versity of Chicago Press, 1980.
Toevs, Alden L. "Appropriate Variance Formulas for the Elasticities of Sub 
stitution Obtained from the Translog Production Functions." Economic 
Letters 5 (1980): 155-160.
Toevs, Alden L. "Appropriate Variance Formulas for the Elasticities of Sub 
stitution Obtained from the Translog Production Functions." Economic 
Letters 10(1982): 107-113.
Triplett, Jack E. "An Essay on Labor Cost." In The Measurement of Labor Cost, 
edited by Jack E. Triplett. Chicago: University of Chicago Press and 
NBER, 1983. Pp. 1-60.
Turner, Robert W. "Are Taxes Responsible for the Growth in Fringe Benefits?" 
National Tax Journal 40 (June 1987): 205-220.
Varian, Hal R. Intermediate Microeconomics. New York: W. W. Norton, 1987.
Vogel, Ronald J. 'The Tax Treatment of Health Insurance Premiums as a Cause 
of Overinsurance." In National Health Insurance, edited by Mark V.
References 173
Pauly. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1980. Pp.
220-249. 
Vroman, Susan and Gerard Anderson. "The Effects of Income Taxation on the
Demand for Employer-Provided Health Insurance." Applied Economics
16 (February 1984): 33-43. 
Wales, Terence J. "Estimation of a Labor Supply Curve for Self-Employed
Business Proprietors." International Economic Review 14 (February
1973): 69-80. 
Wales, Terence J. and Alan D. Woodland. "Labour Supply and Progressive
Taxes." Review of Economic Studies 46 (June 1979): 83-95. 
Wilensky, Gail R., Pamela J. Parley, and Amy K. Taylor. "Variations in Health
Insurance Coverage: Benefits vs. Premiums." Milbank Memorial Fund
Quarterly/Health and Society 62 (Winter 1984): 53-81. 
Woodbury, Stephen A. "Substitution Between Wage and Nonwage Benefits."
American Economic Review 73 (March 1983): 166-182. 
Woodbury, Stephen A. "Taxation and Employer-Provision of Fringe Benefits."
Paper presented at the Midwest Economics Association Annual Meeting,
Cincinnati, Ohio, March 28-30, 1985. 
Woodbury, Stephen A. and Douglas R. Bettinger. "The Decline of Fringe
Benefit Coverage in the 1980s." In Structural Changes in U.S. Labor
Markets in the 1980s: Causes and Consequences, edited by Randall W.
Eberts and Erica Groshen. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1991. Pp.
101-134. 
Woodbury, Stephen A. and Wei-Jang Huang. "The Slowing Growth of Fringe
Benefits." Paper presented at the Eastern Economic Association Annual
Convention, Boston, Massachusetts, March 10-12, 1988. 
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. 7970 Census of Popula 
tion: Subject Reports, Industrial Characteristics. Washington, D.C.:
USGPO, 1972. Table 32.
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. 1980 Census of Popula 
tion: Detailed Population Characteristics, United States Summary.
Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1982. Table 289. 
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. County Business
Patterns (Annual): United States. Washington, D.C.: USGPO, various
years. 
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. The National
Income and Product Accounts of the United States, 1929-82, Statistical
Tables. Washington, D.C.: USGPO, September 1986. 
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. Survey of
Current Business, various July issues.
174 Tax Treatment of Fringe Benefits
U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. Employment and
Earnings. Washington, D.C.: USGPO, various March issues. Tables B-2
and B-3. 
U.S. Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service. Statistics of
Income 1977, Individual Income Tax Returns. Washington, D.C.:
USGPO, 1979.
INDEX
Adamache, Killard W., 2, 3, 5, 7n4, 10, 44, 59, 122, 147n6
Agency hypothesis, 47-48
Alien, Steven G., 48
Alpert, William T., 2, 3, 10, 59, 60, 67, 75, 94nl5
Anderson, Gerard, 2-3, 147nl
Anderson, Gordon, 21, 37-38n9
Anderson, Richard B., 31
Andrews, Emily S., 47
Antos, Joseph R., 39, 59
Atrostic, B. K., 2, 3, 6n2, 39
Bell, David N. F., 7n5, 26 
Bettinger, Douglas R., 45 
Birnbaum, Jeffrey H., 136 
Blundell, Richard, 21, 37-38n9 
Burkhauser, Richard V., 44 
Burman, Len, 6n2 
Burtless, Gary, 30
Cantor, J. C., 87
Chollet, Deborah J., 6n3
Christiansen, Laurits R., 24
Clark, Robert L., 48
Compensation package: constraints on mix in, 9; definition of total, 45-46; effect of income and 
price on mix of, 152; effects of 1986 Tax Reform on, 119-21; equations in model for price 
and demand for, 33-34, 40-41, 43-45; inverse of rates of exchange for, 24; model for tradeoffs 
within mix of, 10-12; prices of components of, 24-27, 32-34; relative prices of, 14, 24, 25-27; 
simulation of real expenditures for, 100-101; worker preference for mix of, 20, 32, 37nl, 
149-50; See also Demand system; Fringe benefit package; Health insurance benefits; Pension 
benefits
Congressional Budget Office, 6n2
Consumer cost function, 19-20
Consumer theory: implications and predictions of, 23-24, 100, 123; literature of, 9-10
Current Population Survey data, 39, 59-61, 151
Data sources: EEEC data base, 6, 39-40, 50, 58-61, 83-84, 151; for estimating demand for fringe 
benefits, 39-40; NIPA data series, 6, 39-40, 42-43, 83-84, 151; NMCES data, 39, 59-61
Deaton, Angus, 10, 19-22, 33, 150
Deaton-Muellbauer Almost Ideal Demand System, 21-22, 30, 33, 35, 150
Demand system model: comparison of result of two estimates, 78-84; equations and variables for 
estimating, 24-25, 33-34, 40-41, 46; equations and variables using EEEC data, 61-68; nota 
tion for, 35-37; results using EEEC data, 68-78; results using NIPA data, 48-58
Duality theory, 19




Elasticities of demand: computation of, 30-31; confidence intervals for, 31-32; estimates of, 17-18 
Elasticity of substitution: among wages, pensions, and health insurance, 15-17, 152; estimates
for, 18 
Employer contributions: effect of fringe benefit taxation of, 144-45; simulation of health insurance
tax cap effect, 132-34; simulation of health insurance tax effect, 123-32; taxation of pension
and health insurance, 2, 121-22, 135-36; tax exclusion for, 1; See also Fringe benefits; Health
insurance benefits; Pension benefits
Parley, Pamela J., 89
Feldstein, Martin, 2, 121
Freeman, Richard B., 10, 59, 75
Frees, Rudolf, 7n5
Fringe benefits: comparison of demand estimate analyses, 78-84; cost to employer of, 15-16; 
determination of, 9; estimates of demand using EEEC data, 58-78; estimates of demand us 
ing NIPA data, 40-58; simulation of taxation of contributions to, 137-44; as substitute for 
wages, 1; See also Fringe benefit package; Health insurance benefits; Pension plans; Retire 
ment income
Fringe benefits package: ideal and existing data sets for, 39-40; model for provision of, 5-6; 
tradeoffs within, 25-27
Goddeeris, John H., 163 
Goldstein, Gerald S., 3 
Gordon, Roger H., 44 
Grant, James H., 31 
Greenberg, Edward, 60 
Griliches, Zvi, 85-86
Hall, Robert E., 28
Hamermesh, Daniel S., 2, 3, 31, 39, 45, 82
Hart, Robert A., 7n5, 26
Hausman, Jerry A., 30
Health insurance: effect of taxing contributions to, 123-35; effect of 1986 tax reform on spending
for, 119-21; elasticity of demand for, 152; hedonic price index for, 85-93; proposed tax cap
on contributions for, 122-23; recommendation for tax policy for, 164-65; simulation of tax
effect for, 123 
Health insurance benefits: effect of 1986 Tax Reform Act on expenditures for, 119-21; employer's
cost for, 16
Hedonic price index (health insurance), 85-93 
Holmer, Martin, 2 
Huang, Wei-Jang, 2, 3, 4, 136 
Human capital, firm-specific: control for level of, 47-48; proxy for level of, 67
Income tax, corporation, 107-8 
Johnston, J., 46
Kang, Suk, 21 
Kasper, J. A., 6nl, 87 
Kawasaki, Seiichi, 7n5
177
Kmenta, Jan, 32 
Korczak, Sophie M., 6-7n3 
Krinsky, Itshak, 31
Lau, Lawrence J., 22
Lazear, Edward, 26, 47
Leibowitz, Arlene, 2, 3
Lewbel, Arthur, 22
Lin, Wuu-Long, 22
Long, James E., 2, 3, 48, 57, 94nl5
Manser, Marilyn, 24
Manson, William D., 3, 26, 48
Megdal, Sharon B., 30
Mellow, Wesley, 82
Mitchell, Olivia S., 6n2, 47
Moffitt, Robert, 30
Moulton, Brent R., 60
Muellbauer, John, 10, 19-22, 33, 150
Mumy, Gene E., 3, 26, 48
Munnell, Alicia, 2, 136
National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) data series, 6, 39-40, 42-43, 83-84, 87-90, 151 
National Medical Care Expenditure Survey (NMCES) data, 39, 59-61 
NIPA. See National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) data series 
NMCES, National Medical Care Expenditure Survey (NMCES) data
Old Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI), 136
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 6-7n3
Parsons, Donald O., 48
Pauly, Mark V., 3
Pechman, Joseph, 62, 108
Pension benefits: computation of compensation share as, 45-46; effect of 1986 Tax Reform Act
on, 120; elasticity of demand for, 120, 152; employer's cost for, 16; taxation of employer
contribution to, 136
Pension system, private: criticism of, 2, 136; size and delivery of, 1 
Pension system, public. See Old Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) 
Phelps, Charles E., 5, 7n4, 122, 147n6, 165 
Phlips, Louis, 10 
Pollak, Robert A., 22 
Pollard, Walker A., 60 
Preferences, worker: for compensation package mix, 20, 32, 37nl, 149-50; employer attention to,
9-10; with fixed quantity of wage benefits, 15-16; for pension and wage benefits, 12-14 
Public policy: issues in tax treatment of fringe benefits, 161-62; options for tax treatment of
fringe benefits, 162-64
Rice, Robert G., 2, 3 
Robb, A. Leslie, 31 
Rossiter, Louis F., 6nl
178
Scott, Frank A., 2, 3, 48, 57, 94nl5 
Seidman, Laurence S., 136, 162 
Shephard, Ronald W., 20
Sloan, Frank A., 2, 3, 5, 7n4, 10, 44, 59, 122, 147n6 
Smeeding, Timothy M., 10 
Smith, Robert S., 39
SMSAs. See Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs) 
Stafford, Frank, 42
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs), 76
Survey of Employer Expenditures for Employee Compensation (EEEC) data base, 6, 39-40, 50, 
58-61, 83-84, 90-93, 151
Tax policy: decomposition of simulated effects of, 105-7; effect on compensation of changes in, 
154-59; effect on revenues of changes in, 159-61; recommendation for, 164-65; simulated 
comparisons of, 101-4; simulation of effect of changes in, 6, 97-100, 103-4
Tax Reform Act (1986): burden for corporate income tax under, 107-8; effect on income of, 120-21; 
simulated effects of, 109-19; simulation process for, 108-9
Tax system: incentives for health and pension plans of, 1-2; incentives for private fringe benefits, 1
Taylor, Amy K., 2, 3, 5, 7n4, 89, 122, 123, 132
Theil, Henri, 10
Thursby, Jerry G., 31
Toevs, Alden L., 31
Triplett, jack, 10
Turner, John A., 44, 45
Turner, Robert W., 2, 3
U. S. Department of Commerce: Bureau of Economic Analysis, 6nl, 27, 39, 43, 85, 151; Bureau
of the Census, 47
U. S. Department of Labor (DOL), Bureau of Labor Statistics, 47 
U.S. Department of the Treasury, 62, 63 
Utility functions: See also Consumer cost function 
Utility functions, direct and indirect, 18-19; See also Consumer cost function
Varian, Hal, 147n2 
Vogel, Ronald J., 2, 121 
Vroman, Susan, 2, 3, 147nl
Wage benefits: effect of 1986 Tax Reform Act on expenditures for, 119-20; inelasticity of demand 
for, 152; price relative to pension benefits of, 25-27; substitute of fringe benefits for, 1; tradeoff 
with fringe benefits of, 12-16
Walden, D. C., 87
Wales, Terence J., 22, 28, 30, 37n8
Wilensky, Gail R., 2, 3, 5, 7n4, 89, 122, 123, 132
Wilson, Renate, 6nl, 87
Woodbury, Stephen A., 2, 3, 4, 7n5, 10, 19, 45, 57, 82, 136
Woodland, Alan D., 30, 37n8




Ix V V V Ix
WE UPJOHN
INSTITUTE 0-88099-108-9
